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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation contains three empirical studies linking analyst recommendations to investor 
attention related biases and information processing biases. The aim of the dissertation is to 
provide a coherent explanation for the post-analyst-revision drift, which is a market anomaly. 
The first study introduces prior individual investor attention as an explanation for this anomaly. 
The second study discusses how the attention seeking characteristics of analyst 
recommendations affects the post-revision drift. The third and final study explains how the 
diffusion of private information contained in analyst recommendation revisions lead to the 
post-analyst-revision drift.   
The first empirical study (Chapter 2) examines whether the level of prior individual investor 
attention rather than the level of institutional attention explains the post-revision drift. The level 
of individual investors’ attention is measured using a relatively novel measure: Google’s 
Search Volume Index. Chapter 2 indicates that, after upgrades, stocks that enjoy greater 
individual investors’ attention underreact significantly more compared to stocks that receive 
close attention from institutional investors. On the other hand, after recommendation 
downgrades, stocks with closer prior attention from individual investors overreact and show a 
significantly greater price reversal compared to stocks that received close attention from 
institutional investors. Our results suggest that attentive individual investors may not be 
rational; hence, investor attention and investor sophistication are important for price discovery 
in the market. 
The second empirical study (Chapter 3) investigates the direction of the association between 
cross sectional analyst characteristics (credibility and the extremeness of the information), 
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individual investor attention, and the post-recommendation drift. Chapter 3 finds that only 
individual investors pay attention to “extreme” revisions made by less credible analysts, 
although they delay their reaction. In contrast, individual investors pay attention to, and react 
immediately and strongly to, less extreme downgrades issued by highly credible analysts. 
These findings suggest that individual investors are swayed by the “extremeness” of the 
information even when the “credibility” is low, whereas they also exhibit a tendency to respond 
more/less strongly to negative/positive information signals, irrespective of their extremeness.  
The third empirical study (Chapter 4) investigates whether the gradual diffusion of private 
information interacts with investor attention and the firm’s information environment to cause 
the post-analyst revision drift. Chapter 4 shows that the gradual diffusion of private information 
empirically explains the price drift(s) that occur after analyst recommendations are released. 
The evidence is stronger for upgrades compared to downgrades, which supports the theory of 
there being a negative attention allocation bias among investors (Baumeister.et.al, 2001). 
Chapter 4 also finds that the private information diffusion is slower when there is higher 
individual investor interest, higher information asymmetry, and during uncertain and 
recessionary times. These findings show that private information processing biases interact 
with the degree of individual investor attention and information asymmetry to cause a stronger 
post-revision drift.   
Taken as a whole, the dissertation finds that the post-revision drift is explained by the degree 
of individual investors’ attention relative to the institutional investors’ attention, the changes 
in individual investors’ attention after extreme revisions provided by less credible analysts, and 
the gradual diffusion of private information contained in analyst revisions. The findings also 
indicate that individual investors exhibit a tendency to react strongly/weakly to 
negative/positive information signals.  
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1.1 Background, Motivations and Contributions 
 
This section describes the background, motivations, and the main contributions to the existing 
literature of this dissertation. The first section explains the main theme of my dissertation. The 
remaining sections explain the motivations and contributions of each empirical study.  
 
1.1.1 The Role of Analysts’ Recommendations 
An analyst’s recommendation represents the analyst’s expert opinion about a specific stock. 
Analysts’ interpret public news about a firm and also disseminates private information through 
their recommendations (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980). Analysts are believed to improve the 
efficiency of the market by providing previously unknown information to the market through 
their recommendations (Grossman, 1995).  
The tasks performed by analysts can be categorised as follows (Michaely and Womack, 1999): 
(a) Collecting information on industries and individual stocks. 
(b) Incorporating this new information when forming recommendations. 
(c) Providing recommendations to customers through oral and written reports. 
The Institutional Broker Estimation System (I/B/E/S) database converts all these 
recommendations to a five point system (Strong Buy, Buy, Hold, Sell, Strong Sell), although 
ratings systems can be different across different brokerage firms. A recommendation revision 
could be defined as the difference between the analysts’ current recommendations and the 
previous recommendation (Boni and Womack, 2006). Recommendation revisions are more 
informative compared to recommendations because they represent new information of which 
the analyst is in possession (Jagadeesh and Kim, 2010). Recommendation revisions could 
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represent new private information gathered by the analyst. Alternatively, recommendations can 
also be adjusted after the release of public information. In the second instance, analysts reveal 
their interpretation of public news via their recommendation revisions. Therefore 
recommendation revisions convey more meaning compared to the recommendation ratings 
themselves. An upgrade (an upward revision) represents new positive information whereas a 
downgrade (a downward revision) represents new negative information. 
 
1.1.2 Post-Revision Drift after Analysts’ Recommendations 
Fama (1997) suggests that newly released public information is going to be reflected in market 
prices in a timely manner. Therefore, any analyst recommendation revisions should be rapidly 
absorbed into the market prices. However, previous researchers have documented a predictable 
price drift after analyst recommendations have been released, which occur in the same direction 
as the initial event day reaction (Womack, 1996; Brav and Lehavy, 2003; Gleason and Lee, 
2003). Gleason and Lee (2003) use the term “post-revision drift” to identify this predictable 
price drift. It is important to examine the reasons for the existence of the post-revision drift 
because it is an anomaly contradicting the notion that public information is absorbed into the 
security prices in a timely manner (Fama, 1997).  
 
1.1.3 Theme of the Research 
A number of past studies indicate that underreaction is the reason for the price drift(s) after the 
release of market announcements (Baberis, Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Daniel, Hirshleifer and 
Subramanyan, 1998). Investor attention has been introduced as an explanation for 
underreaction in the psychological literature (Griffin and Tversky, 1992). Loh (2010) uses 
inattention as an explanation for the post-revision drift using trading volume as a proxy for 
inattention. Da, Engelberg and Gao (2011) argue that indirect measures, such as turnover, are 
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not precise measures of attention. Da.et.al, (2011) further state that Google’s Search Volume 
Index is a direct and more precise measure of attention.  
Using indirect proxies of individual investor attention, Hirshleifer.et.al (2008) suggests that the 
drift phenomenon is driven by individual investors who are more prone to attention related 
behavioural biases. However, the current literature does not directly examine the impact of 
individual investor attention on the post-revision drift. 
Sorescu and Subramanyam (2006) have shown that the nature of analyst characteristics 
(extremeness and credibility) affects the level of investor attention, which affects the degree of 
the post-revision drift. However Sorescu and Subramanyam (2006) does not consider the 
impact of analyst characteristics directly on attention changes.   
Hong (1999) has suggested that private information diffusion leads to an underreaction and a 
price-drift after analyst revisions. Gleason and Lee (2003) have suggested that the firm’s 
information environment is a factor that leads to the post-revision drift. However, the impact 
of private information diffusion on the post-analyst revision drift remains unexplored in the 
current literature.  
In light of the above literature, I offer a compelling explanation for the existence of the post-
revision drift. In the following chapters, I introduce possible explanatory factors for the post-
revision drift. Chapter 2 introduces prior individual investor attention; Chapter 3 considers the 
nature and the impact of the analyst recommendation characteristics on the post-revision drift; 
and Chapter 4 offers an explanation of the post-revision drift using the gradual diffusion of 
private information. The following sections explains the examination and the contribution of 
each chapter separately. 
 
 
 
7 
 
1.2 Investor Attention, Analyst Recommendation Revisions, and Stock Prices 
Chapter 2 examines how the level of individual investors’ attention relative to the institutional 
investors’ level of attention is associated with the post-analyst-revision drift. The influence of 
naïve individual investors trading on the price discovery process following the release of public 
information has been studied in the literature related to a post-earnings announcement drift. 
Theoretical models offer the limited attention of investors as a possible explanation for the 
delay in price discovery following the announcement of public information (e.g. Hirshleifer et 
al., 2008; Hirshleifer, Lim and Teoh, 2011; Peng and Xiong, 2006). The literature argues that 
institutional investors, as professionals, are more attentive to information than their retail 
counterparts (neg, Radhakrishnan and Krinsky, 2000; Collins, Gong and Hribar, 2003; 
Hirshleifer et al., 2011). Barber and Odean (2008) have suggested that scarcity of attention 
generally affects the investment decisions of individual investors’ more than those of 
institutional investors. Past studies such as Baernard and Thomas (1990), Bartov.et.al (2000) 
and Bhattacharya (2001) suggest that even attentive individual investors’ tend to be irrational 
following public information announcements. Given this known difference in the trading 
behaviours of individual and institutional investors, chapter 2 examines the differential 
influence of individual versus institutional investors’ attention to stock prices following analyst 
recommendation revisions. 
Chapter 2 is motivates by the lack of understanding of why the post-analyst-revision drift(s) 
exist. The findings of this study will also have implications for a number of market participants. 
Namely, regulators will be able to understand how individual investors pay attention to, and 
react to analyst recommendation revisions, and the investment community will be able to 
understand whether they are able to form investment strategies around recommendation 
changes.  
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Loh (2010) provided evidence that investor inattention could explain the price drifts following 
analyst recommendation revisions. Chapter 2 uses Google’s Search Volume Index (SVI) as a 
proxy for retail investors’ attention, which differs from the turnover based attention proxy used 
by Loh. Whereas, Loh’s proxy is closely related to trading activity and information asymmetry, 
the SVI based proxy measures individual investors’ active information searches (i.e. attention) 
for specific stocks. Given that retail investors are known for their behavioural biases 
(disposition effect, mental accounting, and framing)-their trading decisions might not reflect 
their attention. The SVI-based attention measure could help to identify the gap between 
attention and the actual trading of individual investors. 
Secondly, Loh focused on the price drift that occurred after three months following the 
analysts’ recommendations, whereas Chapter 2 investigates price reactions up to ten days (i.e. 
two weeks) after the analysts’ revisions. Loh reports that each firm, on average, releases analyst 
recommendations six to eight times every year. It is also common practice for different brokers 
to release their recommendations with respect to a specific firm within a few days/weeks of 
other brokers having released their reports. Hence, concentrating on a shorter time window will 
make it more likely that confounding effects of other events and announcements are 
incorporated. 
 
1.3 Analyst Characteristics and Individual Investor Attention 
Chapter 3 examines how analyst characteristics (credibility and extremes), the changes in 
individual investor attention, and the post-revision drift(s) are associated. First, I examine the 
relationship between analyst characteristics—the strength and weight of analyst 
recommendations—and the post-announcement change in individual investor attention. 
Second, I investigate how a post-revision change in individual investor attention is associated 
with the magnitude of the post-recommendation drift. Third, I investigate the direction of the 
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relationship between analyst characteristics, the change in individual investor attention, and the 
post-recommendation drift. 
A number of studies suggest that investors respond significantly to analyst characteristics that 
indicate the information is highly credible (Hendricks, Patel and Zeckhauser, 1993; Gu and 
Wu, 2003; Mikhail, Walther and Willis, 2004). However, Clement and Tse (2005) have shown 
that there are significant abnormal returns after larger brokers have released analyst 
recommendations. Similarly. Gleason and Lee (2003) suggests that analyst forecasts issued by 
celebrity analysts, which attract more investor attention, have a larger stock price impact than 
forecasts by obscure but highly accurate analysts. Sorescu and Subramanyam (2006) have 
reported that investors react strongly when the recommendation has “strength” (extremeness 
of information) characteristics as opposed to “weight” (credibility of information) 
characteristics. Barber and Odean (2008) have argued that individual investors are more prone 
to be swayed by superficial aspects of stocks.  
This chapter is motivated by the lack of understanding of how analyst characteristics, investors’ 
attention and the post-revision drifts are associated with each other. The analyst community 
will be interested in understanding how the characteristics of their recommendations affect the 
degree of attention paid to them by investors. The investor community would also be interested 
in understanding whether their opinions are swayed by cosmetic characteristics and/or by 
indicators of credibility.  
Chapter 3 makes several contributions; first I extend Sorescu and Subramanyam’s analysis 
(2006) by including a measure of the change in individual investor attention, which links 
analyst characteristics and security prices. Including this measure improves the chances of 
capturing the direction of the relationship between analyst characteristics, individual investors’ 
attention and security prices. Specifically, Sorescu and Subramanyam (2006) stated that high 
strength and low weight analyst recommendations lead to price reversals, whereas low strength 
10 
 
and high weight recommendations lead to price drifts. The inclusion of the change in individual 
investor attention variable (through Google’s Search Volume Index) enables a more thorough 
explanation of the change in attention after the analyst’s news have been released.  
Second, I offer an explanation for the post-recommendation revision drift using the attention 
hypothesis suggested by Griffin and Tversky (1992). Although previous studies (see for 
example Loh, 2010) have used attention related biases to explain the post-recommendation 
drift, these studies have focused on the pre-revision attention level rather than the change in 
attention after the release of news (e.g.: Gleason and Lee, 2003; Loh, 2010). My study extends 
previous studies by considering the post-recommendation change in investor attention. 
 
1.4 Private information, investor attention and the post-revision Drift 
Chapter 4 examines how the gradual diffusion of private information leads to an investor 
underreaction after analyst recommendations are released. This chapter further investigates 
how the degree of investor attention and information asymmetry interacts with the diffusion of 
private information. 
Hong (1999) theorizes that the gradual diffusion of private information leads to investor 
underreaction, which has not been tested in the context of analyst recommendations. Kim, Lin 
and Slovin, (1997) have suggested that private information released after the analyst 
recommendations have been absorbed into the prices, having examined this issue in a market 
microstructure setting. Kadan, Michaely and Moulton (2014) have examined the investor 
trading patterns in response to private information, although they don’t examine how private 
information is diffused after the analyst recommendations are released. Therefore, there is a 
need for a study examining how the private information content in analyst revisions are 
absorbed into market prices, and how it leads to underreaction. 
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The main contribution of the fourth chapter is to shed light how individual attention and 
information asymmetry interacts with private information diffusion to cause the post-revision 
drift. Although Barber et al., (2001), Altinkilic and Hansen (2009), and Loh (2010) examined 
the possible reasons for the post-revision drift, they did not account for the level of private 
information.  
Kadan et al. (2014) showed that individual investor trading in response to private information 
leads to a post-revision drift. However, they used abnormal returns to measure of private 
information content. My second contribution is to build on the work of Kadan et al (2014) by 
examining this association using two measures of private information that are more precise, 
namely a firm-matched abnormal return as well as the abnormal return matched to the industry 
(Babenko, Tserlukevich and Vedrashko, 2012). The firm-matched abnormal returns provide a 
superior methodological tool because I ensure that stocks with analyst recommendations are 
compared with similar firms with no analyst recommendations released on the same day. Since 
Kadan et al. (2014) matched the firm with the characteristic-adjusted portfolio any 
recommendations that occur on the same date are still included. However, when the 
recommending firms are matched against the non-recommending firms, my measure improves 
the chances of capturing precisely the degree of private information. 
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1.5 Organization of the Dissertation 
This section provides a brief description of the structure of this dissertation. The second chapter 
describes the first empirical study of the dissertation titled “Investor Attention, Analyst 
Recommendation Revisions, and Stock Prices”. The third chapter provide the details of my 
second empirical study titled “Analyst Characteristics and Individual Investor Attention”. The 
third and final study titled “Private information, investor attention and the post-revision Drift” 
is included in the dissertation as my fourth chapter. The dissertation is concluded in the fifth 
chapter, describing the main findings, contributions and how the included empirical studies fall 
in line with main theme of research.  
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2.1. Introduction 
We investigate the influence of investor attention on the price discovery process following 
analyst recommendation revisions in the equity market. Analysts’ recommendations are an 
important source of information in financial markets (Jagadeesh and Kim., 2010; Womack, 
1996). Existing research recognises the contributions of analysts’ recommendations in 
improving the market’s informational efficiency (Grossman, 1995). Jagadeesh and Kim 
(2010) argued that analysts’ recommendation revisions (i.e. changes from previous 
recommendations) convey more valuable information compared to the original 
recommendations (see also Boni & Womack, 2006). However, a predictable price drift is also 
reported during the period following the release of analysts’ recommendations and 
recommendation revisions (Barber et al., 2001; Brav and Lehavy., 2003; Gleason and Lee., 
2003). This drift, a reported delay in price discovery, is puzzling because it questions the 
rationality of investor behaviour. Loh (2010) offers a plausible explanation for this 
underreaction based on investor inattention. In this chapter, we extend the research on price 
discovery after analysts’ recommendation revisions. We explore the trading behaviour of 
unsophisticated individual investors to understand the price reactions following analysts’ 
recommendation revisions. 
The influence of naïve individual investors’ trading on the price discovery process following 
the release of public information has been studied in the literature related to a post-earnings 
announcement drift. Bernard and Thomas (1990) suggested that uninformed investors’ 
inability to recognise the full implication of the information released could cause a post-
announcement drift. Bartov et al. (2000) argued that the trading activities of unsophisticated 
investors could explain the post-announcement predictability of returns. The findings of 
Battalio and Mendenhall (2005) and Bhattacharya (2001) also support this argument. Several 
theoretical models propose investors’ limited attention as a possible explanation for the delay 
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in price discovery following the announcement of public information (e.g. Hirshleifer et al., 
2008, 2011; Peng and Xiong, 2006). These theoretical models argue that investors’ cognitive 
biases stem from their selective attention to certain types of information (e.g. market and 
sector-wide information (Peng and Xiong, 2006)) and/or due to their systematic negligence 
of other price-sensitive information (e.g. firm-specific information (Peng and Xiong, 2006) 
or earnings information (Hirshleifer et al., 2011)). The literature argues that institutional 
investors, as professionals, are more attentive to information than their retail counterparts are 
(Bartov et al., 2000; Collins et al., 2003; Hirshleifer et al., 2011). Barber and Odean (2008) 
suggested that scarcity of attention generally affects the investment decisions of individual 
investors’ more than those of institutional investors. Given this known difference in the 
trading behaviours of individual and institutional investors, in this chapter we study the 
differential influence of individual versus institutional investors’ attention to stock prices 
following analyst recommendation revisions. 
Loh (2010) provided evidence that investor inattention could explain the price drifts following 
analyst recommendation changes. Our study builds on the work of Loh (2010) and provides 
new evidence on the trading behaviour of individual investors. Loh provides evidence on 
limited attention-based theories, while we investigate whether the attention of unsophisticated 
individual investors is equally influential in the price discovery process as that of sophisticated 
institutional investors. 
Our study differs from Loh’s (2010) in at least two aspects: First, our proxy of investor 
attention significantly differs from that used by Loh. Following Da et al. (2011), we use 
Google’s search volume index (SVI) as a proxy for retail investors’ attention. The investor 
inattention proxies used by Loh are closely related to trading activity (low daily turnover) and 
information asymmetry (low analyst coverage, low institutional investment). In contrast, our 
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attention variable based on SVI measures individual investors’ active information searches 
(i.e. attention) for specific stocks. 
Given that retail investors are known for their behavioural biases—such as the ‘disposition 
effect’, ‘mental accounting’, and ‘framing’—their trading decisions (or indecision) might not 
reflect their attention. The SVI-based attention measure could help to identify the gap between 
attention and the actual trading of individual investors. We compare the influence of 
retail/individual investors’ attention on the price discovery process against that of the attention 
of institutional/non-retail investors. 
The second important difference between our study and Loh’s (2010) is the time horizon. Loh 
focused on the price drift up to 63 days (i.e. beyond three months) following analysts’ 
recommendations, whereas we investigate price reactions up to 10 days (i.e. two weeks) after 
analysts’ recommendation revisions. We concentrate on a shorter period due to the frequency 
of analysts’ recommendation releases. Loh reports that, for each firm, on average, releases 
analyst recommendations six to eight times every year. It is also common practice for different 
brokers to release their recommendations on a specific firm within a few days/weeks of other 
brokers’ report release. Hence it is difficult to infer price reactions for a longer horizon without 
incorporating the confounding effects of other events and announcements in the market. 
Using a sample of 13,916 recommendation changes issued by 2,416 analysts on 466 US firms 
over the period 2005–2012, we find that price reactions are asymmetric for positive and 
negative analysts’ recommendation revisions. A significant price drift is observed even after 
10 days following recommendation upgrades. On the other hand, overreaction followed by a 
reversal is observed for downgrades within the first two weeks of recommendation changes. 
We find the influence of retail investors’ attention on price discovery to be significantly 
different compared non-retail investors’ attention on stock prices. Our results show that, for 
recommendation upgrades, pre-event individual investors’ attention is positively correlated 
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with the post-event price drift. This finding suggests that stocks that enjoy comparatively 
more attention from individual investors show significant underreaction compared to stocks 
that receive more attention from institutional investors. On the other hand, for 
recommendation downgrades, stocks that receive relatively high attention from individual 
investors induce an overreaction followed by significant price reversal. In multivariate 
analyses, SVI-based individual investor attention measures are found to be significant in 
explaining price drifts for upgrades and price reversal in downgrades. Our results are in line 
with the findings of Da et al. (2011), who find that an SVI-based fear index predicts price 
reversal over the short run. 
Our study contributes to the research on price reactions after analyst recommendations. 
Compared to the price drift over several months following analyst recommendations that is 
reported in the literature (Barber et al., 2001; Gleason and Lee, 2003; Loh, 2010; Womack, 
1996), our results show asymmetric investor reactions between upgrades and downgrades in 
the period immediately following analyst recommendation changes. We find a price drift 
following recommendation upgrades; however, we also report evidence of overreaction and 
price reversal following downgrades. One possible explanation for this asymmetric behaviour 
is the ‘negativity bias’ reported in the psychology literature; generally, negative events have 
larger, more consistent consequences than comparable positive events (Baumeister et al., 
2001). 
Our findings indicate that the asymmetric price reactions following recommendation revisions 
might be related to individual investors’ trading behaviour. Our results suggest that individual 
investors underreact to recommendation upgrades; on the other hand, they tend to overreact 
after downgrades. This evidence may indicate that individual investors’ process buy and sell 
signals differently, as suggested by Barber and Odean (2008). Behavioural biases related to 
the disposition effect, that is, selling winners, may explain the price drift following upgrades 
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(Frazzini, 2006). On the other hand, since individual investors predominantly sell what they 
hold in their portfolio (Barber & Odean, 2008), their responses to downgrades – that is, sell 
signals – are quicker compared to their responses to upgrades. Psychological biases related to 
‘regret aversion’ could also explain this finding. Investors’ emotional responses are stronger 
to unfavourable outcomes due to their actions than to unfavourable outcomes due to their 
inaction (Kahneman and Tversky, 1982). Hence, investors tend to overreact following a price 
decrease after downgrades (since they feel greater regret for a loss on their existing 
investment) compared to their reaction following price increases after upgrades (i.e. less 
regret for errors of omission, forgoing a possible gain). Contrary to the findings of Loh (2010), 
in our sample, the average daily turnover does not explain the price dynamics following 
recommendation changes. However, the results based on low institutional ownership – 
another commonly used proxy for unsophisticated trading (Bartov et al., 2000; Collins et al., 
2003) – confirm our main findings. 
Our results complement the evidence of limited attention-based explanations for investors’ 
reactions following announcements of public information. Our findings indicate that investor 
sophistication as well as investor attention are important in explaining price reactions after 
analyst recommendation changes. This evidence suggests that investor attention alone may 
not help the price discovery process in the market, because of individual investors’ 
behavioural biases. Since our SVI-based measure of individual investors’ attention is not 
directly related to their trading activities, our results could capture a possible disconnect 
between individual investors’ attention and their trading decisions, specifically when they 
receive buy signals. 
This chapter is organised into five sections. Section 2 provides a review of the literature. 
Section 3 explains the hypotheses development. Section 4 provides details of the data and 
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methodology. Section 5 discusses the empirical findings and robustness analyses. Section 6 
concludes the chapter. 
2.2 Literature Review 
2.2.1 The Post-Recommendation Drift 
Existing literature documents two main types of market reactions to analyst recommendations. 
Firstly, there is an immediate price reaction that occurs on the recommendation release date 
(Cowles, 1933; Keskes.et.al., 2010). Secondly, there is also a predictable drift during the months 
after the recommendations in the same direction as the initial price reaction (Stickel, 1995; 
Womack, 1996; Barber et.al. 2001).  
Stickel(1985) is the first study to document that the reactions to analyst recommendations occur 
over a multiple day period after the release of the recommendation. Stickel (1985) also 
documented that these reactions change according to the magnitude of the ratings change; i.e.: 
Rank changes from rank 2 to rank 1 have the more dramatic effects on prices.  Elton, Gruber and 
Grossman (1986) uses a risk adjusted methodology to re-confirm the notion of a post-
recommendation drift.  
Womack (1996) documents that the post-recommendation drift for new Buy recommendations is 
+2.4% which is significant for one month. New sell recommendations have a higher magnitude 
-9.1% post-recommendation drift that lasts for a longer period of 6 months. Womack (1996) 
argues in favor of the existence of a post-recommendation drift. 
Barber et.al (2001) find that a portfolio of stocks with most (least) favourable consensus 
recommendations provides an average abnormal gross annual return of 4.13 (-4.19) percent after 
controlling for momentum, B/M and market risk. This result indicates that investors are able to 
form investment portfolios that can earn abnormal return using the delayed reaction by all 
investors. The authors cite this as supporting evidence for a post-recommendation drift and 
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investor underreaction. The present study also supports Womack (1996) who suggest that the 
price drift for unfavourable recommendations lasts longer. 
Brav and Lehavy (2003) examines the effect of target prices on the magnitude and the duration 
of the post recommendation drift. Brav and Lehavy (2003) supports the existence of the post-
recommendation drift advocated by Womack (1996), Stickle (1992) and Barber et.al (2001). 
However the evidence contradicts these previous studies because favorable recommendations 
supplemented by favorable target price revisions have larger and longer lasting price drift 
compared to unfavorable recommendations supplemented by unfavorable target price revisions. 
Gleason and Lee (2003) states that the price adjustment process is faster (drift smaller) for 
celebrity analysts than more obscure yet highly accurate analysts. Gleason and Lee (2003) is 
important for my study because it establishes a link between the post-revision drift and some 
aspects of analysts that attract investor attention.  
The study, Sorescu and Subramanyam (2006) is related to the post-recommendation drift as well 
as the investor attention literature. Sorescu and Subramanyam (2006) examine whether post event 
day returns are affected by the strength and weight of the recommendation signal. Strength is the 
dramatic nature of the recommendation whereas the weight is the credibility of the 
recommendation (Griffin and Tversky 1992). Sorescu and Subramanyam (2006) form portfolios 
based on the magnitude of the “strength” and form sub-groups based on the magnitude of “weight”. 
Overall they conclude that there is a return reversal following high strength-low weight 
recommendations. On the other hand there is a return drift following low strength-high weight 
analyst recommendations.  
Altinkilic and Hansen (2009) hypothesize that the post-recommendations drift is simply a delayed 
price response to earnings news released prior to analyst recommendations. Further, the price drift 
is amplified by illiquidity and information dispersion. Altinkilic and Hansen (2009) is the only 
study in this strand of literature that dispute the existence of the post-recommendation drift.  
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Loh (2010) is the first to examine investor attention as a plausible explanation for the post-
recommendation drift. Loh (2010) show that the post-recommendation drift (21 days to 62 days) 
is more than double in magnitude for low attention stocks compared to high attention stocks. The 
evidence supports the view that investors underreact to analyst news and this leads to the post 
announcement drift (Ball and Brown, 1968). Additionally, this supports the notion that investors 
underreact because they pay less attention to some stocks.  
A majority of past studies have documented significant price drift after the revision day. However 
the length of this post-recommendation drift is not consistent among all studies.  The price drift 
has been documented from 21 trading days to 2 months. Further, the relative magnitudes of the 
positive and negative post-recommendation drift(s) are also not consistent across a majority of 
studies. The undereaction hypothesis suggested by studies such as Ball and Brown (1968) and 
Bernard and Thomas (1990) is applied to explain the post-recommendation drift. Studies such as 
Loh (2010) and Sorescu and Subramayam (2006) support this hypothesis. Gleason and Lee (2003) 
identifies some attention related factors that influence the magnitude of the post-revision drift.  
 
2.2.2 Investor Attention 
Merton (1987) predicts that when fundamental factors are held constant the firm value increases 
as a function of investor recognition. The Merton (1987) model is based on the assumption that 
some stocks are known to relatively few investors. Therefore investors in these “neglected” 
securities must hold undiversified portfolios and require a return premium for bearing idiosyncratic 
risk. The implications of the model are: (i) the value of a security increases with the number 
investors who recognise the stock. (ii) the expected return of a security decreases with the number 
of investors recognising the security. (iii) the above two implications are heightened for stocks 
with greater idiosyncratic risk.  
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Griffin and Tversky (1992) theorizes that limited investor attention leads to underreaction to 
information. Further, they argue that the attention to information is a function of the strength 
(dramatic nature) of information and the weight (credibility) of information.  
Another strand of psychology literature indicates that there is a negativity bias in attention 
allocation (Baumeister.et.al. 2001). This means that individuals tend to assign more attention and 
react more strongly when there is negative information compared to the equivalent positive 
information. This evidence is cited as an explanation for extreme negative information having a 
stronger stock price reaction compared to extreme positive information. (Hirshleifer, Lim and 
Teoh, 2004; Barber & Odean., 2008).  
A number of other theoretical studies predict that limited investor attention leads to undereaction 
and then leads to a price drift (Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2003; Sims, 2003; Van Nieuwerburgh and 
Veldkamp, 2010). These studies also indicate that individual investors are prone to underreaction 
and in turn drive the price drift after announcements (Hirshleifer.et.al., 2008).  Many studies find 
evidence consistent with this hypothesis (Bartrov.et.al. 2000; Bhattacharya, 2001; Battalio & 
Mendenhall (2005)1). On the other hand, Hirshleifer.et.al (2011)) does not find evidence to support 
this hypothesis2. 
Hou, Peng and Xiong (2009) using trading volume as a proxy for investor attention states that 
lower investor attention leads to investor underreaction and the post earnings announcement drift. 
On the other hand, higher investor attention leads to overreaction and price momentum.  
Hirshleifer.et.al (2011) suggest that a larger number of competing news events leads to investor 
distraction and a lack of attention. Therefore a larger number of competing news events leads to a 
                                                          
1 Bhattacharya (2001) provides evidence that the volume of small trades (presumably less sophisticated 
investors) is strongly associated with the magnitude of random walk earnings surprises that explains the drift 
after announcements. Bartrov.et.al (2000) suggests that the post-earning announcement drift is strongest among 
stocks with a low institutional ownership. Battalio and Mendenhall (2005) also suggests that larger (presumably 
more sophisticated investors) react to announcements more strongly.  
 
2 Hirshleifer.et.al (2011) states that individuals are significant buyers after negative as well as positive earning 
surprises, however this buying behaviour fails to explain the post-earning announcement drift.  
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higher post earnings announcement drift. A trading strategy that exploits the post earnings 
announcement drift is more profitable for days when there is a larger number of competing news 
events.  
Da.et.al (2011) introduces a novel and direct measure of retail investor attention. Specifically, 
Da.et.al. (2011) is the first study to use Google SearchVolume Index (SVI) to measure investor 
attention. Da.et.al (2011) argues that proxies used in the past studies are flawed because they are 
all indirect measures of attention. To the best of my knowledge, this measure has not been used to 
measure investor attention in past studies on analyst recommendations.  
The current study examines the effect of limited attention on the post-recommendation drift 
following Loh (2010), Sorescu and Subramanyam (2006) and Gleason and Lee (2003). However 
my study uses a direct measure for investor attention suggested by Da.et.al (2011). Further, I also 
examine the relative effects of retail and non-retail attention on the post-recommendation drift. 
This aspect has not been examined by any of the prior studies.  
 
2.3 Hypothesis Development 
The length and magnitude of the post-recommendation drift has not been consistent across past 
studies. Many past studies implicitly assume that the post-recommendation drift is significant but 
does not specifically document the magnitude or the length of the drift (Loh, 2010; Sorescu and 
Subramanyam., 2006; Gleason and Lee., 2003). Therefore it is important to examine the overall 
magnitude of the post-recommendation drift in the sample period of this study. We concentrate on 
a shorter period due to the frequency of analysts’ recommendation releases. Loh reports that, for 
each firm, on average, releases analyst recommendations six to eight times every year. It is also 
common practice for different brokers to release their recommendations on a specific firm within 
a few days/weeks of other brokers’ report release. Hence it is difficult to infer price reactions for 
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a longer horizon without incorporating the confounding effects of other events and announcements 
in the market. 
Although, Loh (2010) tests the impact of inattention on the post-recommendation drift, I 
enhance this examination by decomposing the pre-revision total attention into retail and non-retail 
attention components using a direct measure of retail investor attention. Secondly, Loh (2010) 
considers analyst initiations also as recommendation changes (assuming the previous 
recommendation was a Hold). This is noteworthy since Irvine (2004) argues that analyst initiations 
are given an abnormal level of attention by investors. Irvine (2004) further states that the market 
responds more positively to analyst initiations compared to other recommendations (Also see: 
Peterson, 1987; Branson, Guffey & Pgach, 1998). Crawford, Roulstone & So, (2012) further 
suggest that analyst initiations for stocks previously not covered are particularly unusual events. 
This is the likely result of an increase in liquidity after the analyst initiated the coverage of stock 
(Irvine, 2004).  Since the inclusion of analyst initiations in the sample are likely to lead to a positive 
attention bias, I exclude such recommendations from my sample.  
Overall, There is evidence of a post-recommendation drift in the past analyst literature (Stickel, 
1992; Womack, 1996; Barber et.al., 2001). However the exact magnitude and the length of the 
post-recommendation drift have varied between studies. These studies also considered the post-
announcement drift after recommendation ratings rather than recommendation changes. Therefore 
I develop the first hypothesis to understand the magnitude and the direction of the post-revision 
drift after recommendation changes. Investor underreaction hypothesis suggested by Ball and 
Brown (1968) is applied to explain the post-recommendation drift. Theoretical studies predict that 
limited investor attention lead to undereaction and then leads to a price drift. (Hirshleifer and Teoh, 
2003; Sims, 2003 ; Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp, 2010). I develop the second hypothesis to 
test the notion that investor inattention leads to underreaction and the post-revision drift. 
Hirshleifer.et.al (2008) hypothesizes that individual investors are more prone to investor 
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underreaction and causes post-announcement drift. I develop the third and final hypothesis to 
identify whether the individual (retail) investor attention leads to a stronger post-revision drift. 
Considering this as a backdrop leads to the following testable hypotheses. 
H1: Post-revision drifts exist and they are consistent with the directions of the 
recommendation changes.  
 
H2: The magnitudes of Post-revision drift are negatively correlated to pre -revision 
turnover of the stocks. 
 
H3: The magnitudes of the Post-revision drift are positively correlated to the degree of pre-
revision retail attention.   
 
2.4 Data, variables, and methodology 
This study uses the data of firms listed in US stock exchanges. We collect data on analyst 
recommendations, daily stock prices, daily trading volumes, and the weekly Google SVI. Our 
initial sample includes all stocks on the Russell 3000 Index as on 31 December 2012. 
Thomson Reuters’ I/B/E/S database provides analyst recommendations between December 
1993 and December 2012; however the Google SVI data are available from 2004 January on; 
hence, the sample period is from 2004 to 2012. 
I/B/E/S classifies analysts’ recommendations as follows: 1 (strong buy), 2 (buy), 3 (hold), 4 
(underperform), and 5 (sell). To be consistent with the literature, the ratings were re-sorted on 
a five-point scale where the highest is most favourable and the lowest most unfavourable (i.e. 
5 for a strong buy and 1 for a sell). This re-sorting also helps to better understand the 
recommendation changes since, with the re-sorted scale, positive changes refer to upgrades 
and negative changes refer to downgrades. The recommendation changes are calculated as the 
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current recommendation minus the immediately previous recommendation by the same 
analyst. These recommendation changes range from -4 to +4. We do not include analysts’ 
first-time recommendations for a stock (i.e. when there is no previous recommendation by the 
same analyst for the same stock) in our sample. We also remove any recommendation changes 
when the previous recommendation was issued more than one year ago. We also impose filters 
on our sample to avoid any confounding effects of earnings announcements and other 
information releases from the analysts. We exclude recommendation changes issued within 
21 trading days of the earnings announcements (Altinkilic and Hansen, 2009). We remove 
recommendation changes that were issued within 21 trading days of earnings forecasts and 
target price information releases from the analysts. We also remove analyst recommendation 
changes where multiple analysts provided a recommendation for a specific firm on the same 
day. 
2.4.1 Investor attention variables 
We use several proxies to capture investor attention. In the literature, daily turnover is used 
as a proxy for investor attention (Barber & Odean, 2008; Hou.et.al, 2009; Loh, 2010). To be 
consistent with the literature, we use daily turnover as a measure of investor attention, 
calculating the daily turnover of stocks by dividing the daily trading volume with the total 
number of shares outstanding. The data of daily trading volumes and the total numbers of 
shares outstanding are obtained from the Thomson Reuters Datastream database. 
We measure individual investors’ attention to individual stocks with the Google SVI data. Da 
et al. (2011) introduced Google’s SVI as a proxy for active attention by individual investors. 
Various other researchers, such as Ginsberg et al. (2008) and Choi and Varian (2012), also 
used Google’s SVI to measure the active attention of individuals to specific keywords. Da et 
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al. (2014) used the SVI to construct a fear index that reflects individual investors’ sentiment 
in the market. 
Da.et.al (2001) find evidence to suggest that Google SVI is correlation to but different from 
existing proxies of investor attention; captures investor attention in a more timely manner and 
is likely to be a retail(individual) investor attention measure. They find that there is a larger 
price jump in stocks that are more likely to be purchased by individual investors. Further, 
Da.et.al (2011) directly analyses the effect of Google SVI on retail trades/orders using the 
Dash-5 Monthly reports, and find that Google SVI changes are significantly associated with 
individual trading patterns.  
Google provides the SVI, which reveals weekly time series trends of various search terms 
used by the online users of their search engine and other products. Google’s SVI can be 
extracted using a query of at most five search keywords at a time. SVI data are available since 
January 2004. The index can be constructed based on searches originating from a specific 
geographic location (e.g., countries or states) over a certain period. The SVI can be formally 
defined as  
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where 
triSVI ,,  refers to the SVI for search term i from region r at time t, triSVT ,, is the total 
search volume for search term i from region r at time t, tTSV refers to the total search volume 
for Google at time t, and W,rMSV  is the maximum search ratio of all the k terms included in 
any SVI query over a periodW . Hence, triSVI ,,  is a relative measure of the total number of 
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searches for search term i at time t and the total search volume triSVT ,,  is divided by tTSV  to 
eliminate time trends in the general use of Google’s search engine and also divided by W,rMSV  
to be scaled by the time series of raw search volume data. 
Following Da et al. (2011), we use stock ticker symbols instead of company names as the 
keywords to obtain SVI data for the stocks. Company names are likely to have multiple 
connotations, consumers might search for the company name for reasons unrelated to 
investment decisions, and individuals may also use various alternative versions of a company 
name while searching for company-specific information; for example, keywords such as 
Microsoft, Microsoft Corp, and Microsoft Corporation could be used while searching for 
information about Microsoft. On the other hand, use of the ticker is less ambiguous. Use of 
stock tickers for online search can also be linked to information searches related to investment 
and trading. Therefore, for our SVI queries, we use stock tickers, such as APPL for Apple 
Computers, MSFT for Microsoft, and so forth. We also confine our search within the United 
States, because all the stocks in our sample are from the United States. We collect weekly 
SVI data for stock tickers for our filtered sample of stocks for a period of eight years, from 
2004 to 2012. We include only stocks that have non-zero and non-missing values in their 
stock ticker SVI over the 60 weeks before the recommendation changes. 
Following Da et al. (2011), we create an SVI-based measure of individual investors’ attention, 
as follows: 
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where 
tjAttnInd ,_
 measures the change in the information search volume (i.e. log SVI) for 
stock j in week t compared to the median value of the search volume (i.e. log SVI) for stock j 
over the previous eight weeks. 
Since investor attention should be reflected in trading activities, we define institutional 
investors’ attention as residual turnover, using the following regression model: 
 
    tjtjtjtjtjtj eVolTurnoverrAttnIndTurnover ,,41,3,2,1,  ln _ ln   EEEED            (2) 
 8,2,,1,,, ,..._  tjtjtjtjtj eeeMedianeAttnInst                                                                                 (3) 
 
where 
tjTurnover ,  refers to the weekly turnover of stock j in week t; tjAttnInd ,_ is as 
defined in Eq. (1); 
tjr ,  and tjVol ,  are the weekly return and standard deviation of daily returns 
of stock j in week t, respectively; and 
tje ,  is the residual of the regression model. 
 
We classify stocks with values of 
tjAttnInd ,_
 above the median and values of 
tjAttnInst ,_  
below the median in the pre-recommendation change week as the high relative retail attention 
(HRRA) group. Similarly, we classify stocks with values of 
tjAttnInst ,_  above the median 
in the pre-recommendation change week as the high non-retail attention (HNRA) group. 
 
2.4.2 Other variables 
We collect monthly data on market capitalisation and book-to-market values and quarterly 
data on the debt-to-equity ratios and return on assets of each stock from the Thomson Reuters 
database Datastream International. We collect quarterly institutional ownership data from the 
FactSet ownership database. 
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2.4.3 Post-recommendation abnormal returns (ARs) 
The ARs and cumulative ARs (CARs) are calculated for a period of 10 days after each 
analyst’s recommendation changes. Following Brav and Lehavy  (2003), the daily ARs are 
calculated as the raw stock returns less the returns on the matched size–momentum portfolio, 
available from Kenneth French’s data library (http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/ 
pages/faculty/ken.french/index.html).3 The term CAR(t1, t2) is the cumulative sum of all the 
ARs from day t1 to day t2. We report the size and significance of the averages of CAR(t1, t2) 
for post-recommendation change days. 
 
2.5. Empirical analyses 
2.5.1 Summary statistics 
Table 2.1 reports the details of the sample. For our empirical analyses, we use 13,916 
recommendation changes over a period of eight years (2005–2012). Individual 
recommendation changes can vary from +4 (most upgraded) to -4 (most downgraded). The 
average recommendation changes reported in Table 1 show that, on average, over four years 
(2006–2008 and 2012) firms in our sample received more downgrades compared to upgrades, 
while in other years they experienced more recommendation upgrades than downgrades. 
Overall, our sample has recommendations from 2,412 analysts working for 300 different 
brokerage firms. On average, each analyst provided more than two recommendation changes 
every year.
                                                          
3 We also calculate the AR using alternative methods such as the AR based on the matched size–B/M portfolio 
from Kenneth French’s data library. We calculated AR using a three-factor Fama–French model and also using 
a simpler market model (Brown and Warner, 1980). The results of our analysis remain qualitatively similar, 
irrespective of our choice of AR calculation methods.   
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Our sample covers 466 firms over the sample period and each firm is covered by more than 
three analysts, on average. In comparison to the sample of prior studies, such as that of Loh 
(2010), our sample covers fewer firms and recommendation changes due to our strict data 
filtering. Though our sample has fewer firms, our sample covers larger firms in the market, 
which is apparent in the average value of the market capitalisation of firms in our sample. The 
average market capitalisation of the firms in our sample is $16.875 billion, whereas the 
average market capitalisation of firms reported by Loh (2010) was $3.1 billion. In our sample, 
the average daily turnover of stocks in the pre recommendation change period is 0.99%. This 
value is smaller compared to that of prior studies, again due to our focus on larger firms in 
the market. Table 2.1 also provides the statistics of recommendation changes, analyst-level 
variables, and firm-level variables within the subsamples based on turnover and individual 
investor attention. 
The details of the recommendation changes are reported in Table 2.2. Of the 13,916 
recommendation changes, 26.3% are reiterations of previous recommendations. About 0.7% 
of the recommendation changes are categorised as extreme upgrades (i.e. recommendation 
changes of +3 and +4), another 0.7% recommendations are extreme downgrades (i.e. 
recommendation changes of -3 and -4). The rest of the recommendation changes are almost 
evenly distributed between normal upgrades (i.e. +1 and +2) and normal downgrades (i.e. -1 
and -2).  
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Table 2.2 
 Distribution of recommendation changes 
The sample recommendation changes (revisions) are from the I/B/E/S detail US file for the period 2005–2012. The recommendation 
changes are calculated as an analyst’s current rating minus the analyst’s prior rating. The current ratings are from 2005 onwards, 
whereas the prior ratings start at 2004. Analyst initiations (ratings that had no prior outstanding ratings) are excluded from the 
sample. The ratings are coded as 1 (sell) to 5 (strong buy). The rating changes lie between -4 and +4. Rating changes issued by 
anonymous analysts are excluded from the sample. All recommendation changes within one trading month of an earnings 
announcement are excluded from the sample. All recommendation changes that have earnings forecasts within one trading month 
have been removed from the sample. All observations where the lagged stock price was less than $1 on the event date have been 
removed from the sample. The final sample contains all observations that have values for the Google’s SVI during the 60 weeks 
prior to the event.  
Recommendation Change Frequency Percentage 
-4 56 0.4% 
-3 39 0.3% 
-2 1,981 14.2% 
-1 3,062 22.0% 
0 3,662 26.3% 
+1 3,054 21.9% 
+2 1,967 14.1% 
+3 36 0.3% 
+4 59 0.4% 
Total 13,916 100% 
Summary statistics of the important variables used are provided in Table 2.3. The average value 
of AttnInd _  is 0.01 for the full sample. Average individual investor aattention varies from 14% 
in the HRRA group to 1% in the HNRA group; however, there is almost no difference in average 
individual investor attention between the high-turnover and low-turnover groups. The average 
value of prior turnover ratios is less than one in our sample; hence, the average values of ln(prior 
turnovers) are negative for the full sample and for the subsamples. Table 2.3 reports that the 
difference between the average log turnover values of the HNRA and HRRA groups is small but 
significantly different from zero. As expected, the HNRA group has a significantly higher average 
AttnInst _  compared to the HRRA group; we find average AttnInst _  to also be significantly 
higher for the low-turnover group compared to stocks in the high-turnover group. 
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Table 2.3 also reports the average values of various control variables used in the multivariate 
analyses, such as the natural logarithm of analyst coverage (i.e. the number of analysts 
covering a firm), the return on assets (ROA), the debt-to-equity ratio (D/E) from the quarter 
prior to the event date, and the natural logarithm of monthly market capitalisation from the 
month before analysts’ recommendation changes. The average value of these control variables 
is significantly larger for the low-turnover group compared to stocks with high turnover. 
However, except for ln(Analyst Coverage) and ln(Market Cap), the average values of the 
other variables are not significantly different between the HRRA and HNRA groups. Table 
2.3 reports that the market cap of the stocks in the HRRA group is significantly higher than 
that of the HNRA group. 
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2.5.2 Univariate analyses 
A. Price discovery after recommendation revisions 
We investigate investor response to analyst recommendation changes using the AR on the 
recommendation change announcement day (i.e. event day) and using CARs for day +1 to day 
+10 after the recommendation changes. Figure 2.1 shows that, on average, investor responses 
are quicker for recommendation downgrades than for upgrades. The average CAR(1,10) 
observed on post-recommendation change days for downgrades is only 4.9% of the event day 
reaction, whereas the average CAR(1,10) for upgrades is about 25.7% of the event day reaction. 
Figure 2.2a focuses on the average CARs for day 1 to day 10 after recommendation changes 
and shows a price drift for recommendation upgrades: An investor who purchases stocks a day 
after recommendation upgrades earns, on average, an AR of 0.45% over 10 days (i.e. an AR of 
more than 12% p.a. without taking transaction costs into account). On the other hand, price 
changes after downgrades show an overreaction followed by price reversal: The average CAR 
(1, 10) for downgrades is only -0.09%, though CAR (1, 3) is -0.47%. Figure 2.2 b provides 
more insight into these price trends. Comparisons of average CARs over post-recommendation 
change days for the subsamples of extreme recommendation changes and normal 
recommendation changes show that, except for the subsample of normal upgrades, all the 
subsamples show a price reversal over 10 days after the recommendation changes. In the case 
of extreme upgrades, price trends even suggest investor overreaction on event day, since the 
average CAR (1, 10) is positive for this subsample.
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Table 2.4 provides the average ARs and average CARs for various upgrade and downgrade 
subsamples4. The average CARs for upgrades remain statistically significant, even 10 days after 
recommendation changes, resembling the findings of earlier research (Barber et al., 2001; Loh, 
2010). However for downgrades after day 5, CARs become statistically insignificant, suggesting a 
price reversal. Panel B of Table 4 report post-recommendation change CARs for extreme versus 
normal recommendation changes. A close look at this table suggests that the above-mentioned price 
patterns of the price drift for upgrades and price reversals for downgrades are due to the normal 
recommendation change subsamples. For extreme upgrades, no price drift is observed. Price 
reversal by day 5 is reported for extreme downgrades. 
Although the above-mentioned results report price changes following analyst recommendation 
revisions, several recommendation changes might not be considered clear recommendation changes 
by investors, namely, the recommendation revisions that indicate a hold recommendation. 
Depending on analysts’ past recommendations on the same stock, a hold recommendation might 
have a different meaning; at least this type of recommendation is less clear than a recommendation 
indicating a buy, strong buy, sell, or strong sell. Hence, we also create a subsample of non-
ambiguous recommendation changes by excluding recommendation changes with a hold 
recommendation. In Panel C of Table 2.4, compare the CARs for upgrades and downgrades within 
the non-ambiguous sample. The average CAR values in Panel C are similar to those reported in 
Panel A; however, for the non-ambiguous sample, the price drift is even greater for upgrades while 
the price reversal is faster (CARs become insignificant by day 5). 
                                                          
4 We have considered the financial crisis as a structural break and analysed the results. We find that the results are 
qualitatively similar even during the financial crisis period.  
 40 
Table 2.4 
Average CARs after revisions 
The average percentage CARs of stock recommendation changes are reported according to the different event windows for different 
recommendation change groups. The five-point rating scale ranges from 1 (sell) to 5 (strong buy). The recommendation changes 
range from -4 to +4. First, we categorise all observations as either upgrades (+1 to +4) or downgrades (-1,-4) and report the average 
CAR values. Second, we categorise revisions into one of four recommendation change groups: extreme downgrades (-4,-3), normal 
downgrades (-1,-2), normal upgrades (+1,+2), and extreme upgrades (+3,+4). Third, we filter the revisions by removing ambiguous 
revisions that result in the stock being an upgrade or downgrade to a hold rating. Then we form the groups for non-ambiguous 
upgrades and non-ambiguous downgrades. The table reports the CAR values calculated by adjusting for stock size and momentum. 
The AR each day is the raw Datastream return less the return on the matched size–momentum characteristic portfolio from Kenneth 
French’s website. The sum of the ARs during the event window is the CAR for the table. Alternatively, the CAR was calculated by 
adjusting for stock size and the book to market. The AR in this case is the raw Datastream return less the return on the matched size 
and book-to-market portfolio from Kenneth French’s website. (These results, although not tabulated, are available upon request.) 
Days when the lagged price is less than $1 are excluded and multiple recommendation days are also removed. Recommendations are 
from I/B/E/S from 2005 to 2012. The superscripts *, **, and *** denote statistical significance (based on standard errors clustered 
by calendar day) at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, with associated t-statistics in parentheses below the estimates. 
 
 
 
Group 
Event-Day 
Reaction  
Drift  
CAR(1, 1) 
Drift  
CAR(1, 5) 
Drift CAR(1, 
10) 
Full Sample 
Upgrades 1.75*** 
(23.20) 
0.36*** 
(8.99) 
0.49*** 
(6.52) 
0.45*** 
(4.67) 
Downgrades -1.82*** 
(-23.96) 
-0.42*** 
(-10.07) 
-0.34*** 
(-4.18) 
-0.09 
(-0.87) 
Extreme and Normal Samples 
Extreme Upgrades 2.09*** 
(5.01) 
0.25 
(0.94) 
0.37 
(0.68) 
-0.00 
(-0.01) 
Normal Upgrades 1.74*** 
(22.80) 
0.36*** 
(8.94) 
0.50*** 
(6.49) 
0.46*** 
(4.72) 
Normal Downgrades -1.82*** 
(-23.89) 
-0.41*** 
(-9.92) 
-0.34*** 
(-4.15) 
-0.12 
(-1.12) 
Extreme Downgrades -2.40*** 
(-2.82) 
-0.59* 
(-1.70) 
-0.46 
(-0.57) 
1.39 
(1.28) 
Ambiguous and Non-Ambiguous Samples 
Non-Ambiguous Upgrades 1.80*** 
(21.24) 
0.39*** 
(8.99) 
0.51*** 
(4.55) 
0.53*** 
(5.86) 
Non-Ambiguous Downgrades -1.68*** 
(-11.10) 
-0.38*** 
(-4.73) 
-0.40 
(-1.62) 
-0.27 
(-1.30) 
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B. Prior turnover and ARs 
Daily turnover is a commonly used proxy for investor attention (Loh, 2010; Peng and Xiong, 2006). 
Loh (2010) shows that stocks with low daily turnover experience a greater price drift following 
analyst recommendation changes. In Table 2.5, we report post-event CARs for stocks with high and 
low pre-event turnover. The statistical insignificance of the mean differences of the average CARs 
between the high- and low-turnover groups shows that differences in prior turnover generally do not 
explain post-recommendation revision drifts in our sample. In fact, for downgrades, on average, high-
turnover groups experience a more negative AR on day 1 than the low-turnover group does. The 
insignificant differences of average CARs between the high- and low-turnover groups are quite 
consistent across the subsample results reported in Panel B (extreme vs. normal recommendation 
changes) and Panel C (non-ambiguous recommendation changes). An exception to this price trend is 
observed for extreme downgrades, where significant price reversals are observed for high-turnover 
groups by the 10th day after the recommendation changes. These results do not support the limited 
attention-based explanation of post-recommendation drifts offered by Loh (2010). 
C. Investor sophistication, attention, and ARs 
The limited attention-based explanation for the ARs observed after recommendation changes 
assumes the rational trading behaviour of the investors who pay higher attention to market 
information. Therefore, those stocks that enjoy greater investor attention experience faster price 
discovery compared to stocks that do not receive high investor attention. However, various 
behavioural biases affect an individual’s decision making (Kahneman and Tversky, 1982). Therefore, 
it may not be obvious that attentive individual investors will always behave rationally. 
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Table 2.5 
Average CARs after revisions for turnover groups 
The average percentage CARs of stock recommendation changes are reported according to pre-revision turnover groups. For each day, 
observations are classified into a high- or low-turnover group according to the median daily percentage of shares traded within the 
window (-40,-1) of the recommendation. We report the results for the full sample for the CAR (1, 1), CAR (1, 5), and CAR(1, 10) 
windows, where the sample is separated into upgrades and downgrades. We then report the results for extreme downgrades (-3, -4), 
normal downgrades (-1, -2), normal upgrades (+1, +2), and extreme upgrades (+3, +4). The differences between the groups are reported 
for each category. Days when the lagged price is less than $1 are excluded and multiple recommendation days are also removed. 
Recommendations are from I/B/E/S from 2005 to 2012. The superscripts *, **, and *** denote statistical significance (based on 
standard errors clustered by calendar month) at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, with associated t-statistics in parentheses 
below the estimates. 
 
 
 
 
 
Full Sample 
 CAR(1,1) CAR(1,5) CAR(1,10) 
 Low  
High 
 
Diff Low 
 
High 
 
Diff Low 
 
High 
 
Diff 
Upgrades 0.33*** 
(9.71) 
0.38*** 
(3.84) 
-0.04 
(-0.49) 
0.38*** 
(6.41) 
0.61*** 
(3.24) 
-0.23 
(-1.27) 
0.39*** 
(4.22) 
0.51*** 
(2.56) 
-0.12 
(-0.46) 
Downgrades -0.34*** 
(-6.18) 
-0.48*** 
(-7.05) 
-0.14* 
(-1.77) 
-0.45*** 
(-4.65) 
-0.24 
(-97) 
-0.46 
(-0.70) 
-0.29* 
(-1.89) 
0.10 
(0.38) 
-0.39 
(-1.25) 
Extreme and Normal Revisions 
 CAR(1,1) CAR(1,5) CAR(1,10) 
 Low  
High 
 
Diff Low 
 
High 
 
Diff Low 
 
High 
 
Diff 
Extreme 
Upgrades 
0.68* 
(1.80) 
-0.02 
(-0.08) 
0.70 
(1.50) 
1.15** 
(2.08) 
-0.14 
(-0.21) 
1.29 
(1.52) 
1.39 
(1.34) 
-0.90 
(-0.84) 
2.29 
(1.46) 
Normal 
Upgrades 
0.32*** 
(9.57) 
0.39*** 
(3.82) 
-0.07 
(-0.62) 
0.37*** 
(6.32) 
0.63*** 
(3.42) 
-0.26 
(-1.44) 
0.38*** 
(3.61) 
0.54*** 
(3.28) 
-0.16 
(-0.81) 
Normal 
Downgrades 
-0.34*** 
(-6.08) 
-0.47*** 
(-6.69) 
0.13 
(1.62) 
-0.43*** 
(-4.41) 
-0.25 
(-1.03) 
-0.18 
(-0.65) 
-0.27** 
(-2.42) 
0.03 
(0.19) 
-0.30 
(-1.42) 
Extreme 
Downgrades 
-0.33 
(-1.27) 
-0.73 
(-1.14) 
0.40 
(0.62) 
-1.36*** 
(-3.15) 
0.05 
(0.04) 
-1.41 
(1.21) 
-1.48 
(-1.31) 
2.99** 
(1.96) 
-4.47** 
(2.01) 
Ambiguous and Non-Ambiguous Revisions 
 CAR(1,1) CAR(1,5) CAR(1,10) 
 Low  
High 
 
Diff Low High 
 
Diff Low 
 
High 
 
Diff 
Upgrades 0.35** 
(3.50) 
0.42** 
(5.89) 
-0.07 
(-0.84) 
0.45*** 
(5.23) 
0.57*** 
(4.33) 
-0.12 
(-0.81) 
0.47*** 
(4.16) 
0.59*** 
(3.58) 
-0.12 
(-0.63) 
Downgrades -0.29*** 
(-3.46) 
-0.46** 
(-3.69) 
0.17 
(1.08) 
-0.36** 
(-2.32) 
-0.44* 
(-1.72) 
0.06 
(0.26) 
-0.47** 
(-2.35) 
-0.10 
(-0.32) 
0.37 
(0.95) 
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Table 2.6 
Average CARs after revisions for retail attention groups 
The average percentage CARs of stock recommendation changes are reported according to pre-revision turnover groups. For each day, 
observations are classified into HRRA and HRNA groups according to the Ind_Attn variable for the week prior to the event week. The 
HRRA group contains all the revisions with Ind_Attn both above and below the median and Ins_Attn below the median. The HNRA 
group contains revisions with Ins_Attn above the median. We report the results for the full sample for the CAR(1, 1), CAR(1, 5), and 
CAR(1, 10) windows, (-1, -2), normal upgrades (+1, +2), and extreme upgrades (+3, +4). The differences between the groups are 
reported for each category. Days when the lagged price is less than $1 are excluded. Recommendations are from I/B/E/S from 2005 to 
2012. The superscripts *, **, and *** denote statistical significance (based on standard errors clustered by calendar month) at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively, with associated t-statistics in parentheses below the estimates.where the sample is separated into 
upgrades and downgrades. We first report the results for full upgrades and downgrades. Second, for extreme and normal groups.  
Thirdly for ambiguous and non-ambiguous groups. 
 
 
Full Sample 
 CAR(1,1) CAR(1,5) CAR(1,10) 
 HRRA 
 
HNRA 
 
Diff HRRA 
 
HNRA 
 
Diff HRRA 
 
HNRA 
 
Diff 
Upgrades 0.40*** 
(4.82) 
0.42*** 
(7.85) 
-0.02 
(-0.23) 
0.99*** 
(4.50) 
0.42*** 
(4.28) 
0.57*** 
(2.72) 
1.00*** 
(4.02) 
0.40*** 
(3.21) 
0.60** 
(2.34) 
Downgrades -0.41*** 
(-4.10) 
-0.42*** 
(-7.19) 
0.01 
(0.09) 
-0.40*** 
(-2.10) 
-0.30** 
(-2.65) 
-0.10 
(-0.47) 
0.04 
(0.17) 
-0.11 
(-0.78) 
0.15 
(0.67) 
Extreme and Normal Revisions 
 CAR(1,1) CAR(1,5) CAR(1,10) 
 HRRA 
 
HNRA 
 
Diff HRRA 
 
HNRA 
 
Diff HRRA 
 
HNRA 
 
Diff 
Extreme 
Upgrades 
0.32 
(0.55) 
0.26 
(0.78) 
0.06 
(0.09) 
2.72* 
(1.83) 
-0.68 
(-0.84) 
3.39*** 
(2.72) 
3.93 
(1.63) 
-1.56 
(-1.39) 
5.49*** 
(2.65) 
Normal 
Upgrades 
0.40*** 
(4.79) 
0.43*** 
(7.80) 
-0.03 
(-0.24) 
0.95*** 
(4.32) 
0.44*** 
(4.45) 
0.51** 
(2.43) 
0.95*** 
(3.75) 
0.44*** 
(3.5)) 
0.50** 
(1.96) 
Normal 
Downgrades 
-0.40*** 
(-4.35) 
-0.43*** 
(-7.26) 
0.02 
(0.24) 
-0.36** 
(-1.96) 
-0.32*** 
(-3.00) 
-0.04 
(-0.16) 
-0.06 
(-0.27) 
-0.12 
(-0.85) 
0.06 
(0.23) 
Extreme 
Downgrades 
-0.75 
(-0.71) 
0.09 
(0.25) 
-0.84 
(-0.89) 
-2.30 
(-0.91) 
1.08 
(1.24) 
-3.28 
(-1.52) 
4.39 
(1.26) 
0.62 
(0.50) 
3.77 
(1.22) 
 
Ambiguous and Non-Ambiguous Revisions 
 CAR(1,1) CAR(1,5) CAR(1,10) 
 HRRA 
 
HNRA 
 
Diff HRRA 
 
HNRA 
 
Diff HRRA 
 
HNRA 
 
Diff 
Upgrades 0.42*** 
(4.65) 
0.44*** 
(7.60) 
-0.02 
(-0.15) 
0.98*** 
(5.03) 
0.42*** 
(4.07) 
0.56*** 
(2.66) 
0.98*** 
(4.15) 
0.47*** 
(3.50) 
0.52** 
(1.96) 
Downgrades -0.39** 
(-2.19) 
-0.37** 
(-3.97) 
-0.03 
(-0.14) 
-0.41 
(-0.97) 
-0.17 
(-0.87) 
-0.24 
(-0.59) 
0.45 
(0.89) 
-0.42 
(-1.74) 
0.87* 
(1.75) 
 44 
Figure 2.3 
Post-recommendation revision drifts across retail attention groups 
   
 
This figure compares the average CARs after recommendation revisions for stocks in the HRRA 
group versus those in the HNRA group using non-ambiguous recommendations. The CARs for day 
1 to day 10 following recommendation upgrades (downgrades) are plotted in Figure 2.3 a (Figure 
2.3b). 
 
In Table 2.6, we report evidence of the differential influence of individual versus institutional investor 
attention on stock prices after analyst recommendation changes. Panel A of Table 2.6 shows, for 
recommendation upgrades, a significant difference in CARs between stocks in the HRRA and HNRA 
groups. For stocks in the HRRA group, the average CAR (1, 10) is 0.6% higher than that of the 
HNRA group. This suggests that price discovery is slower for stocks that enjoy greater attention from 
individual investors in the pre-event period. On the other hand, for downgrades, the differences 
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between the average CARs of the HRRA and HNRA groups are not statistically significant. However, 
a positive average CAR (1, 10) for the HRRA group reflects greater price reversal for stocks with 
HRRA compared to stocks in the HNRA group. 
The CARs for the sample of extreme and normal recommendations, reported in Panel B of Table 2.6, 
show price trends similar to those in Panel A. Stocks in the HRRA group experience a significantly 
greater price drift compared to those in the HNRA group for both extreme and normal upgrades. On 
the other hand, for downgrades, though average CARs are not significantly different between the 
HRRA and HNRA groups, a larger return increase for the HRRA group over the 10 days following 
event days reflect the group’s greater price reversal. This price reversal is more prominent for extreme 
downgrades. 
The average CARs from non-ambiguous recommendation changes are reported in Panel C of Table 
2.6. In the non-ambiguous sample, significant differences between the average CARs of the HRRA 
and HNRA groups are also observed for upgrades. For downgrades with non-ambiguous 
recommendations, the HRRA group shows a significantly higher price reversal compared to the 
HNRA group. The difference between the average CAR(1,10) values of the HRRA and HNRA 
groups is 0.87% (i.e. a return difference of about 25.26% p.a. without considering transaction costs). 
Figure 2.3 provides a visual comparison of the average CARs of the HRRA and HNRA groups using 
non-ambiguous recommendations. Figure 2.3a shows that, for upgrades, from day 2 onwards, the 
HRRA group experiences a significantly greater price drift compared to the HNRA group. On the 
other hand, Figure 2.3b shows that stocks in the HRRA group are subject to investor overreaction for 
the first four days following recommendation downgrades followed by a significant price reversal 
compared to the HNRA group. 
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The evidence suggests that higher attention alone may not be enough to explain price discovery after 
recommendation changes. The empirical evidence above indicates that, in the absence of institutional 
investors, attentive individual investors underreact and cause a delay in price discovery for upgrade 
recommendations. On the other hand, the evidence suggests that, for downgrades, attentive individual 
investors overreact, causing a large price decrease for the first four to five days before correcting their 
trading behaviour over the next five days. Therefore, it seems that investor sophistication as well as 
investor attention are important for price discovery. 
2.5.3 Multivariate analyses 
The results of the univariate analyses provide intriguing evidence related to the influence of 
individual investors’ attention on price discovery; however, these analyses do not control for various 
factors related to the characteristics of the firms and the market. It is therefore important to understand 
how far such evidence carries after controlling for the effects of various firm- and market-specific 
factors on ARs. 
To further explore the effect of greater individual investor attention on price discovery after analyst 
recommendation revisions, we use the following multiple regression model: 
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Where AttnentionIndividual_  refers to the variable AttnInd _  and a dummy variable indicating 
stocks from the HRRA group. The variables Extremeand ambiguousnon  refer to the dummy 
variables for extreme and non-ambiguous recommendation changes, respectively. The other control 
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variables ( ix ) in the model are the natural logarithm of stocks’ pre-recommendation market 
capitalisation (ln(Mkt_Cap)), stocks’ pre-recommendation return on assets (ROA) and debt-to-equity 
ratio (D/E), dummy variable for stocks with a pre-event turnover above the median (High_Turnover), 
dummy variable for stocks with analyst coverage above the median (High_analyst_coverage), the 
event-day AR (Event-day AR), and institutional attention ( AttnInst _ ). 
In Tables 7, Panel A and Panel B we report the estimated coefficients of the regression model 
described in Eq. (4). The estimated coefficients from recommendation upgrades, reported in Panel 
A, show that variables measuring individual investor attention ( AttnInd _  and the HRRA dummy) 
are both positive and significant in all the models. This result suggests that prior attention from 
individual investors has a positive and significant correlation to the CAR, even after 10 days of 
recommendation changes. We also do not find the high-turnover dummy and institutional attention (
AttnInst _ ) variables to be significant in any of the models reported in Table 2.7. This result is 
consistent with our earlier findings. 
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Table 2.7 
Multivariate regressions 
The dependent variable in the regression is CAR(1, 10). The main independent variables are Ind_Attn, Ins_Attn, and the HRRA dummy 
variable. We include the following control variables: Non-ambiguity (Where the variable takes a value of 1 if the recommendation is 
not a Hold, and zero otherwise), Event-day AR, Extreme (a large magnitude of the revision), D/E ratio or leverage, ROA for profitability, 
ln(Mkt_Cap), High Coverage (an indicator variable equal to one if analyst coverage is above the median), and High Turnover (an 
indicator variable equal to one if the pre-revision turnover is above the median). Column (1) uses the HRRA variable, column (2) 
controls for the interaction between HRRA and Non-ambiguity, and (3) uses Ins_Attn and Ind_Attn. Panel A (Panel B) reports the 
results for upgrades (downgrades). Industry and year fixed effects are controlled for. Standard errors are clustered by calendar month 
and are in parentheses. t-statistics are reported under each coefficient. The superscripts *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
Panel A: Upgrades 
 (1) (2) (3) 
HRRA 0.705** 0.620**  
 (2.05) (2.00)  
Ind_Attn   0.673* 
   (1.65) 
    
Non-Ambiguity 0.492* 0.572* 0.488* 
 (1.66) (1.65) (1.62) 
    
Non-Ambiguity × HRRA  -0.418  
  (-0.40)  
    
Non-Ambiguity ×Ind_Attn   -2.87 
   (-0.93) 
    
    
Event-Day AR -6.93 -6.94 -6.92 
 (-1.27) (-1.27) (-1.26) 
    
ln(Mkt_Cap) 0.0273 0.0268 0.0367 
 (0.24) (0.24) (0.31) 
    
Extreme -0.500 -0.499 -0.480 
 (-0.73) (-0.73) (-0.69) 
    
D/E 0.00564 0.00569 0.00622 
 (0.57) (0.58) (0.64) 
    
ROA 2.25 2.26 2.25 
 (1.23) (1.23) (1.19) 
    
High Coverage -0.520*** -0.520*** -0.512*** 
 (-2.10) (-2.09) (-2.01) 
    
High Turnover 0.271 0.271 0.298 
 (1.11) (1.10) (1.18) 
    
Inst_Attn   0.198 
   (1.02) 
    
Constant 0.529 0.544 0.432 
 (0.32) (0.33) (0.26) 
Observations 4944 4944 4944 
Adjusted R2 0.3% 0.3% 0.2% 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
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Panel B reports estimated coefficients from the downgrades. Two of the three models reported shows 
significant and positive coefficients for the individual investor attention variables, while, in column 
1, the coefficient of the individual attention variable is positive but insignificant. The coefficients of 
the HRRA dummy are both positive and insignificant in columns 1 and 2; however, the interaction 
Panel B: Downgrades    
 (1) (2) (3) 
HRRA 0.0658 0.873  
(0.21) (1.40)  
    
Ind_Attn   0.854* 
   (1.67) 
    
Non-Ambiguity -0.355* -0.570** -0.373* 
 (-1.70) (-1.96) (-1.80) 
    
Non-Ambiguity × HRRA  1.18*  
  (1.88)  
    
Non-Ambiguity ×Ind_Attn   2.21*** 
   (2.91) 
    
    
Event-Day AR -6.82 -6.81 -6.80 
 (-1.00) (-1.01) (-1.01) 
    
ln(Mkt_Cap) 0.254** 0.258** 0.260** 
 (2.44) (2.43) (2.45) 
    
Extreme 1.42* 1.37* 1.41* 
 (1.89) (1.84) (1.86) 
    
D/E -0.0108 -0.0107 -0.0102 
 (-0.62) (-0.62) (-0.59) 
    
ROA -1.56 -1.47 -1.54 
 (-0.32) (-0.30) (-0.31) 
    
High Coverage 0.214 0.195 0.221 
 (1.16) (1.03) (1.21) 
    
High Turnover 0.394 0.394 0.387 
 (1.22) (1.23) (1.20) 
    
Inst_Attn   0.583* 
   (1.68) 
    
    
Constant -4.13** -4.29** -4.19** 
 (-3.21) (-3.22) (-3.18) 
Observations 4940 4940 4940 
Adjusted R2 0.7% 0.8% 0.8% 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
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between the HRRA and non-ambiguous dummies is positive and significant. The individual attention 
variable ( AttnInd _ ) and its integration with the non-ambiguous dummy are both positive and 
significant in column 3. This evidence suggests individual attention is positively correlated to price 
reversals in downgrades. The significant and positive coefficients may even suggest event-day price 
overreactions after recommendation downgrades. 
The findings of the multivariate analyses support our initial findings that stocks that enjoy greater 
attention from retail investors than from institutional investors induce significant underreactions after 
analyst recommendation upgrades. On the other hand, these groups of stocks induce overreactions 
after recommendation downgrades and show significant price reversals within 10 days of 
recommendation revisions. 
2.5.4 Robustness analysis 
Our main analyses use Google’s SVI-based measure of individual investor attention, that is, 
AttnInd _ ; however, in the literature, low levels of institutional holdings are often used as a proxy 
for non-sophisticated investors’ (i.e. individual investors’) activities (e.g. Bartov et al., 2000; Collins 
et al., 2003). In this section, we use low institutional holdings as an alternative measure of individual 
investors’ attention to test the robustness of the findings reported above. 
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Table 2.8 
Robustness check: Alternative proxy for individual investor attention 
We repeat the analysis using institutional ownership as a proxy for individual investor attention. Panel A reports the average CAR 
values for low and high institutional ownership. These groups are formed by allocating revisions to the low (high) institutional 
ownership group if the institutional ownership percentage is below (above) the median. Panel A reports the results for the averages and 
their differences. Panel B reports the multivariate regression results, controlling for industry and year fixed effects. We report the 
individual effects of institutional ownership and the interactions with Non-ambiguity. Standard errors are clustered by calendar month 
and are in parentheses. The superscripts *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
  
Panel A: Non-Parametric Tests Using Individual Ownership Percentage 
Group CAR(1,1) CAR(1,5) CAR(1,10) 
Low 
 
High 
 
Diff Low  High 
 
Diff Low  High 
 
Diff 
Upgrades 0.43*** 
(6.39) 
0.31*** 
(5.93) 
0.12 
(1.42) 
0.81*** 
(6.57) 
0.27*** 
(2.54) 
0.54*** 
(3.29) 
0.65*** 
(3.88) 
0.29** 
(2.26) 
0.36* 
(1.69) 
Downgrades -0.37*** 
(-4.85) 
-0.41*** 
(-8.10) 
0.04 
(0.42) 
-0.35** 
(-2.25) 
-0.30*** 
(-3.08) 
-0.04 
(-0.24) 
-0.11 
(-0.58) 
-0.04 
(-0.32) 
-0.07 
(-0.50) 
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Panel B: Multivariate Regression Using Institutional Ownership Percentage 
 Upgrades Downgrades 
   
   
Low_Inst_Own 0.915*** 1.61** 
 (3.36) (2.49) 
   
Non-Ambiguous 0.525** 0.607** 
 (2.07) (2.36) 
   
   
Non-Ambiguous × 
Low_Inst_Own 
-0.182 
(0.21) 
1.53** 
(2.45) 
   
   
Event-Day AR -7.04 -6.77 
 (-1.29) (-1.02) 
   
ln(Mkt_Cap) 0.0678 0.281** 
 (0.58) (2.58) 
   
Extreme -0.464 1.30* 
 (-0.66) (1.78) 
   
D/E 0.00552 -0.0107 
 (0.56) (-0.62) 
   
ROA 2.07 -1.54 
 (1.13) (-0.32) 
   
High Coverage -0.503*** 0.230 
 (-2.03) (1.26) 
   
High Turnover 0.335 0.432 
 (1.41) (1.33) 
   
   
Constant 0.0493 -4.63** 
 (0.03) (-3.47) 
Observations 4944 4940 
Adjusted R2 0.003 0.009 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Yearly Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
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In Table 2.8, Panel A we compare the average CARs for stocks with low and high institutional 
ownership over 10 days after the recommendation changes. Stocks with institutional ownership 
below the median are classified as low institutional ownership stocks, while the other stocks 
belong to the high institutional ownership group. The reported differences in the average CARs 
of the two groups show significant differences for upgrades. Stocks with low institutional 
ownership show a significantly greater price drift compared to the high institutional ownership 
group. This result is in line with our main findings. However, for downgrades, no significant 
differences in average CARs are observed between these two groups. 
In Table 2.8, Panel B we provide the estimated coefficients for a multivariate regression model 
similar to that described in Eq. (4); however, in this model we use a low institutional ownership 
dummy (Low_Inst_Own) as a proxy for individual investors’ attention. We find the low 
institutional ownership dummy is positive and highly significant for both upgrades and 
downgrades. For downgrades, the coefficient of the interaction between the non-ambiguous 
and low institutional ownership dummies is also positive and significant. This result indicates 
that stocks with low institutional ownership induce a greater significant underreaction after 
recommendation uprades and a greater significant price reversal after recommendation 
downgrades. These results are consistent with our main findings and demonstrate the 
robustness of the results reported earlier. 
2.6 Conclusion 
We investigate the influence of individual investors’ attention on stock prices after analyst 
recommendation revisions. Using a strictly filtered sample of stocks listed in the US market 
over the period 2004–2012, we find evidence of asymmetric price reactions after analyst 
recommendation revisions. Our findings show investors underreact after recommendation 
upgrades. The CARs are positive and significant even after 10 days following the revision. 
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However, price reactions are faster for downgrades. For downgrades, price reversals are 
observed after three days of decreasing prices. The CARs between day 1 and 10 day  of 
recommendation downgrades are small and statistically insignificant. This finding is new, since 
the literature (Barber et al., 2001; Loh, 2010; Womack, 1996) reports a significant price drift 
after both upgrades and downgrades. 
Following Da et al. (2009), we use Google’s SVI to create a proxy for individual investors’ 
attention. We find stocks that receive greater attention from individual investors show a 
significantly greater price drift after analyst recommendation upgrades. On the other hand, 
these groups of stocks induce a greater price overreaction followed by a significant price 
reversal after recommendation downgrades. This evidence suggests that even attentive 
individual investors may not behave rationally. The findings of this study could be explained 
by psychological biases such as the disposition effect (i.e. selling winners after 
recommendation upgrades) or regret aversion, where investors regret errors due to commission 
(i.e. losses on existing investments after downgrades) more than errors due to omission (i.e. 
foregoing potential gains after upgrades). Our results show this evidence is even stronger with 
less ambiguous recommendations. 
In this study, we provide evidence that suggests that investor attention alone may not be enough 
for price discovery after information release. Our results show that individual investors 
underreact and overreact significantly, even when they are paying attention. This could suggest 
that, along with investor attention, investor sophistication plays an important role in 
establishing an informationally efficient market.  
 
55 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
Analyst Characteristics and Individual Investor Attention 
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3.1 Introduction 
Investors extract important information from the recommendations of equity analysts; this information 
then guides their investment decisions. Therefore, it is important for investors to identify the 
recommendations of analysts that are credible in order to make informed financial decisions. 
Behavioural biases of investors prevent them from considering indicators of credibility when 
responding to the recommendations of analysts. The behavioural biases of investors also make them 
more interested in analyst characteristics that are superficial and that do not indicate credibility. The 
purpose of this study is to identify the nature of the analyst characteristics that lead to changes in 
investor attention and to examine the effects of these attention changes on the prices of securities.  
A number of studies suggest that investors respond significantly to analyst characteristics that indicate 
a high level of credibility with respect to the information released (Hendricks.et.al, 1993; Gu and Wu, 
2003; Mikhail.et.al, 2004). However, Clement and Tse (2005) have shown that there are larger 
abnormal returns after analyst recommendations by larger brokers. Similarly, Gleason and Lee (2003) 
have suggested that forecasts issued by celebrity analysts that attract more investor attention have a 
larger stock price impact than forecasts by obscure but highly accurate analysts. Sorescu and 
Subramanyam (2006) have shown that investors react strongly when the recommendation has 
“strength” (extremeness of information) characteristics as opposed to “weight” (credibility of 
information) characteristics. Barber and Odean (2008) argue that individual investors are more prone 
to buy attention-grabbing stocks than institutional investors.  
 First, I examine the relationship between the characteristics (strength and weight) of analyst 
recommendations and the post-announcement change in individual investor attention. Griffin and 
Tversky (1992) have indicated that individuals emphasise the strength of information (e.g., the warmth 
of a recommendation letter) and under-emphasize the weight (the credibility of the letter writer). 
Supporting this notion, Sorescu and Subramanyam (2006) have found that investors emphasize on the 
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strength of the recommendation (the dramatic nature indicated by the magnitude of the 
recommendation change) whereas they de-emphasize the weight (the credibility, as indicated by the 
experience of the analyst). I build on the work of Sorescu and Subramanyam (2006) by identifying the 
relationship between analyst characteristics (strength and weight) and an active measure for the 
attention of individual investors. Da, Engelberg, and Gao (2011) introduced the notion that an abnormal 
change in the Google Search Volume Index is a more accurate measure of the change in individual 
investor attention than alternative measures. I examine the relationship between analyst characteristics 
and the change in individual investor attention. I focus on individual investor attention because 
individuals are more prone to attention related behavioural biases (Barber and Odean, 2008; 
Hirshleifer.et.al, 2011; Bartov.et.al, 2000) 
Second, I investigate how a post-revision change in individual investor attention is associated with the 
magnitude of the post-recommendation drift. Studies such as Peng and Xiong (2006), Peress (2008), 
Loh (2010), and DellaVigna and Pollet (2009) have shown that investor inattention leads to a price 
drift after company specific announcements. However, these studies measure investor attention using 
indirect proxies (e.g. media coverage, high distraction days, and turnover). They implicitly assume that 
there is a change in actual investor attention that leads to an investor reaction. I go beyond prior studies 
by examining the change in individual investor attention after announcements using the Google SVI 
measure and examine the relationship between this change in individual investor attention and the post-
recommendation drift.  
Third, I investigate the direction of the relationship between analyst characteristics, the change in 
individual investor attention, and the post-recommendation drift. Sorescu and Subramanyam (2006) 
have argued that the strength/weight of analyst recommendations leads to a stronger/weaker change in 
attention and that this change leads to a reversal/drift in the prices of securities. Although, Sorescu and 
Subramanyam (2006) clearly measured the relationship between analyst characteristics (strength and 
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weight) and the prices of securities (reversal and drift), they did not consider how the analyst 
characteristics directly affect the change in investors’ attention. Da et al. (2011) have suggested the 
Google Search Volume Index is a good proxy for attention, which directly measures the level of 
attention paid by individual investors. I build on the work by Sorescu and Subramanyam (2006) by 
including the change in investor attention variable (measured using Google SVI), which is an essential 
component in establishing the direction of the relationship under investigation.  
First, the results indicate that individual investors pay attention to both low-strength revisions issued 
by high-weight analysts and “high-strength revisions issued by low-weight analysts”. In contrast, 
institutional investors do not pay attention to “high strength revisions issued by low-weight analysts”. 
The results also indicate that individual investors react immediately after high-weight revisions, even 
when the strength is low. However, they tend to view high-strength revisions by low-weight analysts 
with initial scepticism, which is consistent with the findings of Sorescu and Subramanyam (2006). 
Furthermore, the results indicate that individual investors rather than institutional investors determine 
the portion of the event-reaction that is consistent with the direction of the recommendation revision. 
This evidence is consistent with Kadan et al. (2014), who suggested that only individual investors trade 
in the same direction as the change in recommendation after the revision is released.  
With respect to the event-date(s), the results indicate that the investors tend to pay attention and react 
strongly after “high-weight, low-strength” downgrades, although there is no such reaction after 
corresponding upgrades. This finding is consistent with the notion that individual investors exhibit 
negative attention bias (Barber and Odean, 2008). My results are also consistent with the notion that 
individual investors delay their reaction after “high-strength, low-weight” revisions, which 
subsequently leads to a post-revision drift. This finding is consistent with the argument that individual 
investors are more likely to be swayed by “strength (extreme nature)” even when the “weight 
(credibility)” is low, even though they are initially sceptical of the large revisions made by low ability 
59 
 
 
analysts (see Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1998; Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam, 1998; 
Sorescu and Subramanyam, 2006). My results are consistent with the findings of Sorescu and 
Subramanaym (2006) for the shorter windows.  
Furthermore, the results indicate that the event-week changes in individual attention results in a larger 
drift after the event-week only for “high-strength, low-weight” revisions. This result is consistent with 
the notion that individual investors immediately pay attention to “high-strength, low-weight” upgrades; 
however, they are initially sceptical when responding to these revisions and exhibit a delayed reaction 
(post-revision drift). Even when the weight (the ability of the analysts) is low, the dramatic nature of 
the revisions induces individual investors to exhibit a delayed response. The evidence also substantiates 
my claim that individual investors exhibit negative attention bias. 
The two-stage least square analysis suggests that the nature of analyst characteristics leads to a change 
in the attention of investors, and that the change in attention leads to a delayed investor reaction (drift). 
My results show that it is mainly individual investors that tend to pay attention to large (dramatic) 
revisions made by low-weight analysts. This leads to a change in individual attention after these 
revisions and a subsequent post-revision drift (delayed reaction) after such revisions. In contrast, 
individual investors tend to react immediately after “low-strength, high-weight” downgrades, which 
lead to a strong event-reaction, short-term drift, and a subsequent reversal. Overall, the evidence shows 
that only individual investors pay attention to the “strength” of the revision even when the “weight” is 
low. However, they overreact to the low-strength downgrades when issued by “high-weight” analysts. 
Taken together, the results can be explained by the attention hypothesis proposed by Griffin and 
Tversky (1992) and negative attention bias (Baumeister et al., 2001). 
This chapter makes several contributions. First, it contributes to the strand of literature linking analyst 
recommendations and investor attention. This study extends Sorescu and Subramanaym (2006) by 
including a measure of the change in individual investor attention that links analyst characteristics and 
the prices of securities. The inclusion of this attention measure provides evidence for the direction of 
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the relationship and the mechanism through which analyst characteristics affect post-revision drifts. 
Specifically, Sorescu and Subramanyam (2006) have argued that high strength and low weight analyst 
recommendations lead to price reversals, whereas low strength high weight recommendations lead to 
price drifts. Da et al. (2011) have suggested that the Google SVI is a superior measure of individual 
attention. The inclusion of the change in individual investor attention variable (Google Search Volume 
Index) will enable a more thorough explanation of the change in attention after analyst revisions. 
Abnormal changes in the Google Search Volume Index is used to measure changes in the attention of 
investors. The Search Volume Index indicates the number of times a specific stock has been searched 
for using its ticker code. Therefore this is a revealed attention measure: “if you search for a stock in 
Google, you are undoubtedly paying attention to it” (Da et al., 2011,pp.1462). 
Second, it offers an explanation for the post-recommendation change drift using the attention 
hypothesis and negative attention allocation bias. Although previous studies, such as Loh (2010), have 
used attention related biases to explain the post-recommendation drift, these studies have focused on 
the pre-revision attention level rather than the change in attention after the release of news (e.g. Gleason 
and Lee 2003; Loh, 2010). My study goes beyond previous studies by considering the post-
recommendation change in investor attention. This extension will be relevant when identifying the 
characteristics that investors consider before making investment decisions.  
Third, my study refines the methodology used by Loh (2010) by considering a relatively smaller event-
window relative to Sorescu and Subramanyam (2006). I concentrate on a shorter period due to the 
frequency with which analyst recommendations are released. Loh (2010) has reported that firms release 
analyst recommendations six to eight times every year, on average. It is also common practice for 
different brokers to release their recommendations regarding a specific firm within a few days/weeks 
of other brokers having released their reports. Hence, it is difficult to infer price reactions over a longer 
horizon, as there may be a confounding effect due to other events and announcements in the market.  
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The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature related to this study. 
Section 3 explains the hypotheses development. Section 4 describes the data and the methodology 
employed in the study. Section 5 reports the main empirical results, and section 6 discusses the 
conclusions. 
 
3.2 Literature Review 
3.2.1 Investor Attention 
Pashler and Johnston (1998) have suggested that the central cognitive processing capacity of the human 
brain is constrained. The productivity of individuals with respect to each task depends on the amount 
of time they allocate to each task. Griffin and Tversky (1992) have argued that individuals make 
decisions based on how they perceive strength, while making some adjustments based on the weight, 
or credibility, of the analyst. Individuals tend to focus on the strength (the extremeness) of the 
information and place insufficient emphasis on the weight (the credibility) of the information. Another 
strand of psychological literature indicates that there is a negativity bias in attention allocation 
(Baumeister et al., 2001). This means that individuals tend to assign more attention and react more 
strongly when confronted with negative information as compared to when they are confronted with 
positive information.  
Among theoretical studies that relate stock prices to investor attention, Merton (1987) was the first to 
introduce a model for capital market equilibrium under conditions of incomplete information. Merton 
(1987) theorizes that when fundamental factors are held constant, the firm value increases as a function 
of investor recognition. Peng (2005) hypothesized that investors allocate more information processing 
capacity on firms with high fundamental uncertainty. The model implies that larger firms receive more 
capacity allocation and that their prices react more to earnings of a given magnitude. In other words, 
the Peng (2005) model predicts a longer price drift after announcements relating to smaller firms than 
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larger firms. A related study by Peng and Xiong (2006) predicts that investors underreact to company 
specific announcements, such as earnings announcements and analyst recommendations. A number of 
other theoretical studies also predict that asset prices depend on investor attention (Hirshleifer and 
Teoh, 2003; Hirshleifer.et.al, 2004; Sims, 2003; Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp, 2010). 
Empirical studies provide indirect and direct evidence of investor attention and the prices of securities. 
For instance, Brennan, Jagadeesh, and Swaminathan (1993) explained that the returns on the portfolios 
of firms that are followed by many analysts tend to lead returns of portfolios of firms that are followed 
by fewer analysts. Lo and Mackinlay (1990) reported that returns on larger stocks are higher than the 
returns on smaller stocks. Cohen and Frazzini (2008) have suggested that investors do not appear to 
pay attention to customer linkages that are publicly available. Gleason and Lee (2003) have shown that 
recommendations by celebrity analysts that attract more attention have a larger impact than 
recommendations by obscure but highly accurate analysts. 
Hirshleifer.et.al. (2011) h a v e  suggested that limited i nd i v i du a l  investor attention causes the post 
earnings announcement drift, using the amount o f  news released each day as a proxy for 
investor attention. DellaVigna and Pollet (2009) supported this evidence by examining the post-
earnings announcement drift on high distraction days such as Fridays; whereas Peress (2008) used 
media coverage in the Wall Street Journal to explain the post-earnings announcement drift. Barber and 
Odean (2008) have reported that individual investors are more likely to be net buyers of attention 
grabbing stocks than institutional investors. Barber and Odean (2008) argued that this tendency might 
contribute to momentum in small stocks with losses.  
Sorescu and Subramanyam (2006) examined whether the strength
1 and the weight of the 
recommendation signal leads to a drift or a reversal of the returns. Supporting Griffin and Tversky’s 
(1992) hypothesis, high strength-low weight recommendations are followed by a post-recommendation 
                                                          
1 Strength is measured using the magnitude of the recommendation change, arguing that investors pay more attention 
when the magnitude is higher. Weight is represented by the analyst experience.  
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drift, and low strength-high weight recommendations are followed by a reversal of returns. However, 
in shorter windows the result appears to be contrary to the long-term result. They found that there is an 
initial scepticism for large revisions by low-weight analysts, possible due to investors interpreting these 
changes as overreactions by analysts to extreme information (Barberis et al., 1998; Daniel.et.al, 1998) 
 Loh (2010) used trading volume as a proxy for investor attention to claim that investor attention is a 
plausible explanation for the post-recommendation drift. Da et al.’s study (2011) is distinct from prior 
studies because of the use of Google Search Volume Index (SVI) to measure individual investor 
attention. Da et al. (2011) have argued that the proxies used in past studies are flawed. 
 
3.2.2 Analyst Characteristics 
Stickel (1992) first examined the importance of the reputation of analysts. Stickel (1992) concluded 
that analyst reputation is positively related to the frequency of forecast revisions, forecast accuracy, 
and market reactions. Stickel (1995) further examined the effect of reputation on short-term and long-
term market reactions and concluded that reputation has a permanent impact on the market reaction. 
Cliff and Dennis (2005) examined a sample of IPOs and found that underpricing is positively related 
to the presence of an all-star analyst in the research staff of the lead underwriter. Gleason and Lee 
(2003) found that the recommendations of highly esteemed analysts elicit a stronger immediate price 
reaction, but a lesser pronounced subsequent price drift. 
Clement and Tse (2005) and Hong, Kubik, and Solomon (2000) have suggested that (1) the likelihood 
of boldness increases with the analyst’s experience and (2) experienced analyst are more likely than 
inexperienced analysts to lose their jobs after having provided inaccurate or bold forecasts. These 
findings lend support to the theoretical literature, which suggests that forecast boldness is linked to 
career concerns, reputation, and self-assessed ability (Scharfstein and Stein, 1990; Trueman, 1994). 
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Clement and Tse (2005) have further claimed that bold forecasts are linked with general experience as 
opposed to firm-specific experience. 
 Mikhail et al. (2004) was the first study to consider the effect of past accuracy in sell-side analyst 
research. This study concluded that the five-day period return as well as the post-recommendation drift 
was positively related to past return persistence (Mikhail et al., 2004). Hilary and Hsu (2013) have 
asserted that analysts that consistently make forecast errors have a greater ability to affect prices than 
accurate analysts. The authors measure forecast error consistency using the volatility of unexpected 
errors. 
Some studies have suggested that recommendations accompanied by earnings revisions are more 
profitable and have greater market reactions (see also: Loh et al., 2010; Jagadeesh and Titman, 2001; 
Cornell, 2001). Brav and Lehavy (2003) h a v e  suggested that recommendation revisions 
accompanied by target prices are relatively more informative. 
Barber, Lehavy, and Trueman (2010) have argued that the market reactions to analyst recommendation 
changes are a function of the analyst recommendation change conditional on the rating level. 
Depending on the ratings change, Buy and Strong Buy recommendations have greater returns than do 
Holds, Sells, and Strong Sells. Depending on the ratings level, upgrades earn the highest returns and 
downgrades the lowest. The strength of the signal depends on the recommendation change as well as 
the recommendation level.  
Sorescu and Subramanyam (2006) classify analyst characteristics according to the weight of the 
recommendation and the strength of the signal. The prior analyst literature examines both the weight 
characteristics (e.g. experience, past accuracy, reputation) as well as the strength characteristics (e.g. 
rating change, rating level, broker size, celebrity status of analysts). Gleason and Lee (2003) have 
provided indirect evidence that that the strength of the signal (the celebrity status of analyst) is 
emphasized more than the weight of the signal (the past accuracy of the analyst) when investors 
respond to analyst information. Sorescu et al. (2006) formally examined this hypothesis and concluded 
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that the strength rather than the weight of recommendations are given more attention by investors. 
Consequently, there is a reversal after high-strength and low weight analyst recommendations, whereas 
there is a drift after high-weight and low-strength analyst recommendations.  
 
3.3 Hypothesis Development 
Sorescu and Subramanyam (2006) established what is the foundation for my study. Sorescu and 
Subramanyam (2006) applied the attention hypothesis developed by Griffin and Tversky (1992) to the 
prices of securities after the release of analyst recommendations. Sorescu and Subramanyam (2006) 
have argued that analyst characteristics (strength and weight) lead to changes in investor attention and 
that changes in investor attention lead to an investor reaction (underreaction and overreaction).  
 
Figure 3.1 
Analyst Characteristics and the Post-Revision Drift 
 
Sorescu and Subramanyam (2006) directly examined the association between analyst characteristics 
(weight and strength) and the investor reaction (drift or reversal). They considered analyst experience to 
be a reflection of the weight of the signal, and the magnitude of the revision (i.e. how many levels the 
revision was for) to be a reflection of the strength of the signal. Griffin and Tversky (1992) have 
suggested that the level of the change in attention is a result of the strength more so than the weight of 
the signal. A number of related studies have established an association between analyst characteristics 
and market reactions (e.g.: Barber et al., 2001; Clement and Tse, 2005; Gleason and Lee, 2003; Barber 
Analyst Characterictis 
(Strength and Weight)
Change in Investor Attention
Investor Underreaction(Drift)
OR
Investor Overreaction 
(Reversal)
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et al., 2010). Studies such as Hirshleifer et al. (2011), Barber and Odean (2008) and Loh (2010) have 
established a relationship between the pre-announcement level of attention and the market reaction. 
These studies implicitly assume that the revision leads to a post-revision change in attention, and that, in 
turn, investors respond with a larger post-event return. However, they do not specifically examine the 
degree to which there is a change in attention after the revision. Building on these studies, my first 
hypothesis examines whether individual investors pay more/less attention after high-strength/low-
strength revisions issued by low-weight analysts. I consider the attention paid to revisions by individual 
investors because individual investors are more prone to behavioural biases (Bartov et al., 2000; 
Hishleifer et al., 2011; Barber and Odean, 2008). Hence, individual investors are more likely to be 
attracted by more dramatic revisions, even when low-weight analysts issue them.  
 
H1: There are larger/smaller changes in individual investor/institutional attention after high strength 
revisions issues by low weight analysts.  
 
Sorescu and Subramanyam (2006) found that the immediate reactions are smaller for high-strength 
revisions by low-weight analysts. They suggested that investors view such changes with scepticism 
because they sense a possible overreaction by analysts to extreme information signals (see also: Barberis 
et al., 1998; Daniel.et.al, 1998). This explanation is inconsistent with the attention hypothesis, which 
suggests that individual investors pay more attention to high-strength revisions by low-weigh analysts. 
In this study, I consider the impact of high-strength revisions by low-weight analysts on the event reaction 
as well as the post-event return. I build on the work by Sorescu and Subramanyam (2006) by examining 
a somewhat shorter event window after filtering out all earnings announcements and forecasts that are 
issued within 21 trading days of the revisions. I also remove any trading days with multiple 
recommendation changes. Loh (2010) has reported that each firm, on average, releases analyst 
recommendations six to eight times every year. It is also common practice for different brokers to release 
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their recommendations regarding a specific firm within a few days/weeks of other brokers having 
released their reports. Hence, it is difficult to infer price reactions for a longer horizon without 
incorporating the confounding effects of other events and announcements on the market. In my second 
hypothesis, I examine whether “high-strength and low-weight revisions” and “low-strength and high-
weight revisions” influence the immediate event reaction and the post-event return after the event date. 
Given that predominantly unsophisticated individual investors respond to high-strength revisions issued 
by low-weight analysts, I expect a larger drift after “high-strength and low-weight revisions”. Peng 
(2005) has suggested that the change in attention is expected to lead to a change in investor reaction 
(underreaction or overreaction). Kadan et al. (20014) have suggested that it is mainly unsophisticated 
individual investors who trade in line with the direction of recommendations after the recommendations 
are released. I expect unsophisticated individual investors to immediately pay attention to high-strength 
revisions issued by low-weight analysts, but to delay their reactions. 
 
H2: Post-event return drifts/event day returns are larger/weaker for high-strength and low-weight 
revisions/low-weight and high-weight revisions. 
 
My third hypothesis examines whether the association between the change in individual investor 
attention and the post-revision drift is stronger after “high-strength and low-weight” revisions. This 
hypothesis examines whether unsophisticated individual investors pay attention to “high-strength and 
low-weight” revisions, which consequently leads to a delayed reaction (post-revision drift). For “low-
strength and high-weight” and “high-strength and low-weight” revisions respectively, I examine the 
association between the change in individual attention and the post-revision drift. If the post-revision 
drift(s) were strongly associated with the event-week attention paid by individual investors, this would 
indicate that individual investors pay attention to the revision and also exhibit a delayed reaction (a 
post-revision drift). I expect the association between the change(s) in individual attention and the post-
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revision drift(s) to be larger/smaller for high-strength and low-weight/low-strength and high-weight 
revisions.  
 
H3: The relationship between the post-revision changes in individual investor attention and return drifts, 
are stronger for “high strength and low weight revisions” compared to “low strength and high weight 
revisions”.  
 
This chapter also considers the association between the post-announcement change in investor attention 
and the post-announcement drift, whereas prior studies mainly focus on the pre-announcement level of 
investor attention (see: Hou, Xiong, and Peng, 2009; Peress, 2008; and Loh, 2010). Therefore, individual 
investor attention changes and price reactions occur simultaneously, which results in the direction of the 
relationship being unclear. For example, a larger change in price can lead to more individuals paying 
attention and vice versa. Therefore the direction of the relationship needs to be established between these 
factors. I construct the following hypothesis in order to establish the direction of the relationship between 
the strength and weight factors and the post-revision drift.  
 
H4: The absolute magnitude of the post-revision drift is positively associated with the post-revision 
change in individual investor attention, predicted using the strength and the weight of the signal.  
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3.4 Data, Variables and Methodology 
3.4.1 Data Sample 
A. Recommendations Data 
I collect the stock recommendations sample from the Thomson Financials I/B/E/S database for the 
period between December 1993 and December 2012. The original sample include all stocks in the 
Russell 3000 US index between 2004 and 2012. I select the period starting from January 2004 because 
of the availability of Google SVI data. 
I/B/E/S classifies recommendations as: 1 (Strong buy), 2 (Buy), 3 (Hold), 4 (Underperform) and 5 
(Sell). I reverse the ratings from most favourable to most unfavourable (5 for Strong buy and 1 for Sell) 
in order to make the calculation of the recommendation changes clearer. I mainly focus on the 
recommendation changes since prior studies show that recommendation changes are relatively more 
informative (Boni and Womack, 2006; Loh and Stulz, 2010; Jagadeesh and Kim, 2010). I calculate 
the recommendation changes as the current recommendation minus the immediately prior 
recommendation made by the same analyst. These recommendation changes range from -4 to +4. 
I remove any analyst initiations (first time recommendations) from the sample. I also remove any 
recommendation changes when the previous recommendation was issued more than 1 year ago. 
Excluded from the sample are recommendation changes issued within 21 trading days of the earnings 
announcements to avoid the market reaction being confounded by other variables. I apply this filter 
to ensure that the post-recommendation drift and the post-earnings announcement drift are not 
combined. I obtain the quarterly earnings announcement dates from the Data Stream Database 
of Thomson Reuters. 
Furthermore, I also remove recommendation changes that were issued within 21 trading days of 
earnings forecasts and target prices (I obtain this data from I/B/E/S). This filter is necessary because 
I use a range of event windows. Therefore, I have to be certain that the responses to other analyst 
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information do not confound the analyst recommendations. I also exclude any recommendations 
issued by anonymous analysts and anonymous brokerage houses since it is not possible to calculate 
their recommendation changes. 
B. Attention Data 
Da et al. (2011) proposed using the Google Search Volume Index as a proxy for active attention 
by investors. I gather the weekly SVIs for individual stocks from 2004 to 2012. Google trends data is 
available from the year 2004 onwards.  
Da et al. (2011) have also suggested that the use of the company name as a keyword for the 
SVI is problematic because the company name is likely to have multiple connotations; consumers 
might search for the company name for reasons unrelated to investing and because of the use of 
alternative names for the same company. In contrast, the use of the stock ticker is less ambiguous 
(Da et al., 2011). Therefore, I use the stock ticker for each stock when obtaining data for the stock. 
For example, I use “AAPL” to see if an investor had been searching for the Apple Inc. stock. I 
confine the searches to within the United States because all the stocks being examined are from the 
United States. 
C. Stock Returns 
I obtain the daily returns of all the individual stocks in the U.S. Russell 3000 Index from the Data 
Stream Thomson Reuters Database. I also obtain the monthly market capitalization and the 
monthly book-to-market values for each stock from Data Stream. 
I derive the benchmark returns for benchmark portfolios from the Kenneth R. French data library 
[http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/index.html]. Specifically, I use the daily 
“Detail for 25 Portfolios Formed on Size and Book-to-Market” file and the daily “Detail for 25 
Portfolios Formed Daily on Size and Momentum” file. 
I categorise stocks into different Size, B/M, and Momentum quintiles using the U.S. Research 
Breakpoints Data Files. I then calculate the characteristic adjusted abnormal return(s) by deducting 
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the corresponding daily benchmark return(s) from the daily raw stock return. Specifically, I 
calculate the size and the B/M adjusted abnormal return(s), as well as the size and momentum 
adjusted abnormal return(s). 
D. Strength and Weight Variables 
My proxy for strength is the magnitude of the recommendation changes. A one level change is 
considered as low strength, two-level change is classified as medium strength and three and four level 
changes are classified as high strength. These variables are constructed following the intuition of 
Sorescu and Subramanyam (2006) that three- to four-level changes are likely to be more dramatic and 
vivid.  
My proxies for weight are the analyst experience (the number of years the analyst is present in the 
IBES detail file), and the Carter and Manster (1990) reputation ranks obtained from the Jay Ritter 
website2.  
E. Descriptive Statistics 
Figure 3.2 presents the distribution of the recommendation revisions after all the filters have been 
employed. I exclude any recommendation revisions that occur within one trading month of an earnings 
announcement and/or an earning forecast, and all the days that have multiple recommendations. This is 
a necessary filter in order to ensure than my results are not confounded with other market announcements 
that occur in close proximity to the recommendations. The bar-chart shows the frequencies of the 
recommendation revisions. Re-iterations make up the largest proportion of the sample, accounting for 
around 26 %. More extreme revisions, which are more/less than 3 levels of magnitude, amount to only 
1.36% of the sample. One-point revisions also account for a large proportion (44%), whereas two-point 
revisions amount to 28%. The distribution of the sample indicates that one point and two-point revisions 
are more frequent than extreme revisions (i.e. of more than three-levels). Furthermore, the distribution 
                                                          
2 Ritter’s website is http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter 
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appears to have similar proportions of positive revisions compared to the corresponding negative 
revisions, making my sample relative unbiased towards positive and/or negative revisions.  
 
 
Figure 3.2 
Distribution of Recommendation Revisions 
Figure 3.2 shows the distribution of my recommendation revisions sample. The recommendation changes are calculated as the current 
recommendation minus the previous recommendation. The recommendation ratings are codes from 1 (Sell) to Strong Buy (5), which 
in reverse of the I/B/E/S rating system. The recommendation revisions range from -4 to +4. The full recommendations sample contains 
14,344 revisions. This excludes revisions issued within 21 trading days of earnings announcements, excludes multiple 
recommendation days, and excludes days where the stock price was less than $1. The sample also only includes observations with an 
analyst code and a consensus recommendation; anonymous analyst recommendations are excluded.  
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Table 3.1 presents the descriptive statistics for the weight and strength proxies. Panel A presents the 
descriptive statistics for the analyst weight proxies. 
The mean analyst experience is over 7 years, whereas the median is approximately 6 years. The statistics 
indicate that there is only a slight positive skewness. The mean and the median reputation ranks are very 
close to 7. Therefore, there is a negligible skewness in the reputation rank variable. The numbers of 
observations are smaller for the reputation weight proxy because the reputation ranks are only available 
until the year 2011. Nevertheless, a substantial number of observations exist for each proxy. My sample 
is smaller relative to Sorescu and Subramanyam (2006) because I removed any multiple recommendation 
dates and removed all recommendation changes issued within 21 trading days of earnings 
announcements. Therefore, my sample is less likely to have been affected by confounding events. As in 
the study by Altinkilic and Hansen (2009), it is necessary to remove possible confounding events when 
examining the post-revision drift. Nevertheless, a comparison between my sample and the sample used 
by Sorescu and Subramanaym (2006) shows that my weight proxies are slightly larger. For instance, the 
mean level of experience is 7 years compared to the 4 years reported by Sorescu and Subramanyam 
(2006). This is possibly because of the filtering process, which removes a few less experienced analysts 
from the sample. Furthermore, my sample is more recent, which makes it more likely for analysts to be 
listed in IBES for a longer period of time. The distribution of the reputation proxies is similar in my 
sample as in the sample of Sorescu and Subramanyam (2006), with similar means (around 7) and similar 
maximum and minimum values. 
Panel B reports the distribution of the proxies for strength. A majority of the recommendation changes 
are for low magnitude revisions (1 and 0 level change), which accounts for almost 70% of the sample. 
The medium magnitude revisions (2 level changes) account for 28.5% of the recommendation changes. 
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The smallest portion of the sample is accounted for by the high strength (3-4 level change) revisions, 
which account for only 1.3% of the sample. The strength of the revision is represented by the extremeness 
of the information, as predicted by Griffin and Tversky (1992). Therefore it is intuitive to observe that 
the most dramatic recommendation changes are the most infrequent in the sample. These include 
recommendation changes involving the maximum shift in the recommendation (e.g. Strong Buy to 
Strong Sell; Strong Sell to Strong Buy) and three point recommendation changes (e.g. Strong Buy to 
Sell; Strong Sell to Buy). These recommendation changes represent the most dramatic and vivid changes 
in an analyst’s opinions about a stock. Therefore, they are likely to receive more attention by investors 
(Sorescu and Subramanyam, 2006). Since, the majority of recommendation changes are of the low and 
medium magnitude variety, the results for high magnitude revisions could suffer from a lack of statistical 
power. My recommendation revisions sample has a similar distribution to Sorescu and Subramanyam 
(2006).  
I further fine-tune the definition of strength using two alternative interpretations. First, I classify the 
strength according to the clarity of the signal. According to Barber et al. (2010), the magnitude alone 
does not provide a complete picture of how investors interpret the meaning of revisions. Therefore, I 
consider all revisions to “Hold” as unclear signals and the remainder as clear signals. Although I use an 
alternative definition, revisions classified as high-strength by Sorescu and Subramanyam (2006) remain 
classified as “clear” signals. Therefore, the change in methodology did not lead to any revisions that were 
classified as high-strength by Sorescu and Subramanaym (2006) being classified as low-strength in my 
sample. Second, I classified the revisions according to the magnitude of the revision and the consensus 
recommendation. I classify revisions as high-strength provided that both these conditions were satisfied. 
In this instance, all of the low-magnitude revisions are classified as low-strength; whereas the high 
magnitude revisions are allocated equally between high and low strength. The distribution of the proxies 
for strength indicates that the sample is not substantially different from the one in Sorescu and 
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Subramanyam’s study (2006). However, the two alternative definitions of strength make my results more 
meaningful and robust.  
 
3.4.2 Methodology 
A. Analyst Characteristics (Strength and Weight) and Changes in Individual Investor Attention 
I examine the impact of analyst strength and analyst weight on the change in individual investor attention. 
The main dependent variable (change in individual investor attention) was measured using ∆Ind_Attn, 
calculated following the method used by Da et al. (2011). First, I calculate the logarithms of the weekly 
Google SVI figures for each week following the event. I then calculate the logarithms of the median 
value for each pre-event period (eight weeks prior to the event)3 prior to the recommendation. The median 
over a long-term window captures the normal level of attention that is paid to a specific stock (Da et al., 
2011). Da et al. (2011) further pointed out that ∆Ind_Attn figures could be compared across stocks in the 
cross section.  
 
οܫ̴݊݀ܣݐݐ݊ ൌ ݈݋ ݃ሺܸܵܫ௧ା௡ሻ െ ݈݋݃ሾܯ݁݀ሺܸܵܫ௧ିଵǡ ǥ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ ܸܵܫ௧ି଼ሿሺͳሻ  
 
Since investor attention should be reflected in trading activities, we define institutional investors’ 
attention as residual turnover, using the following regression model: 
    tjtjtjtjtjtj eVolTurnoverrAttnIndTurnover ,,41,3,2,1,  ln _ ln   EEEED              (2) 
 8,2,,1,,, ,..._  tjtjtjtjtj eeeMedianeAttnInst                                                                                   (3) 
                                                          
3 I use an 8-week pre-event period following Da et al. (2011). I have also calculated the figures using a 10 week, 12 week 
and 15 week pre-event periods. The results are similar in each case. 
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where tjTurnover ,  refers to the weekly turnover of stock j in week t; tjAttnInd ,_ is as defined in 
Eq. (1); tjr ,  and tjVol ,  are the weekly return and standard deviation of daily returns of stock j in week 
t, respectively; and tje ,  is the residual of the regression model. 
I calculate the event-date reaction as the characteristic-adjusted abnormal return for the day that the 
recommendation is released. This is the raw stock return less the size and adjusted portfolio return 
collected from French’s data library.  
I use years of experience and the Carter and Manster (1990) reputation ranks as measures of analyst 
ability (Sorescu and Subramanyam, 2006). I construct quintiles for experience, and use high/low 
experience as the largest/smallest experience quintile. I rank brokers above the median reputation rank 
as high reputation brokers, whereas brokers with lower than median ranks and unranked brokers are 
considered low reputation brokers. In unreported results, I also conduct the same analysis excluding 
unranked brokers.  
I construct two measures for strength (i.e. the dramatic nature of the revision) using the levels of 
changes in the recommendation change. Sorescu and Subramanyam (2006) considered larger revisions 
to be more dramatic in nature. I consider “Hold” recommendations to be uncertain recommendations 
that are neither positive nor negative. Therefore, unsophisticated investors are likely to be uncertain 
regarding the meaning of these revisions. Therefore, arbitrarily using level changes as a strength proxy 
might be less meaningful. I considered any changes to a “Hold” recommendation to be unclear 
revisions. In contrast, all changes to a positive (i.e. Buy or Strong Buy) or a negative (i.e. Sell or 
Underperform) are considered to be clear revisions. The clarity of the recommendation can be an 
important factor that determines the strength of the information signal. For instance, Barber et.al. 
(2010) argued that investors pay attention to revisions depending on the levels of the recommendation 
change, conditional on the final level of the recommendation. In line with this contention, I use the 
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clarity of the recommendation change as a strength proxy, where clear signals are considered high 
strength and unclear signals are considered low strength. This methodology change does not exclude 
any high-level changes (of 3 and 4 levels) from the high-strength sample. Therefore, all the revisions 
that were considered high-strength by Sorescu and Subramanyam (2006) are also considered high-
strength in my sample. The methodology changes affect only the two-point and one-point 
recommendation changes.   
My second measure of strength is determined relying on two aspects, namely the levels of change and 
the consensus recommendation of all analysts. Revisions are considered high-strength if there are more 
than two-levels of recommendation changes and if the consensus recommendation is consistent with 
these changes. For instance, for a +3 recommendation change, I examine whether the consensus is 
above the median (i.e. either Strong Buy or Buy). I classify the revision as high-strength only if these 
two conditions are satisfied. In an unreported analysis, I examine my results using the methodology 
used in Sorescu and Subramanyam (2006), and I found that my results were qualitatively similar. 
I first examine the effect of the strength characteristics on these attention measures holding the weight 
characteristics constant. I conduct a univariate analysis by examining the averages for the “high-
strength and low-weight” revisions group and the “low-strength and low-weight” revisions group. I 
also calculate the difference(s) between these groups and their statistical significance clustered by 
calendar month. I consider the effects on abnormal turnover, event reactions, changes in institutional 
attention, as well as the changes in individual investor attention. I also conduct the same analysis to 
examine the effects of weight characteristics, keeping the strength of the revision constant. I examine 
the average(s) and their difference(s) between “low- strength and high-weight” revisions and “low-
strength and low-weight revisions”. I expect larger strength (when weight is held constant) to have a 
larger impact on the changes in individual investor attention. I also expect larger strength (when weight 
is held constant) to have a smaller impact on event-reactions and the changes in institutional attention. 
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In contrast, I expect more weight (when strength is held constant) to have an impact on the changes in 
institutional investor attention and event-reactions, as well as changes in individual investor attention. 
This follows from the notion that more sophisticated investors are only attentive to analyst 
recommendations with relatively more predictive power. However, unsophisticated investors tend to 
pay attention to high-strength, or more dramatic, revisions even when analysts with less predictive 
ability issue them.  
I also estimate the following multivariate regression model, controlling for the industry and yearly 
fixed effects.4  
 
οܫ̴݊݀ܣݐݐ݊ ൌ ܾ଴ ൅ܾଵܮ̴ܵܪ ௜ܹ௧ ൅ ܾଶܪ̴ܵܮ ௜ܹ௧ ൅ܾଷܲݎ݁ܪܴܴܣ௜௧ ൅ܾସܴܱܣ௜௧ ൅ 
ܾହܦȀܧ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ܾ଺ܪ݄݅݃ܥ݋ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁௜ǡ௧ ൅ ܾ଻ܪ݄݅݃ܲݎ݁ܶݑݎ݊݋ݒ݁ݎ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ଼ܾ݈݊ሺܯ݇ݐ̴ܥܽ݌ሻ௜ǡ௧ ൅
ܾଽܪ݄݅݃ܧݒ݁݊ݐܴ݁ݐ௜ǡ௧ ൅ σ ܾଽା௝ିଵܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ௜௝ୀଵହ௝ୀଶ ൅σ ܾଶଷା௝ିଵܻ݁ܽݎ௧௝ୀ଼௝ୀଶ ൅ݑ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߝ௜ǡ௧ሺͶሻ  
 
∆̴it+n is my main dependant variable, which measures the abnormal change in individual 
investor attention. The variable is the change in log (SVI) between the event week and the pre-event 
median of the log SVI.  
ܮ̴ܵܪ ௜ܹ௧ is an indicator variable equal to 1 if revisions have low-strength and high-weight.  
ܪ̴ܵܮ ௜ܹ௧ is an indicator variable equal to 1 if revisions have high-strength and low-weight. 
ܲݎ݁ܪܴܴܣit is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the recommendation change has a high degree of pre-
revision retail attention and a low degree of pre-revision non-retail attention.  
ܴܱܣ࢏࢚is the return on assets for the firm for the most recent fiscal year end.  
                                                          
4 I have also tested the results controlling for company fixed effects as well as monthly and weekly fixed effects. 
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ܦȀܧ࢏࢚is the debt to equity ratio reported for the firm.  
ܪ݄݅݃ܥ݋ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁࢏࢚is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the analyst coverage (number of analysts 
covering a firm) is above the median.  
ܪ݄݅݃ܲݎ݁ܶݑݎ݊݋ݒ݁ݎ࢏࢚is an indicator variable equal to 1 if average turnover for the previous eight weeks 
if above the median.  
݈݊ሺܯ݇ݐ̴ܥܽ݌ሻ௜ǡ௧ is the logarithm of the market capitalization of the firm. 
ܪ݄݅݃ܧݒ݁݊ݐܴ݁ݐ௜ǡ௧ is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the absolute characteristic adjusted abnormal 
return is above the median. 
I expect the coefficient b2 (HS_LW) to be significant and larger than b1, the coefficient for LS_HW.  
 
B. Analyst Characteristics (Strength and Weight) and the Post-Event Returns. 
I examine the direct impact of strength and weight characteristics on the event-day and post-event 
returns. Following Sorescu and Subramanyam (2006), I estimate the following two empirical models 
for this purpose; 
ܧݒ݁݊ݐܴ݁ݐ௜௧ ൌ ܾ଴ ൅ܾଵܮ̴ܵܪ ௜ܹ௧ ൅ ܾଶܪ̴ܵܮ ௜ܹ௧ ൅ܾଷܲݎ݁ܪܴܴܣ௜௧ ൅ܾସܴܱܣ௜௧ ൅ 
ܾହܦȀܧ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ܾ଺ܪ݄݅݃ܥ݋ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁௜ǡ௧ ൅ ܾ଻ܪ݄݅݃ܲݎ݁ܶݑݎ݊݋ݒ݁ݎ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ଼ܾ݈݊ሺܯ݇ݐ̴ܥܽ݌ሻ௜ǡ௧ ൅
σ ଼ܾା௝ିଵܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ௜௝ୀଵହ௝ୀଶ ൅σ ܾଶଶା௝ିଵܻ݁ܽݎ௧௝ୀ଼௝ୀଶ ൅ݑ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߝ௜ǡ௧ሺͷሻ  
 
ܲ݋ݏݐܴ݁ݐ௜௧ ൌ ܾ଴ ൅ܾଵܮ̴ܵܪ ௜ܹ௧ ൅ ܾଶܪ̴ܵܮ ௜ܹ௧ ൅ܾଷܲݎ݁ܪܴܴܣ௜௧ ൅ܾସܴܱܣ௜௧ ൅ 
ܾହܦȀܧ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ܾ଺ܪ݄݅݃ܥ݋ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁௜ǡ௧ ൅ ܾ଻ܪ݄݅݃ܲݎ݁ܶݑݎ݊݋ݒ݁ݎ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ଼ܾ݈݊ሺܯ݇ݐ̴ܥܽ݌ሻ௜ǡ௧ ൅
൅σ ଼ܾା௝ିଵܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ௜௝ୀଵହ௝ୀଶ ൅σ ܾଶଶା௝ିଵܻ݁ܽݎ௧௝ୀ଼௝ୀଶ ൅ݑ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߝ௜ǡ௧ሺ͸ሻ  
EventReturni,t is the characteristic-adjusted abnormal return on the event date. 
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 ܲ݋ݏݐܴ݁ݐ௜௧ is the cumulative abnormal return for two weeks after the revision. 
 
C. Change in Individual Investor Attention and the Post-Revision Drift: By Strength and 
Weight 
 
I estimate the following multiple regression model, controlling for industry and monthly fixed effects, 
to examine the relationship between the changes in investor attention and the post-recommendation 
drift. I estimate this model separately for “high-strength and low-weight (HS_LW)” and “low-strength 
and high-weight (LS_HW)” groups respectively.  
ܲ݋ݏݐܴ݁ݐ௜௧ ൌ ܾ଴ ൅ܾଵοܫ݊݀ܣݐݐ݊௜௧ ൅ ܾଶܲݎ݁ܪܴܴܣ௜௧ ൅ܾସܴܱܣ௜௧ ൅ 
ܾହܦȀܧ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ܾ଺ܪ݄݅݃ܥ݋ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁௜ǡ௧ ൅ ܾ଻ܪ݄݅݃ܲݎ݁ܶݑݎ݊݋ݒ݁ݎ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ଼ܾ݈݊ሺܯ݇ݐ̴ܥܽ݌ሻ௜ǡ௧ ൅
ܾଽܪ݄݅݃ܧݒ݁݊ݐܴ݁ݐ௜ǡ௧ ൅ σ ܾଽା௝ିଵܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ௜௝ୀଵହ௝ୀଶ ൅σ ܾଶଷା௝ିଵܻ݁ܽݎ௧௝ୀ଼௝ୀଶ ൅ݑ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߝ௜ǡ௧ሺ͹ሻ  
  
ܲ݋ݏݐܴ݁ݐ௜ǡ௧ is size the adjusted cumulative abnormal return for recommendation change i between days 
t+5 and week t+10, where t is the event date. 
I expect the coefficient b1 (coefficients of ∆Ind_Attn variables) to be positively significant and 
larger/smaller for the HS_LW group/LS_HW group. 
 
D. Predicted Changes in Investor Attention and the Post-Recommendation Drift: Two Stage 
Least Square Analysis 
In this section, I examine the relationship between predicted change in investor attention and the post-
recommendation drift. The following model is a two-stage multiple regression model. I estimate the 
predicted values of the ∆Ind_Attn for the week t (event week) using equation (4), specified in section 
3.4.2. I use the HS_LW and LS_HW variables are the instrument variables. I show the results for the 
first-stage of the 2SLS to ensure that these two variables are valid predictors of ∆Ind_Attn. Then, I use 
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the predicted ASVI’s to estimate the following multiple regression model, controlling for industry and 
yearly effects.  
ܲ݋ݏݐܴ݁ݐ௜௧ ൌ ܾ଴ ൅ܾଵο̴෣ ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ܾଶܲݎ݁ܪܴܴܣ௜௧ ൅ܾଷܴܱܣ௜௧ ൅ 
ܾସܦȀܧ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ܾହܪ݄݅݃ܥ݋ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁௜ǡ௧ ൅ ܾ଺ܪ݄݅݃ܲݎ݁ܶݑݎ݊݋ݒ݁ݎ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ܾ଻݈݊ሺܯ݇ݐ̴ܥܽ݌ሻ௜ǡ௧ ൅
଼ܾ݈݊ሺܯ݇ݐ̴ܥܽ݌ሻ௜ǡ௧ ൅ σ ଼ܾା௝ିଵܫ݊݀ݑݏݐݎݕ௜௝ୀଵହ௝ୀଶ ൅σ ܾଶଶା௝ିଵܻ݁ܽݎ௧௝ୀ଼௝ୀଶ ൅ݑ௜ǡ௧ ൅ ߝ௜ǡ௧ሺ͸ሻ  
ܲ݋ݏݐܴ݁ݐ௜ǡ௧ is the size adjusted cumulative abnormal return for recommendation change i between days 
t+1 and t+10, where t is the event-date. 
ο̴෣ ǡ is the predicted change in the change in log (SVI) for recommendation change i and 
week t. I estimate the predicted values using the strength and weight variables and other controls.  
I expect the coefficients b1 to be positive and significant because the predicted delayed changes in 
individual investor attention should lead to an underreaction and a larger post-event drift.  
I use the 2SLS method in this analysis to control for any feedback loops (endogeneity) that exist 
between the main variables. A higher change in individual investor attention coincides with the 
change in prices after the revision. Therefore these variables can affect each other, (i.e: Individual 
investors can observe price changes and pay more or less attention or vice versa.). A 2SLS method 
will provide more clarity in the model by controlling for this affect.  
3.5 Empirical Analysis 
3.5.1 Analyst Characteristics and Changes in Investor Attention 
Table 3.2 shows the impact of analyst weight and strength on attention changes. I focus on the “HSLW” 
and “LSHW” groups because Griffin and Tversky’s (1992) hypotheses focus on mainly these two 
categories; they do not appear to have made unambiguous predictions about high strength, high weight 
signals relative to low weight, low strength ones (see also Sorescu and Subramanyam, 2006). Panel A 
shows how difference(s) in weight (when strength is held constant) affects individual investor attention, 
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institutional attention, and event-returns. I find that there are significant difference(s) between the “low-
strength and high-weight (LSHW)” category and the “low-strength and low-weight (LSLW)” category. 
All three of the attention measures are significantly larger for the LSHW category. This finding is 
consistent with Sorescu and Subramanyam (2006), who found that the market pays more attention in the 
shorter term when the weight of the analysts is higher, irrespective of the strength of the recommendation 
change. I also find that the average event-return is significantly larger for the “LSHW” category. This 
finding indicates that the market as a whole pays more/less attention to low-strength revisions issued by 
high-weight/low-weight analysts. Further, the change in institutional attention is significantly larger for 
low-strength revisions issued by high-weight analysts, which indicates that institutional investors who 
are generally more sophisticated pay attention to high-weight analysts. In contrast, I also find that the 
degree of individual investor attention is larger for low-strength revisions when they are issued by high-
weight analysts. Peng (2005) suggest paying more attention to announcements leading to investor 
reactions. A larger event-reaction for “low-strength and high-weight” revisions could be the result of 
more institutional and/or individual investor action. However, Kadan et al. (2014) have found that 
institutional investors/individual investors tend to trade in the opposite/same direction of the revision 
after it has been released. Given this evidence, the change in event-reaction is likely to be the result of 
individual trading. I also find that individual investors’ tend to pay a low level of attention to low-strength 
revisions issued by low-weight analysts. This is consistent with Griffin and Tversky (1992), who 
predicted that the strength and weight together determines the individual investor attention paid to 
information.  
Panel A also compares the attention measures across “high-strength and low-weight” and “low-strength 
and low-weight” categories. I find a different pattern compared to the difference(s) in weight. First, I find 
that the absolute event-return and the institutional attention measures were not different across these 
groups. I find that the change in institutional investor attention and the event reactions are approximately 
the same across high and low strength categories for low-weight analysts.  
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Table 3.2 
Univariate Analysis: Attention Across Strength and Weight Categories 
Table 3.2 presents the univariate analysis for various attention variables between strength and weight groups. The table presents 
the event-day reaction, CAR (-1,+1), ∆Ind_Attn during the event week and ∆Ins_Attn during the event week. ∆Ind_attn is defined 
as the difference between log(SVI) for the revision week minus the logarithm of the median SVIs for the eight weeks(-2,-9). The 
event-week ∆Ins_Attn is the change is the residual of a model estimated to explain the total turnover level using the degree of 
∆Ind_Attn. A revision is defined as High Strength if the recommendation is changed to either Positive (Buy and Strong Buy) for 
Upgrades and vice Versa for Downgrades. If a recommendation is changed to a Hold, the revision if defined as Low-Strength. A 
High-eight revision is defined as a revision issued by an analyst with experience falling to the highest quintile. HSLW is defined 
as revisions that has a high degree of strength and a low-weight. LSHW are revisions falling into low strength and high-weight. 
Panel A reports the mean statistics for HSLW. The difference between above groups and the LSLW group is also reported along 
with the statistical significance. Panel B reports the absolute-event returns for the HSLW and LSHW groups and their difference(s) 
across high- and low- institutional ownership groups. The superscripts *, **, and *** denote statistical significance (based on 
standard errors clustered by calendar month) at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, with associated t-statistics in parentheses 
below the estimates 
Panel A: Attention across Strength-Weight Categories 
Category Absolute Event day 
Reaction 
 
∆Ind_Attn ∆Ins_Attn 
LSHW 0.03*** 
(10.18) 
0.02** 
(2.20) 
0.16*** 
(5.17) 
LSLW 0.02*** 
(5.57) 
-0.00 
(-0.15) 
0.14*** 
(7.50) 
Difference 0.01*** 
(2.93) 
0.02** 
(2.20) 
0.02* 
(1.66) 
HSLW 0.01*** 
(4.99) 
0.01** 
(1.97) 
0.12*** 
(6.20) 
LSLW 0.01*** 
(5.96) 
-0.00 
(-0.15) 
0.14*** 
(7.42) 
Difference -0.00 
(-1.05) 
0.01** 
(2.00) 
-0.02 
(-1.00) 
    
Panel B: Absolute Event Reactions Across High and Low Institutional Ownership Groups 
 High Institutional  
Ownership 
Low Institutional 
Ownership 
LSHW 0.03*** 
(5.24) 
0.03*** 
(5.40) 
LSLW 0.02*** 
(4.50) 
0.01*** 
(4.90) 
Difference(s) 0.01 
(1.12) 
0.02*** 
 
(2.50) 
   
HSLW 0.02*** 
(5.63) 
0.01* 
(1.85) 
LSLW 0.02*** 
(4.50) 
0.01*** 
(4.91) 
Difference(s) -0.00 
(-1.62) 
-0.00 
(-1.60) 
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However there is a larger degree of individual investor attention paid to “high-strength and low-weight” 
revisions compared to “low-strength and low-weight” revisions. This finding indicates that only 
individual investors are attracted to larger strength/more dramatic revisions when the recommending 
analyst has a lower track record of ability. Institutional investors appear to completely disregard the 
strength of the revision when paying attention to low-weight analysts. My results are similar to the 
findings of Sorescu and Subramanyam (2006) with respect to the short-term, who find that there is a 
smaller initial reaction to large changes made by low-weight analysts. Although, Sorescu and 
Subramanyam (2006) cited the initial suspicion by investors that analysts are overreacting to information, 
their finding is inconsistent with their main hypothesis. In contrast, this finding is consistent with my 
first hypothesis, which posited that the degree of individual investor attention will be higher after high-
strength and low-weight revisions. However, larger changes in individual investor attention do not 
necessarily mean that investors will immediately react to this information. Hirshleifer et al. (2011) and 
Bartov et al. (2000) have argued that individual investors delay their reactions after announcements. 
Overall, with respect to Panel A, I find that both individual as well as institutional investors pay more/less 
attention to high-weight/low-weight revisions when the strength is low. On the other hand, I find that 
only individual investors tend to pay more attention to high-strength revisions when weight is low. These 
findings indicate that individual investors, who are more prone to behavioural biases, emphasize the 
strength even when the revision is issued by low ability (weight) analysts. My findings are consistent 
with the predictions of Griffin and Tversky (1992), who suggested that individuals tend to overly 
emphasize the strength of the information signal.  
Panel B shows the absolute event-returns across high and low institutional ownership groups. I construct 
two groups of individual investor interest, high institutional ownership and low institutional ownership. 
First, I calculate the differences between “low-strength, high-weight” and “low-strength, low-weight” 
for each institutional ownership category. I find that there is no material difference between these two 
groups for the high-institutional ownership category. Although I find that the low-strength revisions 
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issued by high-weight analysts have approximately a 3% return compared to the 2% return after low-
strength revisions issued by low-weight analysts, their differences are not statistically significant. In 
contrast, for the low-institutional ownership category, I find that the event-reactions are significantly 
larger/smaller after high-weight/low-weight revisions when the strength is low. The difference for the 
low-institutional group is significant and larger in magnitude at 2%.  
Second, with respect to Panel B, I calculate the difference(s) between the “high-strength, low-weight” 
and “low-strength, high-weight” categories. I find that the differences are not significant for either 
institutional ownership category. I find that the “high-strength, low-weight” group(s) have a smaller 
absolute event-return compared to the “low-strength, low-weight” group(s), for both institutional 
ownership categories. However, these differences are not statistically significant. These findings show 
that neither individual nor institutional investors react immediately to “high-strength” revisions when 
low weight analysts issue them. My findings are consistent with the notion that investors are immediately 
sceptical when reacting to new extreme signals, assuming that these reflect analyst overreactions 
(Barberis et al., 1998; Daniel et al., 1998; Sorescu and Subramanyam, 2006).  
Overall, with respect to Panels A and B, I find that only individual investors pay attention to high-strength 
revisions issued by low weight analysts, although they do not immediately react to these revisions due 
to initial scepticism. In contrast, both individual and institutional investors pay attention to low-strength 
revisions when high-weight analysts issue them. Individual investors tend to have a very large immediate 
reaction after “high-strength and low-weight” revisions, whereas the reactions of institutional investors 
are not as large. This finding is consistent with the findings of Kadan et al. (2014), who found that 
institutional investors trade in the same direction as the recommendation change before the revision, and 
in the opposite direction after the revision. This investment strategy of institutional investors may explain 
why the initial reaction is not strongly associated with the sign of the revision.  
 
3.5.2 Analyst Characteristics (Strength and Weight) and the Post-Event Returns. 
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Table 3.3 shows the relationship between the strength and weight characteristics and the post-event 
returns. Similar to Sorescu and Subramanyam (2006), I examine how the strength and weight variables 
affect the event reaction and the post-event return. I use the two-week (10 day) cumulative abnormal 
return as the post-event return, whereas I use the HSLW and LSHW as the main independent variables, 
indicating “high-strength, low weight” and “low-strength, high-weight”, respectively. My analysis 
resembles the multi-variate analysis used by Sorescu and Subramanyam (2006). However I use a 
smaller event-window, which reduces the possibility of the results getting contaminated by 
confounding events 
With respect to upgrades, I find that the coefficients for LSHW are not significant for both event-return 
and post-event return. With respect to downgrades, I find that the coefficient for LSHW is 
negative/positive and significant when event-return/post-event return is used as the dependant variable. 
This finding is indicative of a significant initial reaction and a subsequent return reversal. This finding 
shows that investors do not react strongly after LSHW upgrades, whereas they tend to overreact after 
LSHW downgrades. The findings in Table 3.2 (the previous table) indicate that individual investors are 
more likely to react strongly after LSHW revisions. Individual investors have a tendency to react 
strongly/weakly after negative/positive news events (see: Barber and Odean, 2008; Hacamo and Reyes, 
2012). This is consistent with the psychological studies that suggest a stronger reaction after negative 
information signals due to the negative attention bias of individual decision makers (Baumeister et al., 
2001). Therefore, the result is consistent with my explanations in Table 3.2.  
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Table 3.3 
Multivariate Analysis: Analyst Characteristics (Strength and Weight) and Post-event Returns 
Table 3.3 reports the multivariate regression estimates using the EventRet (AR for the event-date) and the CAR(1,10) as the 
dependant variable(s). I report the results for upgrades and downgrades separately. LSHW variable is an indicator variable equal 
to 1 if the Strength variable is equal to 0 and the weight variable is equal to 1. HSLW variable is also an indicator variable which 
takes a value of 1 if the strength variable is equal to 1 and weight variable is equal to 0. Pre_HRRA is an indicator variable equal 
to 1 if the ∆Ind_attn before the event is above the median and ∆Ins_Attn before the event is below the median. Pre-event –Ret is 
the CAR(-1,-3). ROA is the net-income for the previous year divided by the total assets. D/E is the total debt value for the firm 
divided by the total equity value. High Coverage is an indicator variable which takes a value of 1 if the analyst coverage is above 
the median. Log(Mkt_Cap) is the logarithm of the market capitalization of the firm. Industry and year fixed effects are controlled 
for. Standard errors are clustered by calendar month and are in parentheses. The superscripts *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
  
 Upgrades Downgrades 
 EventRet CAR(1,10) EventRet CAR(1,10) 
LSHW -0.00160 -0.00294 -0.00780*** 0.00558** 
 (-0.39) (-0.37) (-3.71) (2.06) 
     
HSLW -0.00736** 0.00486** 0.00517* -0.00494 
 (-3.21) (3.22) (1.95) (-0.83) 
     
PreHRRA -0.00262* 0.00851*** -0.00297* 0.00250 
 (-1.66) (2.54) (-1.67) (0.86) 
     
Pre-event Ret -0.00374 -0.00477 0.000130 -0.00590 
 (-1.65) (-1.92) (0.06) (-1.85) 
     
ROA -0.0181 0.0398*** 0.0677 -0.0227 
 (-1.34) (2.84) (1.32) (-0.39) 
     
High Coverage 0.000.348 -0.00567 0.00102 0.00259 
 (0.15) (-2.11) (0.46) (1.21) 
     
D/E -0.178 0. 928 0.714 -0.173 
 (-0.27) (0.08) (1.15) (-1.50) 
     
High Pre-Turnover 0.000431 0.00396 -0.00147 0.00673 
 (0.14) (0.83) (-0.34) (1.41) 
     
Log(Mkt_Cap) -0.00577*** 
(-4.85) 
-0.000414 
(-0.30) 
0.00300*** 
(2.75) 
0.00218 
(1.35) 
Constant 0.0197** 0.0101* -0.0221*** -0.0200** 
 (3.12) (2.39) (-5.44) (-3.47) 
N 4210 4210 4183 4183 
adj. R2 0.051 0.004 0.060 0.006 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Yearly Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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In contrast, the HSLW variable has a negative/positive and significant coefficient after upgrades, when 
event-return/post-event return is used as the dependant variable. This result is consistent with the notion 
that investors react weakly after HSLW revisions and subsequently underreact. The findings outlined 
in Table 3.2 (previous table) indicate that it is mainly individual investors who pay attention to HSLW 
revisions. Therefore, a delayed reaction after these revisions is to be expected according to the existing 
literature (Bartov et al., 2000; Hirshleifer et al., 2011). This result is consistent with my second 
hypothesis, which posits that the HSLW revisions should have a smaller initial reaction and a larger 
drift. The results are consistent with the notion that it is mainly individual investors who pay attention 
after HSLW revisions; however, they delay their reaction to these revisions, possibly due to an initial 
scepticism to large changes by low weight analysts. Nevertheless, these revisions do attract the 
attention of individual investors later, leading to a large post-revision drift. With respect to downgrades, 
I find that the coefficient of HSLW is negative and significant when event-return is used as the 
dependant variable. The coefficient is not significant when post-event-return is used as the dependant 
variable. This finding suggests that for HSLW revisions, the investors’ initial reaction is relatively 
restrained, although there is no visible drift after ten days. Furthermore, I find that the coefficient is 
smaller at the absolute level for HSLW in downgrades (-0.00517) as compared to upgrades (-0.00736). 
This evidence indicates that investors react relatively strongly after HSLW downgrades, which is 
consistent with negative attention bias.  
I also use a number of control variables such as PreHRRA, ROA, D/E, HighCoverage, log (Mkt_Cap). 
With respect to upgrades, I find that the PreHRRA variable is negative/positive and significant when 
event-return/post-event-return is used as the dependant variable. In contrast, with respect to 
downgrades, I find that the same variable has a positive/negative and significant/insignificant 
coefficient. These findings show that a larger degree of individual investor attention prior to the 
recommendation leads to a smaller initial reaction and a larger return-drift. The log(Mkt_Cap) is used 
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as a proxy for the information environment of a firm. With respect to both upgrades as well as 
downgrades, this variable is negatively associated with the event-return. This result shows that for 
stocks that have a better information environment, the impact of a revision is relatively small. The 
coefficient for HighCoverage is positively related to the post-event return after upgrades, which is 
consistent with the notion that the stock’s information environment is negatively related to investors’ 
underreaction. With respect to downgrades, the finding is consistent with the expectation that a stock’s 
information environment is negatively related to underreaction, even though the coefficient is 
insignificant. The Pre-EventRet is used as a control for any investor reaction prior to the revisions. This 
is particularly important given that institutional investors tend to possess an informational advantage 
and react prior to the revised recommendation (Kadan et al., 2014).  
 
3.5.3 Change in Individual Investor Attention and the Post-Revision Drift: By Strength and 
Weight  
 
Table 3.4 shows the association between the changes in individual investor attention and the post-event 
returns separately for the “high-strength, low-weight” and “low-strength, high-weight” categories.  
I use the CAR (6,10) as the dependant variable, in order to ensure that the event-week reaction is 
removed from the variable. Including the event-week reaction would have lead to ambiguity regarding 
the direction of the relationship between individual investor attention and the post-event return. With 
respect to upgrades, I find that the coefficient(s) for ∆Ind_Attn is positive for both HSLW and LSHW 
sub-samples, although only the HSLW sample had a significant coefficient. This result suggests that 
there is a larger association between the ∆Ind_Attn and CAR (6, 10) after HSLW revisions. This is 
consistent with my expectation that it is mainly individual investors who react to HSLW revisions, 
although these reactions are delayed. Investors are initially sceptical to large changes by low-weight 
analysts (Barbesris et al., 1998; Daniel et al., 1998; Sorescu and Subramanyam, 2006).  
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Table 3.4 
Post-Event Change in Individual Attention and the Post-Revision Drift: By Strength and 
Weight  
Table 3.4 reports the multivariate regression estimates using CAR(6,10) as the dependant variable. I report the results separately 
for low strength and high weight sub-sample and high-strength and low-weight subsample. Pre_HRRA is an indicator variable 
equal to 1 if the ∆Ind_attn before the event is above the median and ∆Ins_Attn before the event is below the median. Pre-event –
Ret is the CAR(-1,-3). ROA is the net-income for the previous year divided by the total assets. D/E is the total debt value for the 
firm divided by the total equity value. High Coverage is an indicator variable which takes a value of 1 if the analyst coverage is 
above the median. Log(Mkt_Cap) is the logarithm of the market capitalization of the firm. Industry and year fixed effects are 
controlled for. Standard errors are clustered by calendar month and are in parentheses. The superscripts *, **, and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
Nevertheless, the dramatic nature of these revisions tends to attract the attention of individual investors, 
who are prone to behavioural biases (Griffin and Tversky, 1992). Individual investors tend to exhibit 
a delayed response to these revisions, as indicated by a larger post-event drift. With respect to the 
downgrades sample, I find that the coefficient(s) for ∆Ind_Attn in HSLW or LSHW sub-samples are not 
 Upgrades Downgrades 
 HSLW LSHW HSLW LSHW 
∆Ind_Attn 0.0269*** 0.0353 -0.00917 -0.0143 
 (2.51) (1.36) (-0.49) (-1.32) 
     
HRRA 0.0000415 0.0133 0.0183 -0.00257 
 (0.01) (2.06) (0.98) (-0.49) 
     
HighEventRet 0.00515** -0.00404 0.00603 0.00483* 
 (1.98) (-0.60) (0.99) (1.66) 
     
ROA 0.0253* 0.0532 -0.152 -0.0584* 
 (1.70) (0.50) (-0.96) (-1.80) 
     
High Coverage -0.00193 -0.0147** 0.00388 -0.00223 
 (-0.37) (-2.26) (0.39) (-0.34) 
     
DtoE 0.115 0.516 -0.954 -0.538 
 (0.38) (0.53) (-0.93) (-1.42) 
     
High Turnover 0.00904 -0.0182 0.00293 -0.000783 
 (1.16) (-0.95) (0.19) (-0.11) 
     
ln(Mkt Cap) 0.00163 -0.00244 0.00308 0.00327** 
 (0.86) (-0.59) (0.95) (2.20) 
     
_cons -0.0171 0.0181 -0.0119 0.0252 
 (-0.69) (0.50) (-0.46) (1.46) 
N 802 124 319 664 
Adj. R2 0.010 0.180 0.016 0.038 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Yearly Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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significant. Possibly, this insignificance is due the use of a ten-day event window. As can be seen in 
Tables 3.2 and 3.3, I find that the downgrades do not exhibit a large post-event drift for ten days. The 
event-reactions to downgrades also indicate that there is a stronger immediate reaction after 
downgrades (see Table 3.3). I examine a shorter window in unreported results and find that the 
coefficients of HSLW and LSHW are qualitatively similar. However, I do not report these results 
because the event-week ∆Ind_Attn and the post-event week return would be endogenous in this case. 
In Table 3.5, the results for a smaller window, controlling for the direction of the relationship between 
the ∆Ind_Attn and the drift, can be seen.  
 
3.5.4 Predicted Changes in Investor Attention and the Post-Recommendation Drift: Two Stage 
Least Square Analysis 
In Table 3.5, I report the two-stage least square results for the association between the changes in 
individual investor attention and the post-event drift. In Panel A, I report the results for the first stage 
of my model which predicts the event-week change in individual investor attention using the strength, 
weight and a few control variables. In Panel B, I report the association between the predicted change 
in individual investor attention and the post-event drift.  
In stage one of my analysis in Table 3.5, I use the HSLW and LSHW as the main independent variables 
indicating the strength and weight of the revisions. I also include a number of controls that can lead to 
a larger amount of event-week individual investor attention. PreHRRA indicates the pre-revision 
individual investor attention, which can lead to a smaller or larger spike in attention after a revision.  
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Table 3.5 
Two Stage Least Squared Analysis 
Table 3.5 reports the 2SLS regression estimates using the effect on ∆Ind_Attn as the first stage and using the CAR (1,10) and CAR 
(1,3)as the dependant variable for the second stage. In Panel A I report the first stage results for upgrades and downgrades 
separately. The purpose of Panel A is to predict the value of ∆Ind_Attn using the HSLW and LSHW variables and controls. In 
Panel B, I report the second-stage estimates for the model to explain the CAR (1,3) and CAR (1,10) variables. The main 
independent variable is οܫ̴݊݀ܣݐݐ݊෣  predicted using the first-stage shown in Panel A. LSHW variable is an indicator variable equal 
to 1 if the Strength variable is equal to 0 and the weight variable is equal to 1. HSLW variable is also an indicator variable which 
takes a value of 1 if the strength variable is equal to 1 and weight variable is equal to 0. Pre-HRRA is an indicator variable equal 
to 1 if the ∆Ind_attn before the event is above the median and ∆Ins_Attn before the event is below the median. Pre-event –Ret is 
the CAR (-1,-3). ROA is the net-income for the previous year divided by the total assets. D/E is the total debt value for the firm 
divided by the total equity value. High Coverage is an indicator variable which takes a value of 1 if the analyst coverage is above 
the median. Log(Mkt_Cap) is the logarithm of the market capitalization of the firm. Industry and year fixed effects are controlled 
for. Standard errors are clustered by calendar month and are in parentheses. The superscripts *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
Panel A: First Stage Analysis-Predicting Individual Attention using “Strength and Weight” of information. 
 Full Sample Upgrades Downgrades 
LSHW 0.00677 0.0165 0.00255 
 (1.11) (1.41) (0.40) 
    
HSLW 0.00871** 0.0152*** -0.00538 
 (2.30) (2.71) (-0.68) 
    
Pre-HRRA 0.0625*** 0.0637*** 0.0624*** 
 (9.45) (7.52) (9.04) 
    
ROA 0.0119 0.0539* -0.0167 
 (0.59) (1.81) (-0.67) 
    
DtoE_scaled 0.414* 0.559* 0.186 
 (1.69) (1.86) (0.37) 
    
HighCoverage 0.00346 0.0101 -0.00376 
 (0.64) (1.58) (-0.51) 
    
High Turnover -0.00975 -0.0187 -0.000176 
 (-1.07) (-1.61) (-0.02) 
    
Log(Mkt_Cap) 0.000606 -0.00470 0.00555* 
 (0.20) (-1.46) (1.76) 
    
HighEventRet 0.00204 0.000123 0.00377* 
 (0.60) (0.03) (1.66) 
    
Upgrade -0.00435   
 (-0.91)   
    
Constant -0.0172 0.0172 -0.0473 
 (-0.53) (0.60) (-1.23) 
N 8397 4212 4185 
Adj. R2 0.041 0.040 0.043 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Yearly Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
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I find that the PreHRRA variable ha positive and significant coefficients, showing that a large degree 
of individual investor attention prior to the event is likely to lead to a larger post-revision change. I 
also find that profitability and risk controls are positive and significant with respect to upgrades. This 
indicates that individual investors have a tendency to pay more attention to more profitable and riskier 
firms. Furthermore, with respect to downgrades I find that the HigheventRet is positive and significant. 
This result indicates that the event-return is stronger after downgrades, which leads to a larger degree 
of event-week individual investor attention. This is consistent with the expectation that individuals tend 
to react strongly as soon as they pay attention to downgrades, whereas they do not exhibit the same 
behaviour when responding to upgrades.  
 
  
 
Panel B: Second Stage-Predicted Individual Investor Attention and the Post-revision Drift 
 Upgrades Downgrades 
 CAR[1,3] CAR[1,10] CAR[1.3] CAR[1,10] 
οܫ̴݊݀ܣݐݐ݊෣   0.0550* 0.137*** -0.0464* 0.0410 
 (1.79) (2.68) (-1.66) (0.92) 
     
ROA 0.0174** 0.0338** 0.0653*** -0.0206 
 (2.51) (2.18) (2.75) (-0.36) 
     
DtoE_scaled 0.165 0.118 0.196 -0.427 
 (1.33) (0.48) (1.35) (-0.98) 
     
HighCoverage -0.00335 -0.00717*** 0.000451 0.00320 
 (-1.63) (-2.64) (0.27) (1.51) 
     
High Turnover 0.00126 0.00604 0.00492 0.00642 
 (0.35) (1.14) (1.55) (1.30) 
     
Log (size) -0.00108 0.0000591 0.000498 0.00232 
 (-1.53) (0.04) (0.51) (1.52) 
     
HighEventRet -0.00176 -0.00301* 0.00154 0.00860*** 
 (-1.55) (-1.71) (1.07) (3.54) 
     
Constant 0.0176** 0.0139 -0.0206 -0.0358* 
 (3.63) (1.01) (-1.70) (-2.56) 
N 4212 4212 4185 4185 
adj. R2 0.009 0.002 0.031 0.011 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Yearly Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Panel B shows the results of the second-stage estimations. I examine the association between the 
predicted changes in individual investor attention and the post-event returns for three days and ten days 
respectively. With respect to upgrades, I find that the coefficient(s) of   οܫ̴݊݀ܣݐݐ݊෣  is positive and 
significant when CAR (1,3) and CAR (1,10) are used as the dependent variable. I find that the 
association is relatively smaller (0.0550) for CAR (1, 3), compared to the coefficient (0.137) when 
using CAR (1, 10) as the dependent variable. This evidence is consistent with the results outlined in 
Tables 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4. I find that the event-week change in individual investor attention tend to be 
explained by the post-event returns for shorter and longer windows. The association is stronger/weaker 
for the longer/shorter window, which is consistent with investor underreaction. Overall, my results 
with respect to upgrades are consistent with the contention that it is mainly individual investors who 
tend to pay attention to high-strength revisions issued by low-weight analysts, leading to changes in 
individual investor attention, and, subsequently, a delayed reaction after the upgrades.  
The downgrades show a somewhat similar picture to what could be seen my initial findings. I find that 
the οܫ̴݊݀ܣݐݐ݊෣  is negatively associated with CAR (1, 3);, however has a positive but insignificant 
association with CAR (1, 10). This result shows that individual investors tend to react earlier after 
downgrades. I find that individual investors tend to react in a way that is consistent with the sign of the 
revision, in the three days after the revision. However, they tend to react in the opposite way after ten 
days, leading to a reversal. Furthermore, I find that the HighEventRet  is positive and significant after 
downgrades, which shows that a larger event-reaction leads to a larger reversal (positive value). These 
findings are consistent with the notion that individual investors tend to react strongly after downgrades, 
due to their inclination to pay more attention after negative events, rather than after the equivalent 
positive events (Barber and Odean, 2008).  
 
 
96 
 
 
3.5.5 Robustness Analysis 
In Table 3.6, I use CAR (6,10) as the dependant variable and the HSLW, LSHW and the actual change 
in individual investor attention as the independent variables. This analysis is designed to reveal whether 
the strength and weight of factors have an impact which is not captured by the change in individual 
investor attention variable. Therefore, I estimate two separate models for upgrades and downgrades. 
For the sake of completeness, I also include the Abturn and ∆Ins_Attn variables in this model, in order 
to examine whether changes in turnover (which is a proxy for attention by all investors, as suggested 
by Peng, 2005) and changes in institutional attention have an impact on the post-revision returns.  
With respect to upgrades, I find that the results are largely consistent with my main findings in Tables 
3.2–3.5. With respect to upgrades, I find that change in individual investor attention is positively 
associated with the post-event returns for both columns (1) and (2). The HSLW and LSHW variables 
are not significant for the upgrades sample. This evidence suggests that the channel through which 
strength and weight factors affect the post-event return is through the changes in individual investor 
attention. Hence, when the ∆Ind_Attn and HSLW and LSHW variables are included in the same model, 
the HSLW and LSHW variables are not significant.  
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Table 3.6 
Multivariate Analysis: Actual Change in Individual Attention and the Post-Revision Drift 
Table 3.6 reports the multi-variate regression results using the change in individual attention (∆Ind_Attn and High_∆Ind_Attn) on 
the CAR (5, 10). In this model I use the actual ∆Ind_Attn as the main independent variable. High_∆Ind_Attn is an indicator variable 
indicating above median ∆Ind_Attn. I report the results separately for Upgrades and Downgrades. I use the main control variables 
I used in Table 3.4. I also include ∆Ins_Attn also in this model, the change in institutional attention during the event-week. Industry 
and year fixed effects are controlled for. Standard errors are clustered by calendar month and are in parentheses. The superscripts *, **, 
and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively 
 
 
                     Upgrades                Downgrades 
 (1) (2)          (1)           (2) 
High_∆Ind_Attn 0.00487**  0.000322  
 (1.97)  (0.11)  
     
∆Ind_Attn  0.00921**  0.00405 
  (2.02)  (0.56) 
     
LSHW -0.00515 -0.00521 0.000920 0.000896 
 (-0.78) (-0.79) (0.35) (0.34) 
     
HSLW 0.000160 0.000207 -0.00354 -0.00352 
 (0.09) (0.12) (-0.91) (-0.90) 
     
PreHRRA 0.000683 0.000805 -0.000192 -0.000418 
 (0.44) (0.57) (-0.06) (-0.13) 
     
ROA 0.0211* 0.0224* 0.0375* 0.0375* 
 (1.69) (1.74) (1.89) (1.89) 
     
DtoE -0.000132* -0.000130* -0.000113 -0.000113 
 (-1.77) (-1.76) (-0.98) (-0.98) 
     
High Coverage 0.000555 0.000441 0.00132 0.00135 
 (0.24) (0.19) (0.55) (0.53) 
     
HighTurnover -0.000347 -0.000343 0.000200 0.000189 
 (-0.11) (-0.11) (0.05) (0.05) 
     
Log(Size) 0.00085 
(0.94) 
0.0008 
(0.88) 
0.00030 
(0.31) 
0.0003 
(0.32) 
     
∆Ins_Attn -0.00262 -0.00265 0.00174 0.00186 
 (-0.49) (-0.50) (0.30) (0.32) 
     
HighEventRet -0.00114 -0.00113 0.00509** 0.00509** 
 (-0.93) (-0.93) (2.06) (2.05) 
     
_cons -0.000702 0.000530 -0.00521 -0.00786* 
 (-0.16) (0.12) (-0.79) (-1.67) 
N 3848 3848 3772 3772 
adj. R2 -0.000 -0.001 0.014 0.015 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Yearly Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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With respect to downgrades, I find that the main coefficients are not significant, which is expected 
given that I use the CAR values after the event-week (CAR (6, 10)). I also find that there is a strong 
positive association between the HighEventRet variable and the post-event return. This finding shows 
that a larger event-return after downgrades results in a larger positive value (a reversal). This evidence 
is consistent with my findings in Table 3.2 and 3.3, which suggests that the event-return is larger after 
downgrades. These findings support the contention that investors tend to exhibit negative attention bias 
after revisions.  
I also include the ∆Ins_Attn variable in this multivariate model. I find that for both columns 1 and 2, 
these variable is not significant for either upgrades or downgrades. This evidence suggests that the 
post-revision drift is not determined by the actions of the institutional investors. This evidence is 
consistent with Kadan et al. (2014), who have suggested that institutional investors are less likely to 
trade in the direction of the recommendation change during post-event periods.  
In Table 3.7, I re-estimate the two-stage least squared model (in Table 3.5) using broker reputation as 
a weight proxy. I use the Carter and Manster (1990) broker reputation rankings as a measure of 
reputation. The use of this proxy is consistent with the methodology of Sorescu and Subramanyam 
(2006), who used the same weight proxy. I consider all brokers with above median reputation ranks to 
be “Highly reputed brokers (High-weight)” and the remainder to be “Low reputation (Low-weight)” 
brokers. I then re-construct the HSLW and LSHW categories using the same strength proxy used in the 
prior Tables. I then predict the ∆Ind_Attn, using the same first-stage model used in Table 3.5 (Panel 
A), replacing the newly constructed HSLW and LSHW variables. Then I use the οܫ̴݊݀ܣݐݐ݊෣  as the main 
variable when estimating the multivariate model to explain the post-event drift.  
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Table 3.7 
Two Stage Least Square Analysis using Broker Reputation as an Alternative Weight Proxy 
Table 3.7 reports the 2SLS results after changing the weight variable from experience to reputation. All revisions with above median 
level of Carter and Manster (1990) reputation rank are considered high-weight. The strength variable remains as in Tables 3.2 –3.5, 
where high-strength is defined as clear revisions with a change to a positive/negative rating for upgrades(downgrades). All 
recommendation changed to “Hold” are considered low strength or unclear revisions. HSLW is defined as revisions with High-Strength 
equal to 1 and Reputation below median. LSHW is defined in the same manner. Panel A report the results for the first-stage to predict 
the value of ∆Ind_Attn. Panel B reports the results for CAR(1,3) and CAR(1,10) using the predicted ∆Ind_Attn. I use the same control 
variables used in Table 3, 4 and 5Industry and year fixed effects are controlled for. Standard errors are clustered by calendar month and are 
in parentheses. The superscripts *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively 
 
  
 
 
 
Panel A: First Stage Analysis-Using reputation as a weight proxy. 
 Full Sample Upgrades Downgrades 
HSLW 0.00657* 0.00854* 0.00182 
 (1.87) (1.75) (0.22) 
    
LSHW 0.00565 0.00390 0.00456 
 (1.34) (0.41) (0.93) 
    
HRRA 0.0624*** 0.0634*** 0.0625*** 
 (9.48) (7.42) (9.23) 
    
ROA 0.0105 0.0500* -0.0161 
 (0.53) (1.73) (-0.64) 
    
DtoE 0.414* 0.555* 0.189 
 (1.68) (1.79) (0.38) 
    
High Coverage 0.00312 0.00920 -0.00362 
 (0.59) (1.47) (-0.50) 
    
High Turnover -0.00952 -0.0181 -0.000287 
 (-1.05) (-1.55) (-0.03) 
    
Log (Size) 0.000727 -0.00436 0.00551 
 (0.24) (-1.34) (1.73) 
    
HighEventRet 0.00209 0.0000338 0.00390 
 (0.59) (0.01) (1.12) 
    
Upgrade -0.00451   
 (-0.93)   
    
Constant -0.0197 0.0154 -0.0499 
 (-0.61) (0.51) (-1.34) 
N 8397 4212 4185 
adj. R2 0.041 0.040 0.043 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Yearly Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
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Panel B: Second Stage-Using reputation as a weight proxy. 
 Upgrades Downgrades 
 CAR[1,3] CAR[1,10] CAR[1,3] CAR[1,10] 
οܫ̴݊݀ܣݐݐ݊෣   0.0510* 0.122* -0.0474* 0.0330 
 (1.70) (2.33) (-1.65) (0.52) 
     
ROA 0.0177 0.0345* 0.0653*** -0.0207 
 (1.39) (1.69) (2.51) (-0.32) 
     
DtoE 0.167 0.127 0.196 -0.425 
 (1.28) (0.51) (1.11) (-1.19) 
     
High Coverage -0.00330* -0.00699** 0.000450 0.00319 
 (-1.90) (-2.36) (0.32) (1.10) 
     
High Turnover 0.00118 0.00574 0.00491* 0.00640 
 (0.33) (1.12) (1.92) (1.17) 
     
Log (Size) -0.00110 -0.00000333 0.000503 0.00237 
 (-1.39) (-0.00) (0.57) (1.63) 
     
HighEventRet -0.00176 -0.00301 0.00154 0.00864** 
 (-1.30) (-1.36) (1.30) (3.24) 
     
Constant 0.0176* 0.0141 -0.0206* -0.0362* 
 (2.33) (1.03) (-3.45) (-2.46) 
N 4212 4212 4185 4185 
Adj. R2 0.008 0.002 0.031 0.011 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Yearly Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
 
In Panel A, I find that my results for the first stage is not different when the weight proxy is replaced 
with reputation. The HSLW variable is still significant and positive for upgrades, suggesting that 
individuals pay attention to “high-strength, low-weight” revisions. There is no such evidence for 
downgrades, similar to my main findings. Although I find that the HighEventRet variable is not 
significant in Panel A downgrades, the sign is positive, indicating that a larger event-return leads to a 
reversal.  
The results in Panel B reports the stage-two estimations using reputation as a weight proxy. I find that 
the results are similar to the results in Table 3.5, Panel B. With respect to upgrades, I find that the 
οܫ̴݊݀ܣݐݐ݊ is positively associated with CAR (1, 3) as well as CAR (1, 10). I also find that the 
association gets stronger from three to ten days. 
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Furthermore, the coefficients of my control variables are not largely affected by the change of weight 
proxy. Overall, the results substantiate my main findings. With respect to the downgrades sample, the 
picture is similar to what could be seen in my main findings. I find that the predicted change in 
individual investor attention tends to affect the CAR (1, 3) positively, whereas, the variable affects the 
CAR (1, 10) positively. Consistent with my main results, the coefficient is only significant when CAR 
(1, 3) is used as the dependent variable. The coefficients for the controls are largely similar to what 
they are in Table 3.5.  
Table 3.8 shows the results of a robustness check using an alternative strength proxy. My second 
measure of strength is determined relying on two aspects, namely the levels of change and the 
consensus recommendation of all analysts. The revisions are considered high-strength if there are more 
than two-levels of recommendation changes and if the consensus recommendation is consistent with 
these changes. For instance, for a +3 recommendation change, I examine whether the consensus is 
above the median (i.e.: either Strong Buy or Buy). I classify the revision as high-strength only if these 
two conditions are satisfied.  
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Table 3.8 
Two Stage Least Squared Analysis using Magnitude as a Strength Proxy 
Table 3.8 reports the 2SLS results after changing the strength variable. The weight variable is defined as experience consistent with 
Tables 2-5. High-Magnitude is defined as revisions with a change above 2 levels and a low (high) consensus rating for Downgrades 
(Upgrades). I define a revision as high-magnitude only if both these conditions are satisfied. HMLW is defined as revisions with High-
Magnitude equal to 1 and Weight equal to 0. LSHW is defined in the same manner. Panel A reports the results of the first-stage to 
predict the value of ∆Ind_Attn. Panel B reports the results for CAR (1,3) and CAR (1,10) using the predicted ∆Ind_Attn. I have used 
the same control variables as were used in Tables 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5. Industry and year fixed effects are controlled for. Standard errors are 
clustered by calendar month and are in parentheses. The superscripts *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A: First Stage Analysis-Using an Alternative Strength Proxy. 
 Upgrades Downgrades 
LSHW -0.00352 0.00329 
 (-0.50) (0.60) 
   
HSLW 0.0256** -0.0123 
 (2.16) (-0.71) 
   
HRRA 0.0633*** 0.0625*** 
 (7.50) (9.05) 
   
ROA 0.0511 -0.0161 
 (1.78) (-0.64) 
   
DtoE 0.572 0.192 
 (1.89) (0.38) 
   
High Coverage 0.00976 -0.00394 
 (1.51) (-0.54) 
   
High Turnover -0.0188 -0.000135 
 (-1.59) (-0.01) 
   
Log (size) -0.00431 0.00539 
 (-1.28) (1.69) 
   
HighEventRet -0.00078 0.00378 
 (-0.17) (1.15) 
   
Constant 0.0157 -0.0436 
 (0.49) (-1.13) 
N 4212 4185 
Adj. R2 0.040 0.043 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Yearly Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
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I reconstruct the HSLW and LSHW variables replacing the newly constructed measure of strength. I 
then estimate the first-stage model to predict the changes in individual investor attention. Then I 
estimate the multivariate regression between the predicted changes in individual investor attention and 
the post-revision drift.  
Consistent with my main results, in Panel A I find that HSLW has a positively significant coefficient 
for upgrades. Although the sign of the LSHW is opposite in this analysis, the coefficient is not 
significant. 
  
Panel B: Second Stage-Using and Alternative Strength Proxy 
 Upgrades Downgrades 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
οܫ̴݊݀ܣݐݐ݊෣  0.0640* 0.148*** -0.0420 0.0377 
 (1.78) (2.65) (-1.42) (0.90) 
     
ROA 0.0154** 0.0321** 0.0643** -0.0209 
 (2.12) (2.25) (2.44) (-0.36) 
     
DtoE -0.0000126 -0.00000474 -0.00000748 -0.000175 
 (-0.22) (-0.04) (-0.19) (-0.96) 
     
High Coverage -0.00338* -0.00724*** 0.000415 0.00280 
 (-1.69) (-2.69) (0.30) (1.29) 
     
High Turnover 0.00158 0.00636 0.00517* 0.00665 
 (0.44) (1.23) (1.93) (1.35) 
     
Log (Size) -0.00104 0.000107 0.000522 0.00233 
 (-1.51) (0.07) (0.58) (1.56) 
     
HighEventRet -0.00183 -0.00310* 0.00136 0.00874** 
 (-1.61) (-1.74) (1.22) (3.63) 
     
Constant 0.0183** 0.0143 -0.0194** -0.0368* 
 (3.94) (1.02) (-3.53) (-2.54) 
N 4210 4210 4183 4183 
Adj. R2 0.008 0.002 0.031 0.011 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Yearly Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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With respect to downgrades, both these variables are not significantly related to the change in 
individual investor attention. The HighEventRet is positively but insignificantly related to the predicted 
change in individual investor attention. Although this coefficient is slightly weaker, the sign is 
consistent with my main results.  
Panel B shows the second-stage results using the alternative strength measure. After upgrades, I find 
that the οܫ̴݊݀ܣݐݐ݊෣  is significantly related to the post-event returns for both the event windows. After 
downgrades, this variable is negatively/positively related to the 3-day/10-day post-event CAR. 
However the coefficients are not significant in both windows. Although, this is slightly inconsistent 
with my main result, the consistency of the coefficient signs indicates that the results for Table 3.8 are 
not substantially dissimilar to my main findings.  
Table 3.9 shows the association between the event reactions and the HSLW and LSHW variables when 
alternate proxies are used for weight and strength. Column (1) reports the estimated results when 
revision clarity and experience are respectively used as the strength and weight proxies respectively 
(similar to Tables 3.2–3.6). Column (2) reports the estimation results when revision magnitude and 
experience are used as strength and weight proxies respectively (Table 3.8). Column (3) reports the 
estimation results when revision clarity and reputation are used as the strength and weight proxies 
respectively (Table 3.7). I examine how association between the main independent variables (HSLW 
and LSHW) and the event-return changes when alternative proxies are used.  
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Table 3.9 
Strength and Weight on Event Reaction: The Use of Different Strength and Weight Measures 
Table 3.9 reports the effect using different proxies when estimating the impact of strength and weight variables on the event-day 
reaction. The dependant variable is the absolute level of event-day reaction. Column (1) uses the clarity of the revision as the 
strength measure and experience quintile as the weight measure. Column (2) uses High-Magnitude as the strength measure and 
experience quintile as the weight measure. Column (3) used the clarity variable as the strength measure and the reputation as the 
weight measure. I examine the impact of LSHW and HWLW categories on the event-reaction; using alternative measures. I use 
the same control variables used in Tables 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5. Industry and year fixed effects are controlled for. Standard errors are 
clustered by calendar month and are in parentheses. The superscripts *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively 
 
In Column (1), where my main strength and weight proxies are used to construct the LSHW and HSLW 
variables, I find that the event reaction is larger/smaller after LSHW/HSLW revisions. This is consistent 
with the notion that individual’s event day reaction is stronger/weaker after low-strength revisions 
 (1) (2) (3) 
LSHW 0.0106*** 0.00557** 0.00684** 
 (5.01) (3.58) (2.30) 
    
HSLW -0.00777** -0.00537* -0.00627** 
 (-4.34) (-1.70) (-4.83) 
    
HRRA -0.000584 -0.000336 -0.000385 
 (-0.34) (-0.18) (-0.20) 
    
ROA -0.0757* -0.0765* -0.0759* 
 (-2.49) (-3.01) (-3.01) 
    
DtoE -0.181 -0.164 -0.156 
 (-1.58) (-0.87) (-0.84) 
    
High Coverage -0.000655 0.00192 0.00231 
 (-0.38) (1.14) (1.42) 
    
High Turnover 0.00148 0.00204 0.00144 
 (0.51) (0.48) (0.34) 
    
Log (Size) -0.00398** -0.00474*** -0.00477*** 
 (-4.14) (-7.01) (-7.12) 
    
Pre-event Ret -0.00175 -0.00191 -0.00182 
 (-1.14) (-1.52) (-1.51) 
    
Upgrade -0.00348* 
(-1.92) 
-0.00518 
(-1.45) 
-0.00222 
(-1.20) 
    
Constant 0.0577*** 0.0672*** 0.0670*** 
 (4.76) (8.84) (7.93) 
N 8397 8397 8397 
Adj. R2 0.049 0.047 0.050 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Yearly Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
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made by large weight analysts/high-strength revisions made by low-weight analysts. This finding is 
consistent with the contention that individuals are initially sceptical when faced with large revisions 
by low-ability analysts. Furthermore, they react immediately to high-ability analysts even when they 
issue low-strength signals. Column (2) also shows a positive coefficient (0.00557) for LSHW and 
negative coefficient (-0.00537) for HSLW, which is consistent with my main result. Column (3) has a 
coefficient of 0.00684 (-0.00627) for LSHW (HSLW). Overall, the use of alternative proxies for strength 
and weight do not significantly affect the direction or the magnitudes of the coefficients, showing that 
my results are robust enough to withstand the substitution of various weight and strength proxies. 
 
3. 6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I investigate the direction of the association between cross-sectional analyst 
characteristics (credibility and extremeness of information), individual investor attention, and the post-
recommendation drift. Griffin and Tversky (1992) have theorised that agents overemphasize the 
strength (extremeness) of a signal and de-emphasize the weight (credibility) of signal and that this 
leads to asymmetric attention being placed on weight and strength attributes. Peng (2005) has suggested 
that the changes in attention lead to investor under/over reactions. I formulate my hypotheses based on 
these theories of how individuals process information. I categorise recommendation revisions as high 
and low strength based on the clarity of the signal(s) and their magnitude(s). I further classify the 
recommendation changes by high weight analysts and low weight analysts. I also use reputation and 
experience as alternative proxies for weight, and use the clarity of the recommendation change and 
magnitude as alternative proxies for strength. I measure the change in the attention of individual 
investors by examining the changes in attention after the revision, using Google Search Volume Index 
as a measure of individual investor attention.  
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I first explore whether the level of institutional and/or individual investor attention changes after “high-
strength, low-weight” and “low-strength, high-weight” recommendation revisions. I find that 
individual investors tend to pay attention to both types of revisions, whereas institutional investors only 
pay attention to the latter. I also find that individual investors react strongly and immediately after 
“low-strength, high-weight” revisions. However, they are initially sceptical when reacting to “high-
strength and low-weight” revisions, possibly because they interpret these as overreactions by analysts 
to extreme information (Sorescu and Subramanyam, 2006). My results are consistent with Sorescu and 
Subramanyam (2006) with respect to the shorter term.  
I next examine how the “high-strength and low-weight” and “low-strength and high-weight” variables 
are directly associated with the event-return and the post-revision drift. This analysis is similar to the 
one performed by Sorescu and Subramanyam (2006), although I refine the sample to ensure that it is 
less affected by confounding events. I find that investors tend to react strongly after “highs-weight, 
low-strength” downgrades, although there is no such reaction after corresponding upgrades. This 
finding is consistent with the negative attention bias previously exhibited by individual investors 
(Barber and Odean, 2008). My results are also consistent with the notion that individual investors delay 
their reaction after “high-strength, low-weight” revisions, which subsequently leads to a post-revision 
drift.  
In the next step of the analysis, I examine whether the changes in individual attention lead to larger 
post-revision drift for “high-strength, low-weight” and “low-strength, high weight” revisions 
respectively. I find that the event-week changes in individual attention result in a larger drift after the 
event-week, only for “high-strength, low-weight” revisions. This result is consistent with the notion 
that individual investors immediately pay attention to “highs-strength, low-weight” upgrades; 
however, they are initially sceptical when responding to these revisions and exhibit a delayed reaction. 
These results show that even though individual investors are initially sceptical to large revisions by 
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low-weight analysts, their dramatic nature induce them to respond after a delay. The evidence also 
substantiates my claim that individual investors exhibit a negative attention bias. 
The evidence suggests that the nature of analyst characteristics lead to changes in attention, which 
subsequently leads to an investor reaction. My results show that it is mainly individual investors who 
tend to pay attention to large (dramatic) revisions made by low-weight analysts. Although they are 
immediately attentive, they respond to these revisions after a delay, resulting in a subsequent post-
revision drift. In contrast, individual investors tend to immediately pay attention and react after a “low-
strength, high-weight” downgrade, which leads to a strong event-reaction, a short-term reaction, and a 
subsequent reversal. Overall, the evidence shows that only individual investors pay attention to the 
strength of the revision even when the weight is low. Furthermore, they overreact to the low-strength 
downgrades when “high-weight” analysts issue them. Collectively, my results are explained by the 
attention hypothesis proposed by Griffin and Tversky (1992) and negative attention bias (Baumeister 
et al., 2001). 
Future research might focus on how analyst characteristics, changes in investor attention, and investor 
trading are associated. This will help researchers to understand how the strength and weigh attributes 
contribute to trading asymmetries and how investor trading leads to return differences. Another aspect 
that has not been examined in the current literature is how individual investor attention is related to the 
earning announcement drift and other company specific announcements. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Private Information, Investor Attention, and the Post-revision Drift 
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4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter examines how the gradual diffusion of private information leads to an investor 
underreaction in the setting of analyst recommendation changes. The chapter further investigates how 
the degree of investor attention and information asymmetry interacts with the diffusion of private 
information.  
Analysts act as information providers to equity market participants through their recommendations. 
Sell-side analysts employed by brokerage houses and investment banks make their recommendations 
publicly available. These analysts communicate new public and private information to the market by 
revising their existing recommendations (Boni & Womack, 2006). In an environment in which all 
investors are informed and rational, all new information should be reflected instantaneously in the 
market prices. However, given the informational and cognitive limitations of investors, the private 
information component contained in analyst revisions should diffuse gradually over a prolonged 
period (see: Hong, 1999; Hong, Hong, & Ungureanu, 2010; Hong & Stein, 2007; Hong, Torous, & 
Valkanov, 2002; Huang, 2012; Lin, 2010). The gradual diffusion of private information may predict 
an underreaction to stock recommendations and a foreseeable price drift after recommendations 
(Hong & Stein, 2007).  
Past studies suggest several other explanations for the post-revision drift, such as limited investor 
attention (Hou.et.al, 2009; Loh, 2010; Merton, 1987; Peng, 2005), information asymmetry (Bhat & 
Jayaraman, 2009; Chung et.al, 2014; Coller & Yohn, 1997; Lee, Mucklow, & Ready, 1993; Yohn, 
1998), and illiquidity (Altinkilic & Hansen, 2009; Barber, Lehavy, McNichols, & Trueman, 2001).  
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Hong (1999) theorizes that the gradual diffusion of private information leads to investor 
underreaction. This notion has not been tested yet in the setting of analyst recommendations. 
Kim.et.al. (1997) suggest that private information released after analyst recommendations is absorbed 
into prices, examining this issue in a market microstructure setting. Kadan.et.al (2014) examine the 
investor trading patterns in response to private information, although they do not examine how private 
information diffuses after analyst recommendations. Therefore, there is a need for a study examining 
how the private information content in analyst revisions is absorbed into market prices and how it 
could lead to underreaction.  
My overall contribution is to examine how individual attention and information asymmetry interact 
with private information diffusion to cause the post-revision drift. Although Altinkilic and Hansen 
(2009), Barber et al. (2001), and Loh (2010) examine the possible reasons for the post-revision drift, 
they do not account for the degree of private information. Kadan et al. (2014) suggest that there are 
post-event responses to private information that could explain the post-recommendation drift. Kim et 
al. (1997) examine how private information in recommendations is absorbed into prices only in intra-
day windows. I first contribute to the literature by examining the association between the private 
information content in recommendation revisions and the magnitude of the post-revision drift. 
Existing studies document that the underreaction to information becomes stronger in the presence of 
more retail investor interest (Hirshleifer, Lim, & Teoh, 2011; Hirshleifer, Myers, Myers, & Teoh, 
2008; Kadan et al., 2014) and limited investor attention from all investors (Hou et al., 2009; Loh, 
2010; Peng, 2005). Kadan et al. (2014) further show that individual investor trading in response to 
private information leads to a post-revision drift. However, they use an abnormal return as a measure 
of private information content. My second  contribution is to extend Kadan et al.’s (2014) study by 
examining this association using two more precise measures of private information, namely the firm-
matched abnormal return and the abnormal return matched to the industry (Babenko.et.al, 2012). The 
firm-matched abnormal return is a superior methodology because I ensure that stocks with analyst 
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recommendations are compared with similar firms with no analyst recommendations released on the 
same day. Since Kadan et al. (2014) match the firm with the characteristic-adjusted portfolio, any 
recommendations that occur on the same date are still included. On the other hand, when the 
recommended firms are matched with the non-recommended firms, I improve the chances of 
capturing the degree of private information precisely.  
Prior studies (Altinkilic & Hansen, 2009; Chung et al., 2014; Gleason & Lee, 2003) indicate that 
there is a larger underreaction in the presence of greater information asymmetry. These studies cite 
this as a possible reason for the existence of a post-announcement drift. However, they do not account 
for the degree of retail investor attention and/or the degree of private information in their 
investigations. Therefore, my third contribution is to examine how the interaction between 
information asymmetry and retail investor attention affects the diffusion of private information.   
I find a positive association between the degree of private information and the post-revision drift. 
This evidence is consistent with the notion that a larger amount of private information takes a longer 
period to be absorbed by the market (Hong & Stein, 2007). The evidence further indicates that the 
private information diffuses at a slower rate after upgrades than after downgrades. Specifically, the 
post-revision drift has a stronger (weaker) relationship with the private information content after 
upgrades (downgrades). This evidence is consistent with negative information inducing a stronger 
reaction than positive information (Barber & Odean, 2008; Hacamo & Reyes, 2012).  
I then test the association between private information and post-revision drift conditional upon the 
level of pre-revision retail attention (measured by the change in the SVI measure). Kadan et al. (2014) 
suggest that only individual investors trade consistently with the sign of the recommendation during 
the post-recommendation period. I find that the private information diffusion is slower in the presence 
of more retail attention. This notion is consistent with individual (retail) investors exhibiting more 
attention biases when responding to private information in the presence of market frictions. My 
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evidence is consistent with Hacamo and Reyes (2012), Hirshleifer et al. (2011), and Kadan et al. 
(2014). Further, the results indicate that individual investors are prone to underreact more (less) to 
new positive (negative) private information (Barber & Odean, 2008; Hacamo & Reyes, 2012).  
Furthermore, the evidence suggests that the impact of information asymmetry is stronger (weaker) 
for upgrades (downgrades) because investors consider the worst-case scenario when reacting to news 
(Epstein & Schneider, 2008). This results in investors responding to negative private information 
strongly under information asymmetry because they assume that the reliability of the negative signal 
is high (worst-case scenario) (also see: Zhou, 2015). I also find that, even in the presence of high 
levels of information asymmetry and retail attention, there is even slower diffusion of private 
information after upgrades. However, there is no such evidence for downgrades. The negative 
attention allocation bias suggests that individuals respond more strongly to the release of bad news 
than to the release of equivalent good news (Baumeister.et.al, 2001). My results are consistent with 
this behavioural explanation and with the past empirical studies (Barber & Odean, 2008; Hacamo & 
Reyes, 2012). I also find that the rate of private information diffusion is slower during times with a 
high degree of uncertainty and that positive (negative) private information diffuses more slowly 
(more quickly) during recessionary periods (non-recessionary periods), consistent with Veronesi 
(1999).  
For robustness, I use alternative proxies for private information and retail attention. I find that the 
results are consistent with the main result when the degree of private information is measured using 
a matched-firm approach. The results are also consistent when alternative proxies, such as the 
institutional ownership percentage, are used to measure individual attention. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature. Section 3 
explains the hypothesis development. Section 4 describes the data and methodology employed. 
Section 5 discusses the findings and Section 6 concludes.  
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4.2 Literature Review 
4.2.1 Information Content of Analyst Recommendations 
Stickel (1985) investigates the information content of analyst opinions and provides evidence for 
significant information content in analyst rating changes conditional upon the type of the rank change. 
Later studies also provide supporting evidence to suggest that analyst recommendations reveal 
significant information content (Barber et al., 2001; Elton.et.al., 1986; Kadan et al., 2014; Kim et al., 
1997; Loh & Stulz, 2010; Womack, 1996). Kim et al. (1997) examine the speed with which private 
information is incorporated into stock prices and suggest that centralized market structures (in which 
all orders are routed to one central exchange) are more efficient in absorbing private information. 
However, Kim et al. (1997) examine the reactions using intra-day data rather than daily data. Gleason 
and Lee (2003) suggest that the price adjustment process is faster and more complete for celebrity 
analysts and wider analyst coverage. The evidence provided by Gleason and Lee (2003) is related to 
the present study because they find an indirect empirical link between information content, 
information asymmetry (analyst coverage), and investor attention (celebrity status).   
Boni and Womack (2006) assert that recommendation revisions are more informative than 
recommendation ratings. A recommendation revision could be defined as the change in the new 
recommendation compared with the previous recommendation. Analysts change recommendations 
because of new private or public information coming to light. Further, analysts mainly provide 
information through their ability to rank stocks within industries (Grossman & Stiglitz, 1980). This 
prediction implies that analysts provide firm-specific information via their recommendation changes.  
Kadan et al. (2014) examine the way in which investors use the private information contained in 
analyst revisions. They find that institutional investors who possess a short-lived informational 
advantage buy before analyst upgrades and then sell when upgrades are announced. Kadan et al. 
(2014) name this investment strategy a “buy the rumour and sell the news” approach. On the other 
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hand, individual investors tend to buy after upgrades have been released. Kadan et al. (2014) show 
that institutional investors form their investment strategies utilizing analyst recommendations. 
The prior analyst literature suggests that specific analyst characteristics reveal the degree of 
information content in the analyst recommendation (Elton et al., 1986; Gleason & Lee, 2003; 
Womack, 1996). Further, the rate at which private information is absorbed depends on the market 
structure, the degree of investor attention, and the type of investors (see: Gleason & Lee, 2003; Kadan 
et al., 2014; Loh, 2010). However, past studies have not explored how the private information content 
in the recommendation revisions is diffused over time and whether this notion leads to an 
underreaction after recommendations. 
4.2.2 Diffusion of Private Information  
Hong (1999) develop a model for underreaction and overreaction to stock prices using the gradual 
diffusion of information. The model assumes “bounded rationality” in that the rationality of 
individuals is limited by the information that they posess, their cognitive limitations, and the time 
they require to make a decision. The authors show that private information travels slowly across the 
market because investors identify and interpret new private information at different points in time. 
The slow diffusion of private information in turn leads to an underreaction and a price drift. Hong 
and Stein (2007) take a step further by incorporating the gradual information diffusion model into a 
more general “disagreement model” in which information diffusion, limited investor attention, and 
heterogeneous priors jointly explain the underreaction to announcements.  
4.2.3 Post-revision Drift and Alternative Explanations 
A predictable drift lasts for several months after the release of analyst recommendations has been 
documented (Barber et al., 2001; Elton.et.al., 1986; Stickel, 1985, 1995; Womack, 1996). A post-
revision drift is observed even when the longer-term market reactions to recommendation revisions 
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rather than recommendations are examined (Gleason & Lee, 2003; Loh, 2010; Sorescu & 
Subramayam, 2006).  
Several factors have been suggested as the causes of this anomaly, namely limited investor attention 
(Gleason & Lee, 2003; Loh, 2010; Sorescu & Subramayam, 2006), illiquidity of stocks (Altinkilic & 
Hansen, 2009; Barber et al., 2001), and information asymmetry (Altinkilic & Hansen, 2009; Gleason 
& Lee, 2003). A recent study by Kadan et al. (2014) offers indirect evidence to suggest that the post-
event trading by individuals accounts for a significant portion of the post-revision drift (this evidence 
is consistent with Hirshleifer et al. (2008), who suggest that individuals are more prone to underreact, 
resulting in a larger drift). The past literature does not examine the gradual diffusion of private 
information as a possible explanation for the post-revision drift. I examine whether the diffusion of 
private information leads to the post-revision drift conditional upon illiquidity, limited attention, and 
information asymmetry.  
4.3 Hypothesis Development 
This section applies the existing theory and empirical evidence to develop hypotheses that predict 
how investors react to private content.  
Hong (1999) suggests that the gradual diffusion of private information leads to underreaction and a 
post-announcement drift. However, the existing analyst recommendations literature does not examine 
the relationship between the degree of private information and the post-recommendation drift. Kadan 
et al. (2014) examine the association between the private information content and the trade 
imbalances. They investigate the abnormal buy minus sell trade imbalance above the typical trade 
imbalance. I extend Kadan et al.’s (2014) study by examining the association between the degree of 
private information and the post-event return reactions (cumulative abnormal returns). Further, 
Kadan et al. (2014) use the raw event date abnormal returns as the measure of private information. I 
calculate two more precise measures of private information, firstly by matching the abnormal returns 
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to a control sample based on industry, size, and book to market ratio and secondly by matching the 
abnormal returns to the industry portfolio. The firm-matched abnormal returns are a superior 
methodology because I ensure that stocks with analyst recommendations are compared with similar 
firms with no analyst recommendations released on the same day. Since Kadan et al. (2014) match 
the firm with the characteristic-adjusted portfolio, any recommendations that occur on the same date 
are still included. On the other hand, when the recommended firms are matched with the non-
recommended firms, I improve the chances of capturing the degree of private information precisely.  
A larger amount of private information contained in the recommendation revision will take a longer 
period to become absorbed into the market prices (Hong & Stein, 2007). Therefore, a strong positive 
association between the post-revision drift and the degree of private information would be supportive 
of the gradual diffusion of private information. Considering this as a backdrop, the first hypothesis 
examines the association between the degree of private information and the post-revision drift. 
H1: The magnitude of the post-revision drift is positively associated with the degree of private 
information revealed on the event date.  
Hong and Stein (2007) predict that private information diffusion causes an underreaction and a post-
announcement drift after adjusting for the impact of limited investor attention. Loh (2010) suggests 
that pre-revision limited investor attention causes the post-revision drift. Further, Hirshleifer et al. 
(2008) suggest that individual investors who are more prone to attention-related biases cause the price 
drift after announcements. I extend the studies of both Hirshleifer et al. (2011) and Loh (2010) by 
examining whether the degree of attention interacts with the degree of private information to cause 
the post-revision drift. Hirshleifer et al. (2011) suggest that the degree of retail investor interest is 
positively associated with the degree of underreaction (post-event drift).  
I develop my second hypothesis to investigate how the association between private information and 
post-revision drift increases with the degree of retail investor interest. The hypothesis extends beyond 
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the studies by Hirshleifer et al. (2011) and Loh (2010) by examining how the diffusion of private 
information interacts with the degree of retail investor attention to cause the post-revision drift.  
H2: The strength of the association between post-revision drift and private information increases 
with the degree of relative individual investor attention.  
Gleason and Lee (2003) assert that the post-revision drift is positively associated with the degree of 
information asymmetry (supported by Altinkilic & Hansen, 2009). The post-earnings announcement 
drift is a function of the degree of information asymmetry as well as the degree of information content 
(Chung et al., 2014). Together these results generate my second hypothesis, which states that the 
strength of the relationship between private information and post-revision drift is conditional on the 
level of information asymmetry. Prior studies do not examine how fast the private information 
diffuses, given a high level of information asymmetry conditional on the degree of retail attention. I 
extend the past studies, such as those by Gleason and Lee (2003) and Loh (2010), by examining the 
way in which the degree of retail investor attention interacts with the information environment to 
increase the underreaction (post-revision drift). Hirshleifer et al. (2008) suggest that individual 
investors consume more time when processing new market information. Therefore, my third 
hypothesis follows from the notion that the diffusion of private information will be the slowest when 
there are high levels of information asymmetry and relative individual investor attention.  
H3: The association between private information diffusion and information asymmetry is 
positively related to the degree of individual investor attention. 
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4.4 Data, Variables and Methodology 
4.4.1 Data and Sources 
The Institutional Broker Estimation System (I/B/E/S) database provides the analyst recommendation 
sample for the Russell 3000 index between January 2004 and December 2012. The data are obtained 
from the recommendation detail file. The data set provides information on the brokerage firm for 
which the analyst works, as well as information about each recommendation.  
The I/B/E/S classifies recommendations as: 1 (strong buy), 2 (buy), 3 (hold), 4 (underperform), and 
5 (sell). I reverse the ratings from the most favourable to the most unfavourable (5 for strong buy and 
1 for sell) to make the calculation of recommendation changes clearer. I mainly focus on 
recommendation changes since prior studies show that recommendation changes are relatively more 
informative (Boni & Womack, 2006; Jagadeesh & Kim, 2010; Loh & Stulz, 2010). I calculate the 
recommendation changes as the current recommendation minus the immediately previous 
recommendation made by the same analyst. These recommendation changes range from -4 to +4. I 
remove any analyst initiations (first-time recommendations) from the sample. I also discard any 
recommendation changes when the previous recommendation was issued more than 1 year earlier.  
The sample excludes recommendation changes issued within 21 trading days of the earnings 
announcements to avoid the market reaction from being confounded (Altinkilic & Hansen, 2009). I 
apply this filter to ensure that the post-recommendation drift and the post-earnings-announcement 
drift are not combined. I obtain the quarterly earnings announcements from the Data Stream Database 
of Thomson Reuters. Further, I remove recommendation changes that were issued within 21 trading 
days of earnings forecasts and target prices (I obtain these data from I/B/E/S). 
I derive the benchmark returns for benchmark portfolios from the Kenneth R. French data library 
(http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/index.html). Specifically, I use the daily 
“Detail for 30 Industry Portfolios” file to obtain the daily industry averages for each portfolio.  
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I obtain stock-specific data, such as daily raw returns, daily trading volumes, shares outstanding, 
market capitalization, and book-to-market data from the Thomson Reuters Data Stream database. I 
derive the Google Search Volume Index values from Google Trends. I manually download the 
Google SVI values from 2004 to 2012 using the individual stock tickers in the Russell 3000 index. 
My collection process is consistent with Da et al. (2011). 
 The VIX implied volatility index values are downloaded from the Federal Reserve data library  
(https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/VIXCLS/downloaddata). The recession indicators are 
also downloaded from the Federal Reserve data library 
(https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/USREC).  
 
4.4.2 Measures for the Main Variables 
A. Distribution of Recommendation Revisions 
Figure 4.1 presents the distribution of recommendation revisions after all filters are employed. I exclude 
any recommendation revisions occurring within one trading month of an earnings announcement and 
/or earning forecast, all days that have multiple recommendations. This is a necessary filter to ensure 
than my results are not confounded with other market announcements occurring in close proximity to 
recommendations. I only include recommendation revisions that can be matched with non-event firms 
for same Industry, Size and B/M. Therefore the number of observations in the recommendation 
revisions sample significantly decreases to 7,693, from 13,916 in Chapter 2. The bar-chart shows the 
frequencies of recommendation revisions. Re-iterations make up the largest proportion of the sample, 
accounting for around 27 %. More extreme revisions that are more(less) than 3 levels of magnitude 
amount to only 1.33% of the sample. One-point revisions also account for a large proportion (45%), 
whereas two-point revisions amount to 26%. The sample distribution indicates that one point and two-
point revisions are more frequent that extreme revisions (more than three-levels). Although the number 
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of observations have decreased significantly from Chapter(s) 1 and 2, the distribution is not 
significantly affected.  Further, the distribution appears to have similar proportions of positive revisions 
compared to the corresponding negative revisions, making my sample relatively unbiased towards 
positive and/or negative revisions.  
 
Figure 4.1 
Distribution of Recommendation Revisions 
Figure 3.2 shows the distribution of my recommendation revisions sample. The recommendation changes are calculated as the 
current recommendation minus the previous recommendation. The recommendation ratings are codes from 1 (Sell) to Strong Buy 
(5), which in reverse of the I/B/E/S rating system. The recommendation revisions range from -4 to +4. The full recommendations 
sample contains 14,344 revisions. This excludes revisions issued within 21 trading days of earnings announcements, excludes 
multiple recommendation days, and excludes days where the stock price is less than $1. The sample also only includes 
observations with an analyst code and a consensus recommendation, anonymous analyst recommendations are excluded. The 
sample also excludes any recommendation changes that cannot be matched with a non-event firm with the closest Industry, Size 
and B/M. The sample contains 7,693 
 
 
 
B. Private Information Measures 
I construct two measures of private information by controlling the firm-level abnormal returns to a 
matched control sample and the value-weighted mean of the industry. Prior studies suggest that firm 
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stock returns co-move with the market and industry returns after industry-wide news releases (Ball 
& Brown, 1967; Cyert, 1967; King, 1967; Williams, 1967). Piotroski and Roulstone (2004) support 
the notion that analysts provide industry- and market-wide information by examining the stock return 
synchronicity after forecasts (also see: Crawford.et.al, 2012; Irvine, 2004). Further, Pitroski and 
Roulstone (2004) suggest that analysts provide both firm-specific and industry-level information via 
their forecasting activities. Cyert (1967) and Williams (1967) suggest that the variations in forecasts 
that are not explained by industry- and market-wide factors are a product of factors that are unique 
to the firm (supported by Crawford.et.al (2012) and Irvine (2004)).  
First, I compute a FirmSpecificPrivateContent measure using the value-weighted industry averages. 
Specifically, I subtract the value-weighted industry average from the market-model-adjusted event 
abnormal return for the recommended stock. With more significant differences between the event 
day abnormal returns and the event day value-weighted industry averages, there should be large firm-
specific information content in the recommendation revisions, which leads to a price change that is 
substantially different from the industry-wide price change. In other words, a variation in returns that 
is not explained by the industry-wide factors indicates that the analyst is introducing new firm-
specific (private) information of which they are in possession.  
Secondly, I employ a matching-firm approach to measure the degree of firm-specific information 
over and above the industry-wide information (see: Babenko et al., 2012). First, I identify the industry 
portfolio, market valuation, and book-to-market of each of the firms in the recommendation revision 
sample. I then select a set of firms that belong to the same industry portfolio, have market value and 
book-to-market ratios within a 10% range of the recommended firm’s corresponding values, and do 
not make a recommendation revision during the same week. I then calculate the abnormal return by 
subtracting the return predicted using the market model from the event day raw return (Babenco et 
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al., 2012).1 Next, I examine the price change on the event date when there is a recommendation 
revision and the price change for the matched firm without a recommendation revision or any other 
information release. Intuitively, the release of firm-specific information via a recommendation 
revision should lead to an event day price change that is above and beyond the price change for the 
matched firm. The release of industry-wide information and more intra-industry synchronicity should 
result in a smaller difference between the event day return for the recommended firm and that for the 
matched firm.2  
In Table 4.1, I present the summary statistics for the two firm-specific (private) information measures, 
namely the matched-firm return and the industry-adjusted return. My final sample contains 5,608 
recommendation revisions (upgrades and downgrades) for 532 firms (extracted from the Russell 3000 
index) during the period from 2004 to 2012. Further, I ensure that all the observations have sufficient 
raw returns, turnover values, and Google SVI values at least 8 weeks prior to the event. I exclude all 
analyst reiterations because prior studies indicate that reiterations do not contain any private and/or 
market-wide information content (see: Altinkilic & Hansen, 2009; Boni & Womack, 2006; Loh & 
Stulz, 2010).  
Panel A shows the distribution of the two private information measures. The distribution of the 
matched returns and industry-adjusted returns has significant variability from -29.29% to 23.80% and 
from -26.72% to 23.27%, respectively. The distribution of the two measures is consistent with the 
                                                          
1 Specifically, I regress the daily raw firm returns on the daily market returns (calculated using the S&P 500) for the event 
window [-262, -12] and use this model to predict the normal returns for the firm. Then, I calculate the difference between 
the event day raw returns and the normal returns.  
2 I use only the event day for my calculations, consistent with Kadan et al. (2014). However, I check the results using a 
3-day event window [-1, +1] as well. The results are qualitatively similar.  
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notion that recommendation upgrades (downgrades) are embedded with positive (negative) private 
information. Further, analysts appear to be providing the market with varying degrees of both firm-
specific and industry-wide information (Piotroski & Roulstone, 2004). Panel A also indicates that the 
mean and median of both the matched returns and the industry-adjusted returns are close to or equal 
to zero. This aspect of the distribution suggests that the average (median) analyst recommendation 
revision contains mostly industry-wide or market-wide information. This result is consistent with the 
prior studies suggesting that recommendation revisions at the average level contain minimal firm-
specific information to induce a stock price response (Altinkilic & Hansen, 2009; Loh & Stulz, 2010). 
However, the distribution for the matched returns indicates that the top and bottom quartiles of the 
sample induce a stock price response that is close to 1% above the matched firms. This is consistent 
with the notion that only some of the recommendation revisions are informative and induce a stock 
price response (Clement & Tse, 2005; Gleason & Lee, 2003; Loh & Stulz, 2010; Sorescu & 
Subramanyam, 2006). Another clear indication is that the differences between the event returns and 
the firm-matched returns are greater than the event returns and the firm-matched returns. In the 
matched returns, I match each recommended firm with a corresponding control firm without any 
information releases. Therefore, the differences in the abnormal returns are likely to be larger than 
those in the industry-adjusted abnormal returns sample, from which I subtract the value-weighted 
industry average. The value-weighted industry average contains the recommended stock’s event 
return; therefore, this would make the value-weighted average slightly larger than the matched-
sample return. This measure is consistent with the prior studies that distinguish between market-wide 
and firm-specific information (Crawford.et.al, 2012; Irvine, 2004; Kadan et al., 2014; Piotroski & 
Roulstone, 2004). The mean and median values are not significantly different from each other, 
suggesting little skewness in both the samples.  
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Panel B presents the correlation matrix between the private information measures and the alternative 
abnormal return measures. Specifically, I calculate the pair-wise correlations selecting pairs of 
variables among the matched-firm returns, the industry-adjusted returns, the market-model-adjusted 
abnormal returns, and the characteristic-adjusted abnormal returns. The high positive correlation 
(98%) between the market-model-adjusted abnormal returns and the characteristic-adjusted abnormal 
returns indicates that the two methods of measuring the stock performance provide qualitatively 
similar results. Panel B further shows that for a 1% increase (decrease) in abnormal returns (both 
characteristic-adjusted and market-model-adjusted), the industry-adjusted returns on average 
increase (decrease) by 0.58%. This moderate positive coefficient indicates that firm-specific 
information is a significant proportion of the full information contained in the analyst revision. This 
indication is contrary to Kadan et al. (2014), who measure the degree of private information using 
abnormal returns around the revision date. The correlations between matched returns and market-and 
model-adjusted (characteristic-adjusted) abnormal returns are also positive and moderately high at 
75% (74%). These coefficients also indicate that the matched-return measure is significantly related 
to the full information content contained in the abnormal return. However, the abnormal return 
measure does not replace the matched return as a private (firm-specific) information measure, 
contrary to Kadan et al. (2014). The +73% correlation coefficient between the two private information 
measures, namely the matched-firm returns and the industry-adjusted abnormal returns, indicates that 
the two measures do not contradict each other. The correlation is probably moderately high because 
of the construction of the two measures; the matched-firm measure controls for the industry, size, 
and book-to-market, whereas the industry-adjusted abnormal return controls for the industry-wide 
effect only.  
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Table 4.2 reports the average values for the control variables used in the multivariate analysis. These 
include the Ind_Attn variable, which is the change in the SVI variable for the week prior to the event 
week, specifically the logarithm (SVI) for the week prior to the event week (-1) minus the logarithm 
of the median SVI for eight weeks (-2, -9). We also report the change in the institutional attention 
(Ins_Attn) for the week prior to the event week. Other variables reported include the ROA (return on 
assets), DtoE (debt to equity ratio), and logarithm of analyst coverage (i.e. the number of analysts 
covering a firm). Table 4.2 shows that a majority of these control variables are not largely different 
across the private-content groups.  
For upgrades as well as downgrades, ln (analyst coverage) is significantly larger (smaller) for the 
low private information group (high private information group). Since analyst coverage is positively 
associated with the information environment, a stock with a better information environment should 
have a smaller amount of private information being revealed on the event date. The descriptive 
statistics are consistent with this notion. In downgrades, AwayConsensus is larger (at an absolute 
level) for the low private content sample. This is possibly due to analysts who are in possession of 
new private information issuing recommendations that differ from the prior consensus. The ln (Mkt 
Cap) variable is significantly larger for the low private content group in the case of both upgrades 
and downgrades. Once again, this shows that for stocks with a better information environment, the 
amount of private information revealed on the event date is significantly smaller. This is consistent 
with the notion that investors are more informed when it comes to stocks with a better information 
environment. However, for stocks with a poorer information environment, analyst revisions that 
contain new private information would have a larger impact on the event date.  
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C. Post-Revision Drift Measure 
I calculate the post-event cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) after each recommendation change 
over a 10-day window (consistent with Loh, 2010; Sorescu & Subramanyam, 2006; Stickel, 1985). 
The daily abnormal return (AR) is the raw return less the normal return predicted by the market 
model, in which the parameters of the market model are estimated using the S&P 500 index in the 
estimation window (-251,-11).3 The CAR is the cumulative sum of all the ARs for a specific period. 
I also calculate the CARs for alternative windows (5 day to 10 day) for robustness.  
 
D. Individual and Institutional Attention Measures 
Following Da et al. (2011), I create an SVI-based measure of individual investor attention as follows: 
¹¸
·
©¨
§
¹¸
·
©¨
§  8,,...2,,1,  lnln,_ tjSVItjSVItjSVIMediantSVItjAttnInd       (1) 
The 
tjAttnInd ,_
 measures the change in the information search volume (i.e. the log SVI value) for 
stock j in week t compared with the median value of the search volume (i.e. the log SVI value) for 
stock j over the previous eight weeks.  
As investors’ attention should be reflected in their trading activities, we define institutional investor 
attention as the residual turnover using the following regression model: 
    tjtjtjtjtjtj eVolTurnoverrAttnIndTurnover ,,41,3,2,1,  ln _ ln   EEEED       (2) 
     
 8,2,,1,,, ,..._  tjtjtjtjtj eeeMedianeAttnInst                                                                            (3)                                      
 
                                                          
3 I also calculate the size, B/M, and momentum-adjusted abnormal returns for robustness purposes using the Kenneth 
French data library portfolios.  
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tjTurnover ,  refers to the weekly turnover of stock j in week t, tjAttnInd ,_  is as defined in Equation 
(1), tjr ,  and tjVol ,  are the weekly return and standard deviation of the daily returns of stock j in week 
t, and tje ,  is the residual of the regression model.   
We classify stocks with higher than median 
tjAttnInd ,_
 and lower than median tjAttnInst ,_  in 
the pre-recommendation change week as the high relative retail attention (HRRA) group. Similarly, 
we classify stocks with higher than median tjAttnInst ,_  in the pre-recommendation change week as 
the high non-retail attention (HNRA) group. 
 
4.4.3 Empirical Tests 
A. Private Information Diffusion and the Post-revision Drift 
The first hypothesis examines the relationship between the degree of private information revealed on 
the event date and the magnitude of the post-revision drift. I examine whether a larger amount of 
private information will diffuse gradually, leading to a larger post-revision drift. I extend Hong and 
Stein’s (2007) study by examining whether the degree of private information revealed by analysts 
leads to a gradual reaction. I consider the association between the post-revision drift (post-event 
cumulative abnormal return) and the degree of private information.  
First, I divide the sample into two sub-samples based on the private content measured as the event 
day abnormal return minus the industry portfolio return. High private content (low private content) 
includes all the events that have a value above (below) the median. I then calculate the cumulative 
abnormal returns from 1 to 10 days after the event for each sub-sample. Then, the differentials 
between the high and the low group are calculated separately for upgrades and downgrades.  
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For upgrades and downgrades separately, I estimate the following multiple regression model with 
fixed effects for industry and years, controlling for a number of additional variables. The dependent 
variable is PostRevDrifti, t (1, 10), whereas the main independent variable is 
FirmSpecificPrivateContenti,t.  
 
୧ǡሺ୲ାଵǡ୲ାଵ଴ሻ ൌ Ƚ଴ ൅Ƚଵ	୧ǡ୲ ൅ Ƚଶ୧ǡ୲ ൅ 
Ƚଷ୧ǡ୲ ൅Ƚସ୧ǡ୲ ൅ Ƚହ୧ǡ୲ ൅ Ƚ଺୧ǡ୲ ൅ Ƚ଻୧ǡ୲ ൅
Ƚ଼୧ǡ୲ ൅ Ƚଽሺሻ୧ǡ୲ ൅ σ Ƚଽା୨ିଵ୧୨ୀଷ଴୨ୀଶ ൅σ Ƚଷ଼ା୨ିଵ୲୨ୀଽ୨ୀଶ ൅୍ǡ୲ ൅
ɂ୍ǡ୲ሺ4) 
 
where:  
ܲ݋ݏݐܴ݁ݒܦݎ݂݅ݐ௜ǡሺ௧ାଵǡ௧ାଵ଴ሻ is a variable for stock i’s CAR value for 10 days after the revision date.4 
 ܲݎ݅ݒܽݐ݁ܥ݋݊ݐ݁݊ݐ௜ǡ௧ is the difference between the abnormal return for the event date and the industry 
portfolio return for the same date. 
ܪܴܴܣ௜ǡ௧ is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if the change in SVI is above the median 
and the change in the non-retail attention measure is below the median, as explained in the previous 
section.  
ܪ݄݅݃ܥ݋ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁௜ǡ௧ is an indicator variable indicating above the median for the sample of the 
logarithms of the number of analysts covering the stock according to the I/B/E/S for the year 
preceding the recommendation revision (Clement & Tse, 2005; Gleason & Lee, 2003).  
                                                          
4 I recalculate the variable using 30, 40, and 50 days and estimate the model. The results are qualitatively similar.  
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ܵ݅ݖ݁௜ǡ௧ is the logarithm of the market capitalization for the stock at the end of the previous calendar 
year (Loh & Stulz, 2010).  
ܣݓܽݕܥ݋݊ܿ݁݊ݏݑݏ௜ǡ௧ is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the absolute deviation of the new 
recommendation from the consensus is larger than that of the previous recommendation from the 
consensus. Jagadeesh and Kim (2010) contend that recommendations that move towards the 
consensus have a smaller price impact that those that move away from the consensus. I examine 
whether this has an impact on the post-revision drift. 
௜ǡ௧ is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the aggregate pre-event abnormal returns are above 
the median.  
ܴܱܣ௜ǡ௧ is the percentage of profit before tax divided by the total asset value for the previous year. 
 ܦݐ݋ܧ௜ǡ௧ is the debt value divided by the equity value for the previous year. ܮ݋݃ሺܶݑݐ݊݋ݒ݁ݎሻ௜ǡ௧ is the 
logarithm of the average value of the turnover for 8 weeks prior to the event.  
I re-estimate the above model using the alternative measure of private information. The degree of 
private information is measured using the matched-return approach, which I explained in the 
preceding section. This model can be expressed as follows: 
୧ǡሺ୲ାଵǡ୲ାଵ଴ሻ ൌ Ƚ଴ ൅Ƚଵ୧ǡ୲ ൅ Ƚଶ୧ǡ୲ ൅Ƚଷ୧ǡ୲ ൅
Ƚସ୧ǡ୲ ൅ Ƚହ୧ǡ୲ ൅ Ƚ଺୧ǡ୲ ൅ Ƚ଻୧ǡ୲ ൅ Ƚ଼୧ǡ୲ ൅
Ƚଽሺሻ୧ǡ୲ ൅ σ Ƚଽା୨ିଵ୧୨ୀଷ଴୨ୀଶ ൅σ Ƚଷ଼ା୨ିଵ୲୨ୀଽ୨ୀଶ ൅୍ǡ୲(5) 
In this model, I replace the private information measure as follows: ܯܽݐ݄ܴܿ݁݀݁ݐ௜ǡ௧ is calculated as 
the market-model-adjusted event day abnormal return less the matched-firm abnormal return for the 
same date.  
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In both equation 4 and equation 5, I expect the private attention variable to be positive and significant 
for both the upgrade and the downgrade sample. In each instance, a larger positive coefficient 
indicates that a larger private information content takes a longer period to become absorbed into the 
prices, which results in a larger post-revision drift. This is consistent with Hong and Stein (2007). I 
examine the private information diffusion for multiple event windows (CAR (1, 3), CAR (1, 7), CAR 
(1, 10), and CAR (11, 20)). This analysis is designed to reveal the short-term patterns of private 
information diffusion.  
 
B. Private Information Diffusion and Retail Investor Attention 
Hong and Stein (2007) adjust the private information diffusion model to incorporate individual 
investor attention. In my second hypothesis, I examine how individual investor attention interacts 
with the association between private information and post-revision drift.  
To examine the second hypothesis, I perform the following empirical tests. I first include an 
interaction term between the HRRA and the FirmSpecificPrivateContent variable in the above-
mentioned model (HRRA×FirmSpecificPrivateContent) and re-estimate the results. Secondly, I 
include High Retail and High Non-retail as two separate indicator variables and include an interaction 
variable between FirmSpecificPrivateContent and High Retail (High 
Retail×FirmSpecificPrivateContent). This model is re-estimated for the whole sample. Thirdly, I 
repeat the analysis using the institutional ownership percentage as a proxy for the institutional 
attention (inversely individual attention).  
I expect the coefficient of FirmSpecificPrivateContentit and its interaction terms to be positive and 
significant for both upgrades and downgrades. This would be consistent with the prior studies 
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indicating that the presence of more individual investors leads to slower private information diffusion 
and a larger post-announcement drift (Hirshleifer et al., 2008; Kadan et al., 2014).  
 
C. Private Information Diffusion, Information Asymmetry, and Retail Investor Attention 
The third hypothesis examines the relationship between the degree of private information, the retail 
investor attention, and the general information asymmetry in the firm. The HighCoverage variable 
measures the general level of information asymmetry prevalent in the firm environment. On the other 
hand, the FirmSpecificPrivateContent variable measures the degree of private information revealed 
by each recommendation revision. If some investors take time to interpret the meaning of private 
information and if there is a higher degree of information asymmetry, this should amplify the post-
revision drift. I first include an interaction term between the analyst coverage (a proxy for information 
assymetry)  according to Gleason and Lee (2003)) and the FirmSpecificPrivateContent variable 
(HighCoverage×FirmSpecificPrivateContent). I then create sub-samples for high retail attention and 
low retail attention based on the Ind_Attnij variable. I also create sub-samples for high non-retail 
attention and low non-retail attention based on Ins_Attnij. Then, I re-estimate the model with the 
HighCoverage×FirmSpecificPrivateContent variable to examine the impact conditional on the 
degree of retail and non-retail attention. I expect the interaction term to be negative and significant 
for the overall sample. I also expect the interaction term to be positive and significant when there is 
a larger (smaller) degree of individual (institutional) attention. This would indicate that, in spite of 
having high retail attention, investors underreact to private information, causing a post-revision drift.  
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4.5 Empirical Analyses 
4.5.1 Private Information Diffusion and Post-revision Drift 
In Table 4.3, I examine the association between the degree of private information and the post-
revision drift. Panel A presents the results for upgrades and Panel B those for downgrades. I divide 
the sample into five private content quintiles based on the industry-adjusted abnormal returns. I 
calculate the market-model-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns for event windows ranging from 
CAR (1, 4) to CAR (1, 10). I then examine the differences in the CARs between the highest and the 
lowest quintile and their statistical significance. 
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In Panel A, I find significant differences between the highest and the lowest quintiles from CAR 
(1, 2) to CAR (1, 10). The differences between the private content groups range from 1% to 
2.2%. Regarding upgrades, the post-revision drift keeps increasing from 2 days to 10 days for 
the high private content quintile. However, the low private content quintile does not have 
significant drift figures for any of the event windows. This evidence indicates that a larger degree 
of private information is associated with a larger magnitude of the post-revision drift. Further, 
the post-revision drift keeps increasing after upgrades until the 10-day window. The CAR values 
increase significantly for the high private content quintile until the CAR (1, 5) window; the drift 
then falls in significance from 5 to 10 days. However, the private information diffusion appears 
to take place even after 10 days, although its influence is smaller in magnitude. The findings in 
Panel A are consistent with my first hypothesis. Specifically, I find that a larger amount of private 
information leads to an underreaction because some investors take time to interpret this 
information (Hong, 1999; Hong & Stein, 2007). My result is also consistent with Kadan et al. 
(2014), who show that there is a post-event trading reaction when analyst recommendations 
contain private information.  
In Panel B, I examine the results after downgrades. The high private content quintile shows 
consistent and significant post-revision drifts from the CAR (1, 2) to the CAR (1, 7) window. 
None of the values are significant for the low private content quintile. The “high–low” 
differentials range from 1% to 1.50% and are significant for the first 5 days. The findings for 
Panel B are also consistent with my first hypothesis: a larger amount of private information 
contained in downgrades appears to lead to an underreaction (larger post-revision drift). 
However, the diffusion of private information appears to be relatively faster (slower) after 
downgrades (upgrades). Specifically, the private information diffusion is incomplete (complete) 
after 10 days for downgrades (upgrades). This finding is consistent with the negative attention 
allocation bias, which indicates that negative (positive) information attracts more (less) attention 
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from investors (Baumeister et al., 2001). This result is consistent with the notion that the private 
information diffusion is stronger for downgrades than for upgrades. Baumeister et al. (2001) 
suggest that individuals respond to negative news more strongly than they respond to equivalent 
positive news. This contention is consistent with the prior empirical evidence that indicates a 
stronger (weaker) reaction after negative (positive) information releases (Barber & Odean, 2008; 
Hacamo & Reyes, 2012).  
Overall, Table 4.3 indicates that the gradual diffusion of private information is a possible reason 
for the existence of the post-revision drift. The evidence is relatively stronger for upgrades.  
Table 4.4 reports the results for the multiple regression model examining the association between 
the post-revision drift and the degree of private content. The main dependent variable is the post-
revision drift for the event windows CAR (1, 4), CAR (1, 6), CAR (1, 10), and CAR (11, 20). 
The main independent variable is the FirmSpecificPrivateContent variable, which is the 
industry-adjusted abnormal return for the event day. I observe the association between these 
variables in shorter- and longer-term settings to identify the duration of private information 
diffusion.  
Panels A and B report the results for upgrades and downgrades, respectively. Panel A provides 
further evidence to suggest that there is a gradual diffusion of private information after upgrades. 
The FirmSpecificPrivateContent variable takes values of +0.126, +0.209, and +0.150 for 4, 6, 
and 10 days, respectively. This finding shows that more private information contained in a 
revision leads to a post-revision drift that is larger in magnitude. Although the private content 
coefficient becomes slightly weaker when CAR (1, 10) is used, it is still significant and positive. 
The result shows that the private information contained in upgrades diffuses gradually. For 
example, a 1% change in private content would lead to a 0.13% (0.15%) change in the post-
revision drift after 4 (10) days. However, I do not see a significant coefficient; when CAR (11, 
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20) is used as the dependent variable, the coefficient is negative but insignificant. This evidence 
is consistent with the gradual diffusion of private information suggested by Hong (1999) (also 
see: Hong & Stein, 2007).  
The result shows that the private information diffusion does not take place to a greater extent 
after 11 to 20 days. I also do not observe an overreaction to private information after 11 days, 
which is consistent with the past literature showing an underreaction to positive information 
(Barber & Odean, 2008; Hacamo & Reyes, 2012).  
On the other hand, Panel B shows a shorter-term diffusion of private information after 
downgrades. I find that the FirmSpecificPrivateContent coefficient is positive and significant 
when CAR (1, 4) and CAR (1, 6) are used as dependent variables. This evidence is consistent 
with the notion that a larger amount of negative private information in the downgrades leads to 
a larger negative post-revision drift. The rate of private information diffusion appears to be 
relatively greater for downgrades: a 1% change in FirmSpecificPrivateContent leads to a 0.26% 
(0.19%) change in the post-revision drift after 4 days (6 days). These figures are relatively larger 
than those of the upgrade sample. However, the coefficient is not significant when CAR (6, 10) 
and CAR (11, 20) are used. The evidence supports the notion that there is faster diffusion of 
private information after downgrades, which leads to a relatively shorter post-revision drift. 
These findings are consistent with Barber and Odean (2008) and Hacamo and Reyes (2012). 
 
The indicator variable HRRA (high relative retail attention), constructed using the Google Search 
Volume Index, is also included as a control variable. The findings indicate that the degree of 
retail attention is significantly and positively related to the post-revision drift after upgrades but 
not downgrades. The result is consistent with the study by Hirshleifer et al. (2008), who suggest 
that a larger presence by individual investors tends to lead to a post-announcement drift. 
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Table 4.4 
Multivariate Analysis: Private Information and the Post-recommendation Drift 
 
The dependent variable is PostRevDrifti, t (1, 10), whereas the main independent variable is FirmSpecificPrivateContent. 
The dependent variables are CAR (1, 4), CAR (1, 6), CAR (1, 10), and CAR (11, 20). FirmSpecificPrivateContent is the 
abnormal event day return less the value-weighted industry average. HRRA is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 
if the retail attention is above the median and the non-retail attention is below the median. AwayConsensus is an indicator 
variable equal to 1 if the absolute deviation of the new recommendation from the consensus is larger than the previous 
recommendation from the consensus; High Coverage is equal to 1 if the logarithm of the number of analysts covering the 
stock according to the I/B/E/S is above the median; and Size is the logarithm of the firm-market value. HighPreRet is an 
indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the pre-event period (-1, -5) has a value above the median. ROA is the return on 
assets for the firm for the previous year end. Leverage is the D/E ratio for the previous year end. Turnover is the logarithm 
of the average pre-event turnover for eight weeks before the event. The results are estimated separately for upgrades (Panel 
A) and downgrades (Panel B). Alternative event windows of CAR (1, 4), CAR (1, 6), CAR (1, 10), and CAR (11, 20) are 
used. The models include fixed effects for year and industry. Standard errors clustered by month are estimated and reported 
in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The sample period is 
from January 2004 to December 2012.   
 
Panel A: Upgrades 
 CAR (1, 4) CAR (1, 6) CAR (1, 10) CAR (11, 20) 
 
FirmSpecificPrivateContent 0.126** 0.209* 0.150* -0.0829 
 (2.00) (1.79) (1.84) (-1.16) 
     
HRRA -0.00137 0.0116* 0.00424* -0.00395 
 (-0.33) (1.75) (1.66) (-0.79) 
     
High Coverage -0.000198 -0.0136*** -0.00840* 0.00639 
 (-0.04) (-2.27) (-1.66) (1.09) 
     
Size -0.00100 -0.0000246 -0.000966 -0.00287* 
 (-0.71) (-0.01) (-0.42) (-1.65) 
     
Away Consensus 0.00491** 0.00754* 0.00609 -0.00497* 
 (1.98) (1.90) (1.57) (-1.65) 
     
HighPreRet 0.00359 0.00160 0.00381 -0.000525 
 (1.13) (0.37) (0.87) (-0.14) 
     
ROA -0.00979 0.0375 0.00855 -0.0327 
 (-0.29) (0.71) (0.16) (-0.77) 
     
Leverage 0.000161 0.0000646 -0.000253 -0.0000482 
 (0.87) (0.21) (-0.82) (-0.14) 
     
Turnover -0.00719*** -0.00351* -0.00204 0.000984 
 (-3.61) (-1.65) (-0.92) (0.35) 
     
     
Constant 0.0188 0.0526* 0.101*** 0.00230 
 (1.28) (2.47) (3.57) (0.10) 
Observations 828 828 828 828 
Adj. R2 0.034 0.040 0.020 0.042 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Yearly Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Panel B: Downgrades 
 CAR (1, 4) CAR (1, 6) CAR (1, 10) CAR (11, 20) 
FirmSpecificPrivateContent 0.263*** 0.188* 0.0706 -0.0111 
 (3.01) (1.72) (0.76) (-0.20) 
     
HRRA 0.00149 -0.00144 0.00198 -0.00499 
 (0.26) (-0.21) (0.33) (-0.97) 
     
High Coverage -0.00803* -0.00568 -0.0119 0.00268 
 (-1.66) (-0.98) (-1.63) (0.46) 
     
Size -0.000394 -0.000989 0.00107 -0.00276* 
 (-0.23) (-0.37) (0.41) (-1.67) 
     
Away Consensus -0.00425 -0.00646* -0.00550 -0.00106 
 (-1.41) (-1.79) (-1.48) (-0.32) 
     
HighPreRet 0.00705* 0.00830* 0.00570 -0.00300 
 (1.84) (1.76) (1.21) (-0.74) 
     
ROA -0.00845 0.0152 -0.0360 -0.0408 
 (-0.20) (0.28) (-0.73) (-1.12) 
     
Leverage 0.000194 -0.000145 -0.000538 0.000296 
 (1.27) (-0.55) (-1.00) (0.91) 
     
Turnover -0.00177 -0.00387 -0.00566 0.000369 
 (-0.68) (-1.13) (-1.32) (0.11) 
     
Constant  -0.00533 0.00732 -0.00585 0.0304 
 (-0.24) (0.24) (-0.19) (1.26) 
Observations 837 837 837 837 
Adj. R2 0.050 0.029 0.011 -0.006 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Yearly Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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High Coverage is negative and significant, which indicates that greater analyst coverage is 
associated with a smaller post-revision drift. Gleason and Lee (2003) suggest analyst coverage 
as a measure of the quality of a firm’s information environment. My result shows that a better 
quality information (lower information asymmetry) environment would induce a smaller post-
revision drift after upgrades. This shows that lower investor uncertainty about the content of 
recommendation revisions leads to a smaller underreaction (post-revision drift). For downgrades, 
I see a negative and significant coefficient for High Coverage only when CAR (1, 4) is used as 
the dependent variable. This result shows that a lower level of information asymmetry of the 
firm would lead to investors responding to downgrades relatively earlier. This evidence is 
consistent with Gleason and Lee (2003).  
The Awayfromconsensus variable is positive (negative) and significant for upgrades 
(downgrades). This finding shows that analyst revisions that move away from the general 
consensus of all analysts lead to a larger underreaction (post-revision drift). Analyst 
recommendations that move away from the consensus are likely to be interpreted as 
overreactions by analysts. Therefore, the diffusion of private information will be even slower 
after analyst recommendations that move away from the consensus. The Awayfromconsensus 
coefficient for upgrades and downgrades supports this notion.  
The Turnover variable measures the impact of attention from all investors prior to the revision. 
The turnover variable is negative and significant for upgrades. This finding is consistent with the 
contention that limited investor attention leads to a post-revision drift (Loh, 2010). However, the 
turnover variable is negative and significant only in the shorter-term event windows (4 and 6). 
The result indicates that limited investor attention is only meaningful for shorter windows. 
Further, the HRRA variable is significant in spite of having the turnover control variable. This 
143 
 
 
indicates that the relative retail attention has a significant association with the post-revision drift, 
particularly when longer-term event windows are examined.  
I also control for momentum, profitability (ROA), and leverage (D/E). The evidence shows that 
momentum explains the post-revision drift to some extent, particularly for downgrades. 
However, the effect of momentum does not change my overall finding with respect to private 
information. 
 
4.5.2 Private Information Diffusion and Individual Investors 
In Table 4.5, I examine the way in which individual investors’ attention influences the private 
information diffusion after analyst recommendation revisions. Table 4.5 also examines how the 
rate of private information diffusion changes according to the degree of individual investor 
attention. This examination follows from the contention that individual investors are more prone 
to underreact to announcements with more private information (Hirshleifer et al., 2011). I first 
estimate the model including the HRRA variable; then, I re-estimate the model using alternative 
measures of individual and institutional investor attention. I also include interaction terms 
between the FirmSpecificPrivateContent variable and the alternative individual attention 
measures.  
 
In Table 4.5, Panel A examines the upgrades, whereas Panel B examines the downgrades. In column 
(2), I interact HRRA with the FirmSpecificPrivateContent variable. I find a significant interaction 
coefficient of +0.731 (+0.477) for upgrades (downgrades). In the presence of more individual 
investor attention, there appears to be a stronger association between private content and post-
revision drift. These findings are consistent with my second hypothesis, which states that the 
diffusion of private information is slower when the degree of individual attention is larger. My 
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results are also consistent with prior studies suggesting that individual investors underreact to new 
information releases, which leads to a post-announcement drift (Bartov.et.al, 2000; Hirshleifer et 
al., 2008; Kadan et al., 2014; Loh, 2010). The magnitude of this association is stronger (weaker) for 
upgrades (downgrades). The likely reason for this could be the negative attention allocation bias, 
which means that investors exhibit a stronger tendency to underreact more (less) to positive 
(negative) analyst revisions (Hacamo & Reyes, 2012). Further, the result is heightened for the HRRA 
sample, since individual investors have a stronger tendency to exhibit attention-related biases 
(Hirshleifer et al., 2008). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
145 
 
 
Table 4.5 
Private Information Diffusion and Retail Attention 
The dependent variable is CAR (1, 10), whereas the main independent variable is FirmSpecificPrivateContent. HRRA is an indicator variable 
taking the value of 1 if the retail attention is above the median and the non-retail attention is below the median. High Retail is an indicator 
variable in which the Ind_attn is above the median. High Non-retail is an indicator variable in which the Ins_attn variable is above the median. 
HighInsOwnership is an indicator variable in which the percentage of institutional ownership is above the median. The results are estimated 
upgrades (Panel A) and downgrades (Panel B). The interactions between individual attention and FirmSpecificPrivateContent are also reported. 
The models include fixed effects for month and industry. Standard errors clustered by year are estimated and reported in parentheses. *, **, 
and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The sample period is from January 2004 to December 2012.   
 
Panel A: Upgrades 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
FirmSpecificPrivateContent 0.209* 0.0642 0.208* -0.0815 0.315 0.349 
 (1.79) (0.55) (1.79) (-0.66) (1.84) (1.86) 
       
HRRA 0.0116* -0.000228     
 (1.75) (-0.04)     
       
High Coverage -0.0136** -0.0134** -0.0144** -0.0136** -0.00141 -0.00171 
 (-2.27) (-2.21) (-2.34) (-2.19) (-0.17) (-0.21) 
       
Size -0.0000246 -0.000417 0.0000915 0.000432 -0.000363 -0.000317 
 (-0.01) (-0.21) (0.05) (0.21) (-0.11) (-0.10) 
       
Away Consensus 0.00754 0.00770** 0.00714* 0.00747* 0.0128** 0.0127** 
 (1.90) (2.01) (1.78) (1.92) (2.10) (2.08) 
       
HighPreRet 0.00160 0.00174 0.00123 0.00278 -0.00498 -0.00455 
 (0.37) (0.40) (0.28) (0.65) (-0.91) (-0.83) 
       
ROA 0.0375 0.0338 0.0378 0.0296 0.120* 0.121 
 (0.71) (0.64) (0.72) (0.59) (1.67) (1.64) 
       
Leverage 0.0000646 0.000139 0.0000159 0.0000192 0.000771 0.000583 
 (0.21) (0.45) (0.05) (0.06) (0.17) (0.13) 
       
Turnover -0.00351 -0.00486** -0.00335 -0.00490** -0.00327 -0.00288 
 (-1.64) (-2.19) (-1.57) (-2.26) (-1.50) (-1.29) 
       
HRRA×FirmSpecificPrivateContent  0.731**     
  (2.55)     
       
High Retail   0.0124** -0.000737   
   (2.37) (-0.14)   
       
High Non-retail   -0.00160 -0.00120   
   (-0.34) (-0.26)   
       
High Retail×FirmSpecificPrivate    0.828***   
    (3.97)   
       
HighInsOwnership     -0.00319* -0.00276 
     (-1.71) (-1.51) 
       
HighInsOwnership× 
FirmSpecificPrivateContent 
     -0.0566* 
      (-1.67) 
       
Constant 0.0526* 0.0610** 0.0459* 0.0519* 0.0580 0.0563 
 (2.47) (2.95) (2.07) (2.34) (1.58) (1.53) 
Observations 828 828 828 828 579 579 
Adj. R2 0.040 0.073 0.042 0.104 0.065 0.065 
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Panel B: Downgrades 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
FirmSpecificPrivateContent 0.188* 0.105 0.139 0.115 0.178 0.233* 
 (1.72) (0.92) (1.15) (0.86) (1.38) (1.66) 
       
HRRA -0.00144 0.00744     
 (-0.21) (1.08)     
       
High Coverage -0.00568 -0.00518 -0.00958 -0.00577 -0.00592 -0.00414 
 (-0.98) (-0.89) (-1.57) (-1.00) (-0.84) (-0.57) 
       
Size -0.000989 -0.00146 0.000498 -0.00123 -0.00110 -0.00167 
 (-0.37) (-0.56) (0.17) (-0.48) (-0.32) (-0.49) 
       
Away Consensus -0.00646 -0.00674 -0.00442 -0.00629 -0.00758 -0.00759 
 (-1.79) (-1.85) (-1.18) (-1.74) (-1.60) (-1.61) 
       
HighPreRet 0.00830* 0.00689 0.00797 0.00804* 0.0111* 0.0101 
 (1.76) (1.54) (1.62) (1.74) (1.70) (1.57) 
       
ROA 0.0152 0.0213 -0.00272 0.0124 0.0902 0.0838 
 (0.28) (0.37) (-0.04) (0.22) (1.44) (1.35) 
       
Leverage -0.000145 0.0000737 -0.000260 -0.000131 -0.00572 -0.00593 
 (-0.55) (0.34) (-0.61) (-0.54) (-1.14) (-1.20) 
       
Turnover -0.00387 -0.00392 -0.00490 -0.00400 -0.00551 -0.00566 
 (-1.13) (-1.15) (-1.31) (-1.16) (-1.23) (-1.25) 
       
HRRA×FirmSpecificPrivateContent  0.477*     
  (1.67)     
       
High Retail   0.00782* 0.0101*   
   (1.67) (1.74)   
       
High Non-retail   -0.00249 -0.00158   
   (-0.52) (-0.35)   
       
High Retail× 
FIRMSPECIFICPRIVATECONTENT 
   0.200   
    (0.95)   
       
HighInsOwnership     -0.000543 -0.00263 
     (-0.22) (-0.90) 
       
HighInsOwnership×FIRMSPECIFICPR
IVATECONTENT 
     -0.0723* 
      (-1.70) 
       
Constant 0.00732 0.00725 0.00311 0.00399 0.0152 0.0195 
 (0.24) (0.23) (0.09) (0.12) (0.39) (0.50) 
N 837 837 837 837 567 567 
Adj. R2 0.029 0.041 0.020 0.032 0.041 0.045 
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In column (3), I examine the direct impact of individual and institutional attention using the 
HighRetail and HighNon-Retail variables. The coefficient for HighRetail is positive and 
significant for both upgrades and downgrades. For upgrades, this finding shows that more 
individual investor attention would lead to a larger post-revision drift after upgrades. On the 
other hand, for downgrades, a larger degree of individual investor attention would lead to a larger 
positive post-event reversal, which is shown by the positive and significant CAR. This evidence 
is consistent with the notion that individual investors underreact (overreact) to positive (negative) 
information. In other words, individual investors exhibit the negative attention allocation bias 
after the release of analyst revisions. I also observe in column (3) that the non-retail attention 
indicator variable is insignificant for upgrades and downgrades. This is further evidence to 
suggest that institutional investors do not appear to underreact or overreact strongly to analyst 
revisions.  
In column (4), I examine the interaction between the HighRetail variable and the 
FirmSpecificPrivateContent. For upgrades, I observe a positive and significant coefficient, 
which shows that the diffusion of private information is slower when the individual investor 
interest is larger. However, I do not observe a statistically significant result after downgrades. 
This substantiates the contention that the diffusion of private information is even slower when 
there is more individual investor attention.  
Column 5 reports the results of re-estimating the model after replacing the individual investor 
attention proxy with the institutional ownership measure. I find that the coefficient for 
HighInsOwnership is negative and significant for upgrades. This result is also consistent with 
the notion that a smaller degree of individual investor attention (larger institutional ownership 
percentage) results in a smaller post-revision drift after upgrades. The findings also show a 
relatively stronger (weaker) coefficient for HighInsOwnership after upgrades (downgrades). 
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This is consistent with the main result of the chapter. Further, column (6) shows a negative and 
significant coefficient for the interaction variable 
(HighInsOwnership×FirmSpecificPrivateContent) after upgrades. This evidence is consistent 
with the notion that relatively less individual investor interest (more institutional ownership) 
leads to slower diffusion of private information, resulting in a smaller post-revision drift. For 
downgrades, the interaction variable is negative and significant. This result indicates that when 
there is a high level of institutional ownership, a larger degree of private information (more 
negative) would result in a smaller negative post-revision drift. This finding indicates that in the 
presence of a smaller degree of individual investor interest, there would be a smaller post-
revision drift after downgrades, which is consistent with my second hypothesis and the result 
using the HRRA variable.  
Overall, the results for Table 4.5 are consistent with my second hypothesis, which suggests that 
the rate of private information diffusion becomes slower when the degree of individual investor 
attention increases. I also find that this slower diffusion in the presence of more individual 
investor interest leads to a post-revision drift after upgrades as well as downgrades.  
 
4.5.3 Private Information Diffusion, Information Asymmetry, and Individual Attention 
In Table 4.6, I show how the degree of information asymmetry interacts with the degree of 
individual investor attention to affect the diffusion of private information. I estimate the model 
with an additional interaction variable (FirmSpecificPrivateContent×High Coverage) for 
upgrades and downgrades separately. I separate the sample into retail attention sub-samples, in 
which HRA is high-retail attention and LRA is low retail attention.  
For the upgrade sample, I observe that HighCoverage is negative and significant (insignificant) 
for the HRA (LRA) sample. The result is consistent with the contention that investors take more 
time to respond to new information when the level of information asymmetry is high (Epstein & 
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Schneider, 2008; Gleason & Lee, 2003). Further, when the degree of individual investor interest 
is relatively larger, this tendency of investors to underreact is heightened. This finding is 
consistent with past studies showing that individual investors are more prone to behavioural 
biases (Barber & Odean, 2008; Hacamo & Reyes, 2012).  
Table 4.6 
Private Information Diffusion and Information Asymmetry 
The dependent variable is PostRevDrifti, CAR (1, 10), whereas the main independent variable is FirmSpecificPrivateContent. 
HRRA is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the retail attention is above the median and the non-retail attention is 
below the median. AwayConsensus is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the absolute deviation of the new recommendation from 
the consensus is larger than the previous recommendation from the consensus; High Coverage is equal to 1 if the logarithm of 
the number of analysts covering the stock according to the I/B/E/S is above the median; and Size is the logarithm of the firm-
market value. HighPreRet is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the pre-event period (-1, -5) has a value above the 
median. ROA is the return on assets for the firm for the previous year end. Leverage is the D/E ratio for the previous year end. 
The results are estimated for upgrades (Panel A) and downgrades (Panel B), separately for HRA (high retail) and LRA (low 
retail), for which high retail contains revisions with Ind_att above the median and vice versa. I also include an interaction 
variable between FirmSpecificPrivateContent and High Coverage. Include fixed effects for month and industry. Standard errors 
clustered by month are estimated and reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%. 
 Upgrades Downgrades 
 HRA LRA HRA LRA 
FirmSpecificPrivateContent 0.611** 0.0415 0.527** 0.0354 
 (2.40) (0.38) (2.12) (0.29) 
     
High Coverage -0.0370** 0.00452 -0.0172 -0.00872 
 (-2.77) (0.47) (-1.41) (-0.98) 
    
Size 0.00494 -0.00380 0.0000181 -0.00199 
 (1.06) (-1.34) (0.00) (-0.58) 
     
Away Consensus 0.00239 0.0117** -0.00935 -0.00345 
 (0.24) (2.24) (-1.45) (-0.73) 
     
HighPreRet -0.00967 0.00871 0.00423 0.0101* 
 (-0.98) (1.44) (0.51) (1.85) 
     
ROA 0.0989 0.00743 0.0827 -0.0128 
 (0.91) (0.12) (1.10) (-0.15) 
     
Leverage 0.000358 0.0000304 -0.00124** -0.00107* 
 (0.51) (0.07) (-2.45) (-1.78) 
     
FirmSpecificPrivateContent 
× High Coverage 
0.553* -0.843*** -0.535 0.148 
 (1.67) (-3.67) (-1.62) (0.56) 
     
Constant 0.0354 0.131*** -0.0318 0.0389 
 (0.72) (4.06) (-0.65) (0.92) 
Observations 313 515 416 412 
Adj. R2 0.230 0.089 0.099 0.103 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Yearly Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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The interaction variable (FirmSpecificPrivateContent×HighCoverage) indicates the association 
between private content and post-revision drift when there is a high level of analyst coverage 
(low level of information asymmetry). For upgrades, there is a gradual diffusion of private 
information in spite of the degree of information asymmetry for the HRA sample. The coefficient 
is +0.553 for the HRA sample, which indicates that a larger amount of private information results 
in a larger post-revision drift even when there is a low level of information asymmetry. On the 
other hand, the FirmSpecificPrivateContent variable has a coefficient of +0.611, which indicates 
that more private information results in an even larger post-revision drift when there is a high 
level of information asymmetry (low coverage). This result is consistent with the notion that 
individual investors take a prolonged amount of time to process new private information and this 
tendency is heightened when there is a high level of information asymmetry. My result is 
consistent with Epstein and Shneider (2008) and Gleason and Lee (2003). For the LRA sample, 
I find consistent results. When there is a low level of information asymmetry, I observe a negative 
and significant coefficient of -0.843. In the LRA sample, a smaller amount of information 
asymmetry combined with a high degree of private information results in a smaller underreaction 
(drift). This result is consistent with the contention that a low degree of information asymmetry 
leads to a faster diffusion of private information, which results in a smaller post-revision drift. 
This finding shows that when the degree of individual investor attention is small (LRA), the 
possibility of gradual information diffusion is smaller. On the other hand, the 
FirmSpecificPrivateContent variable is insignificant for LRA. This finding shows that even in 
the presence of a high level of information asymmetry (low coverage), private information does 
not diffuse slowly when there is a low level of interest by individual investors. This evidence 
supports the argument that individual investor attention is the prominent factor that determines 
the post-revision drift after upgrades (Hirshleifer et al., 2008).   
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For downgrades, the diffusion of private information appears to be slower in the presence of 
more individual investor attention (HRA). The FirmSpecificPrivateContent variable is positive 
and significant (insignificant) for the HRA (LRA) sample. This result indicates that in the 
presence of a high level of information asymmetry (low coverage), private information diffuses 
slowly for the high individual attention sample. However, this is not the case for the low 
individual attention sample. The result is consistent with the claim that individuals underreact to 
the new private information contained in the revisions, which results in a post-revision drift.  
For HRA and LRA downgrades, the coefficients for the interaction variable 
(FirmSpecificPrivateContent×High Coverage) are not significant. Individual investors do not 
appear to underreact to downgrades in the presence of a low level of information asymmetry. 
This result is consistent with the notion that the private information diffusion is stronger for 
downgrades than for upgrades. Baumeister et al. (2001) suggest that individuals respond more 
strongly to negative news than to equivalent positive news. This contention is consistent with the 
prior empirical evidence that indicates a stronger (weaker) reaction after negative (positive) 
information releases (Barber & Odean, 2008; Hacamo & Reyes, 2012).   
The comparison of the FirmSpecificPrivateContent coefficients between upgrades and 
downgrades for the HRA sample reveals a similar pattern. Although both coefficients are positive 
and significant, the coefficient for upgrades is larger (0.611) than the coefficient for downgrades 
(0.527). This finding shows that, in the presence of high levels of information asymmetry and 
individual investor interest, the private information diffusion is slower, which leads to a larger 
post-revision drift. This result is consistent with the private information diffusion theory of Hong 
(1999). It also supports the notion that individual investors, who are prone to behavioural biases, 
underreact more (less) to upgrades (downgrades). Further, this finding is consistent with Epstein 
and Schneider (2008), who suggest that investors underreact more to positive information when 
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there is a high level of information asymmetry (low coverage). Epstein and Schneider (2008) 
suggest that when ambiguity-averse investors are faced with a high level of information 
asymmetry, they respond by assuming the worst-case assessment. If an ambiguous signal 
conveys good (bad) news, the worst case is that the signal is unreliable (very reliable). 
Specifically, when there is a high level of information asymmetry and the revision carries good 
news, investors would consider the signal to be unreliable and underreact to the information. 
This explanation is consistent with my result for upgrades and downgrades in HRA.  
 
4.5.4 Robustness Analyses 
In Table 4.7, I re-estimate the results after replacing the matched-firm event day return with the 
private content measure. I include the interaction variable between HRRA and MR (firm-
matched return) in the model to examine how the diffusion of private information is affected by 
the presence of more retail investor attention. First, I estimate the results for the full upgrade and 
downgrade samples. Second, I estimate the results only for the high coverage (low information 
asymmetry) samples.  
The results in Table 4.7 are consistent with my main results in Tables 5 and 6. In the full sample, 
I find that the coefficient for the interaction variable between HRRA and MR is significant for 
upgrades as well as downgrades. In other words, for high relative retail attention revisions, a 
larger MR leads to a larger post-revision drift. This result supports my second hypothesis, which 
suggests that the private information diffusion is slower when the relative retail attention is high. 
The finding is consistent with other studies indicating that individual investors are prone to 
underreact to new announcements (Barber & Odean, 2008). On the other hand, the isolated 
HRRA and MR variables are not significant when their interaction terms are included in the 
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model. This result shows that the combination of the degree of private information and the degree 
of relative retail attention determines the post-revision drift.  
Table 4.7 
Robustness Check: Alternative Proxy for Private Information 
The dependent variable is the CAR (1, 10), whereas the main independent variable is MR. MR is the abnormal event day 
return less the matched non-event firm return. HRRA is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the retail attention is 
above the median and the non-retail attention is below the median. AwayConsensus is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the 
absolute deviation of the new recommendation from the consensus is larger than the previous recommendation from the 
consensus; High Coverage is equal to 1 if the logarithm of the number of analysts covering the stock according to the I/B/E/S 
is above the median; and Size is the logarithm of the firm-market value. HighPreRet is an indicator variable taking the value 
of 1 if the pre-event period (-1, -5) has a value above the median. ROA is the return on assets for the firm for the previous 
year end. Leverage is the D/E ratio for the previous year end. The results are estimated separately for upgrades (Panel A) 
and downgrades (Panel B). I estimate the results separately for the full sample and only the high-coverage sample. The 
models include fixed effects for month and industry. Standard errors clustered by month are estimated and reported in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The sample period is from 
January 2004 to December 2012.   
 Upgrades Downgrades 
 Full  
Sample 
High  
Coverage 
Full  
Sample 
High  
Coverage 
MR -0.0722 -0.0647 -0.114 -0.104 
 (-0.87) (-0.43) (-1.64) (-0.73) 
     
HRRA -0.000291 -0.00160 0.0115 0.00928 
 (-0.03) (-0.13) (1.40) (0.88) 
     
MR×HRRA 0.351* 0.546*** 0.657* 0.00296 
 (1.93) (2.90) (2.31) (0.01) 
     
High Coverage -0.00692  -0.00616  
 (-0.93)  (-1.31)  
     
Size -0.00251 0.00401 -0.000186 -0.00120 
 (-1.29) (1.56) (-0.15) (-0.33) 
     
Away Consensus 0.00582* 0.00834** -0.00612* -0.00212 
 (1.94) (2.09) (-1.81) (-0.40) 
     
HighPreRet 0.00258 -0.00496 0.00601* 0.0111 
 (0.58) (-0.99) (1.66) (1.62) 
     
ROA 0.000917 -0.0287 0.0207 -0.0245 
 (0.01) (-0.37) (0.32) (-0.23) 
     
Leverage -0.000208 0.000285 0.000122 -0.00139** 
 (-0.60) (0.69) (0.53) (-2.35) 
     
Constant 0.120** 0.0163 -0.000769 0.0934 
 (4.35) (0.45) (-0.03) (1.89) 
Observations 840 453 838 421 
Adj. R2 0.020 0.031 0.018 -0.010 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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In the high coverage sample, I find similar results to those presented in Table 4.6. Specifically, the 
interaction between HRRA and MR is positive and significant for upgrades. This result shows that, 
even when the level of information asymmetry is low, private information diffuses gradually for the 
HRRA sample. This is consistent with the notion that individual investors underreact to new private 
information even when there is a low level of information asymmetry. This results in a slower 
diffusion of private information and a larger post-revision drift. This finding is consistent with my 
result in Table 4.5. In the downgrade sample, I observe no significant coefficient for the interaction 
variable between HRRA and MR. This is further evidence to substantiate the contention that there is 
a faster (slower) degree of private information diffusion after downgrades (upgrades). This finding is 
consistent with the negative attention allocation bias suggested by Baumeister et al. (2001).  
The interaction coefficient for the full upgrades (full downgrades) is 0.351 (0.657). These coefficients 
are not consistent with my main result. My main result indicates that there is relatively slower private 
information diffusion after upgrades. However, these coefficients do not support this contention. 
Nevertheless, the removal of revisions with low coverage (high information asymmetry) from the 
sample tends to make these results more consistent with my main result. For the high coverage 
upgrade (downgrade) sample, we see a significant (insignificant) coefficient. This result is consistent 
with the main result. Overall, the results in Table 4.6 are largely consistent with my main results. 
In Table 4.8, I examine whether the association between private information and post-revision drift 
depends on the timing of the revision. Prior research suggests that the under/overreaction to good 
(bad) news depends on whether the news is released in good or bad times (Ozoguz, 2009; Veronesi, 
1999).  
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Table 4.8 
Private Information Diffusion in Uncertain Times 
The dependent variable is CAR (1, 10), whereas the main independent variable is FirmSpecificPrivateContent. I use the same 
control variables as in the previous tables. Panel A (Panel B) estimates the results for upgrades (downgrades). I estimate the 
results for high uncertainty and low uncertainty periods separately. I classify revisions into high and low uncertainty times by 
considering above (below) the median VIX index as high (low) uncertain times. The daily VIX index was downloaded from 
the Federal Reserve data library. Similarly, I examine the separate effects of recessionary times and non-recessionary times. 
The recession indicators were downloaded from the Federal Reserve data library. The models include fixed effects for month 
and industry. Standard errors clustered by month are estimated and reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
 
 
  
Panel A: Upgrades 
             Uncertainty            Recession 
 High Low Yes No 
FirmSpecificPrivateContent 0.293*** 0.0651 0.361*** 0.0681 
 (2.57) (1.39) (4.22) (1.24) 
     
HRRA 0.0185* 0.0123*** 0.0297* 0.00224 
 (1.65) (2.39) (1.86) (0.35) 
     
High Coverage -0.0159*** -0.00535 -0.0179* -0.00862* 
 (-2.23) (-1.25) (-1.66) (-1.76) 
     
Size -0.00129 -0.00158 -0.00269 0.000097
9 
 (-0.72) (-1.12) (-0.72) (0.09) 
     
Away Consensus -0.00843 0.00414 -0.0132* 0.00518**
* 
 (-1.23) (1.03) (-1.87) (2.55) 
     
HighPreRet -0.00321 0.00672** 0.00473 0.00304 
 (-0.41) (2.20) (0.41) (1.29) 
     
ROA -0.0328 0.0545 -0.0140 0.0155 
 (-0.94) (1.37) (-0.77) (0.50) 
     
Leverage -0.00341*** 0.000102*** 0.0000406 -0.000569 
 (-5.09) (8.71) (1.05) (-1.01) 
     
Turnover -0.00671 0.000683 -0.00996** -0.000282 
 (-1.25) (0.40) (-2.44) (-0.29) 
     
Constant 0.00373 -0.0105 0.0160 0.0127 
 (0.07) (-0.48) (0.29) (0.68) 
N 577 954 523 1930 
Adj. R2 0.069 0.038 0.142 0.013 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Yearly Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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The expected uncertainty also affects the response to good or bad news. Therefore, the private 
information diffusion might be affected by the time during which the recommendation is released,  
Which makes this robustness check necessary. First, I divide the sample into two subsamples: high 
uncertainty (High VIX Index) and low uncertainty (Low VIX Index). Second, I divide the sample 
into two different subsamples: recessionary periods, in which the NBER recession indicator takes the 
value of 1, and non-recessionary periods, which include the remainder of the observations. 
For upgrades (Panel A), I find that the coefficient is positive for FirmSpecificPrivateContent in both 
high and low uncertainty periods. However, the coefficient (0.293) is significant and larger for the 
high uncertainty periods. This finding is consistent with Epstein and Schneider (2008), who suggest 
that investors underreact more to good news during ambiguous (uncertain) times. On the other hand, 
Panel B: Downgrades 
 Uncertainty Recession 
 High Low Yes No 
FirmSpecificPrivateContent 0.140* 0.0544 0.167** 0.0814 
 (2.26) (0.47) (2.01) (1.25) 
     
HRRA 0.0232* 0.00194 0.0225* -0.00377 
 (1.67) (0.46) (1.70) (-0.62) 
     
High Coverage 0.00836 -0.000679 0.00200 -0.00221 
 (0.51) (-0.11) (0.12) (-0.69) 
     
Size 0.00301 0.00219 0.00455 0.00170 
 (0.95) (1.43) (1.03) (1.22) 
     
Away Consensus -0.00879* -0.00546** -0.0102** -0.00363 
 (-1.82) (-2.12) (-2.20) (-1.40) 
     
HighPreRet -0.00864 0.000836 -0.00370 0.000984 
 (-0.78) (0.22) (-0.48) (0.42) 
     
ROA 0.00265 -0.0500 -0.0542 -0.0122 
 (0.07) (-1.43) (-0.83) (-0.41) 
     
Leverage -0.000115*** -0.00122 -0.0000914*** -0.00106 
 (-5.64) (-1.51) (-2.70) (-1.63) 
     
Turnover -0.00679 0.000193 -0.0101** -0.000182 
 (-1.15) (0.11) (-2.37) (-0.12) 
     
Constant -0.0237 -0.0220 -0.0439 -0.0215 
 (-0.52) (-0.88) (-1.30) (-1.06) 
N 537 1065 537 1817 
Adj. R2 0.015 0.013 0.037 0.005 
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for downgrades (Panel B), we see a smaller coefficient (0.140) for the FirmSpecificPrivateContent 
variable. My results are similar to those of Zhou (2015), who suggests a stronger reaction to bad news 
than to good news and asserts that in times of a high degree of ambiguity there is a larger magnitude 
of this effect. 
The result is also consistent with the theoretical predictions of Epstein and Schneider (2008), who 
suggest that investors tend to consider the worst-case scenario when responding under high levels of 
ambiguity. Therefore, in periods of high ambiguity, there should be a larger underreaction to good 
news and a smaller underreaction to bad news. Table 4.8 shows results consistent with this notion.  
Panel A also shows that the coefficient is positive for FirmSpecificPrivateContent in both 
recessionary and non-recessionary periods. However, the coefficient (0.361) for recessionary periods 
is larger and more significant than the insignificant coefficient (0.0681) for non-recessionary periods. 
This suggests that the stocks underreact more to upgrades (good news) during recessions (bad times). 
On the other hand, for downgrades, Panel B shows a positive coefficient for 
FirmSpecificPrivateContent that is large (small) and significant (insignificant) during good (bad) 
times. This evidence supports the notion that investors underreact more (less) to bad news during bad 
times (good times). Veronesi (1999) presents a rational, regime-switching model in which investors 
react asymmetrically to good and bad news depending on whether it is released during good and/or 
bad times. Consistent with Veronesi (1999), we find that investors underreact more (less) to good 
(bad) private information when it is released in bad times (good times) (also see: Boyd, Hu, & 
Jagannathan, 2005; Zhou, 2015). 
Overall, Table 4.8 shows that the diffusion of private information is slower after revisions that are 
released during recessionary and more uncertain periods. The strength of the relationship between 
private information and post-revision drift depends on the uncertainty of the time during which the 
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revisions are released. Nevertheless, the coefficients of FirmSpecificPrivateContent remain positive 
and consistent with the gradual diffusion of private information.  
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter examines whether the gradual diffusion of private information interacts with other 
factors (information asymmetry and individual investor attention) to cause the post-revision drift. I 
find a positive association between the degree of private information and the post-revision drift. This 
evidence is consistent with the notion that a larger amount of private information takes a longer period 
to be absorbed by the market (Hong & Stein, 2007). Further, the magnitude of this association is 
stronger for upgrades than downgrades. This evidence is consistent with negative information 
inducing a stronger reaction than positive information (Barber & Odean, 2008; Hacamo & Reyes, 
2012). 
I find that the diffusion of private information is slower in the presence of more retail attention. This 
notion is consistent with individual (retail) investors exhibiting more attention biases when 
responding to private information in the presence of market frictions. My evidence is consistent with 
Hacamo and Reyes (2012), Hirshleifer et al. (2008), and Kadan et al. (2014). I also find that private 
information diffuses more slowly in the presence of more individual investor interest. This evidence 
is supportive of the notion that individual investors exhibit the negative attention allocation bias 
suggested by Baumeister et al. (2001).  
I also find that private information diffuses even more gradually when there is more information 
asymmetry (consistent with Chung et al., 2014) and when the level of individual investor interest is 
high. This evidence is consistent with Zhang (2006), who suggests that a larger degree of information 
asymmetry results in a larger underreaction to the private component of market announcements. The 
evidence also suggests that the impact of information asymmetry is stronger (weaker) for upgrades 
(downgrades) because investors consider the worst-case scenario when reacting to negative and 
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positive news (Epstein & Schneider, 2008). Furthermore, I find that individual investors tend to 
underreact to private information even when the level of information asymmetry is relatively low.   
This chapter finally produces a number of questions for future research. It would be pertinent to 
determine whether the individual and institutional trading patterns support the existence of gradual 
private information diffusion. Further, it would be interesting to observe any leakages of private 
information prior to the release of the recommendation and how that would have an impact on the 
diffusion of private information. A more thorough examination of the profitability of an investment 
strategy formed based on the degree of private information also needs to be undertaken.   
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5.1 Main theme: The post-revision drift 
Previous researchers have documented a post-revision drift after analyst recommendations 
have been released, which occurs in the same direction as the initial event day reaction 
(Womack, 1996; Brav and Lehavy, 2003; Gleason and Lee, 2003). The reasons for the 
existence of the post-revision drift must be examined because it is an anomaly that contradicts 
the notion that public information is absorbed into prices in a timely manner (Fama, 1997).  
Factors such as inattention (Loh, 2010), individual investor activity (Hirshleifer et al., 2008), 
analyst characteristics (Sorescu and Subramanyam, 2006), and private information diffusion 
(Hong and Stein, 2007) have been suggested as possible reasons for the post-revision drift. 
However none of these studies offer a cohesive explanation for the existence of the post-
revision drift. Therefore, in my dissertation I offer a compelling explanation, building on the 
prior literature. Chapters two, three, and four examined whether the post-revision drift is caused 
by prior individual attention, the nature of analyst characteristics, and the gradual diffusion of 
private information, respectively.  
5.2 Investor Attention, Analyst Recommendation Revisions, and Stock Prices 
Chapter 2 examined how the level of individual investors’ attention relative to institutional 
investors’ attention is associated with the post-analyst-revision drift. Chapter 2 extended Loh’s 
(2010) analysis in at least two aspects: First, Chapter 2 used Google’s Search Volume Index 
(SVI), which is a more direct proxy for retail investors’ attention, Second, Chapter 2 
concentrated on a shorter time-period due to the frequency of analyst recommendation releases. 
Loh (2010) has reported that each firm, on average, releases analyst recommendations six to 
eight times every year. Therefore, concentrating on a shorter event window reduces the effects 
of any confounding events.  
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This chapter found that price reactions are asymmetric for positive and negative revisions to 
analysts’ recommendations. Although, a price drift is observed even after ten days following 
recommendation upgrades. A short term reaction followed by a reversal is observed following 
downgrades. For upgrades, the findings suggested that stocks that enjoy more attention from 
individual investors comparative to institutional investors’ exhibits a subsequent drift. With 
respect to recommendation downgrades, a larger level of attention from individual investors 
lead to an overreaction followed by a significant price reversal. In contrast to Loh (2010), 
Chapter 2 did not indicate that the pat turnover (attention paid by all investors) explains the 
post-revision drift after recommendations. 
Chapter 2 contributed to the past literature by showing a post-revision drift in the period 
immediately following changes to the analysts’ recommendations, which is different from past 
studies that examined price drifts several weeks after the release of the recommendations 
(Barber et al., 2001; Gleason and Lee, 2003; Loh, 2010; Womack, 1996).  
Second, Chapter 2 contributed to the literature by showing an underreaction in the wake of 
recommendation upgrades and an overreaction following downgrades. This is different 
compared to what the prior evidence had indicated, which showed a larger drift (underreaction) 
following downgrades as compared to upgrades (See: Womack, 1996; Barber et al., 2001). 
This asymmetric behaviour is explained by the ‘negativity bias’ reported in the psychology 
literature; generally, negative events have stronger consequences than comparable positive 
events (Baumeister et al., 2001).  
This evidence also indicated that even attentive individual investors may not necessarily 
behave rationally. The findings of this study could be explained by the disposition effect (i.e. 
selling winners after recommendation upgrades) or regret aversion, where investors regret 
errors due to commission (i.e. losses on existing investments after downgrades) more than 
errors due to omission (i.e. foregoing potential gains after upgrades).  
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Overall, this study provides evidence to suggest that investor attention alone may not be enough 
for price discovery after information releases. Along with investor attention, investor 
sophistication plays an important role in establishing an informationally efficient market. 
 
5.3 Analyst Characteristics and Individual Investor Attention 
Chapter 3 examined how analyst characteristics (credibility and extremes), the changes in 
individual investor attention, and the post-revision drift(s) are associated. Sorescu and 
Subramanyam (2006) have stated that extreme but less credible analyst recommendations lead 
to price reversals, whereas less extreme but more credible recommendations lead to price drifts. 
Chapter 3 builds on the work of Sorescu and Subramanyam (2006) by including a measure of 
the change in individual investor attention that links analyst characteristics and the prices of 
securities. This measure of attention change improves the chances of accurately capturing the 
direction of the relationship. Furthermore, Chapter 3 extended previous studies on investors’ 
attention by considering the post-recommendation change in investor attention rather than a 
pre-revision attention measure. 
First, I found that individual investors pay attention to both small revisions by highly credible 
analysts and large changes made by analysts with low credibility. In contrast, institutional 
investors do not pay attention to large changes made by analysts with low credibility. 
Furthermore, individual investors react immediately after highly credible analysts even when 
the issue concerns small revisions. However, they tend to view large revisions by less credible 
analysts with initial scepticism, which is consistent with the findings of Sorescu and 
Subramanyam (2006). The evidence further shows that individual investors rather than 
institutional investors determine the portion of the event-reaction that is consistent with the 
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sign of the recommendation revision. This evidence is consistent with the findings of Kadan et 
al. (2014), who suggested that only individual investors’ trades are in the same direction as the 
recommendation change after the revision has been released.  
Second, I found that individual investors delay their reactions after large changes by less 
credible analysts, which subsequently leads to a post-revision drift. This finding is consistent 
with the notion that investors are initially sceptical after extreme changes by less credible 
analysts, although they react to these revisions after a delay. My results are consistent with the 
conclusions of Sorescu and Subramanaym (2006) for shorter time windows. 
Third, I found that the event-week changes in individual attention results in a larger post-
revision drift, only for the sub-sample of large revisions made by less credible analysts. This 
result is consistent with the notion that individual investors immediately pay attention to large 
upgrades by less credible analysts; however, they are initially sceptical when responding to 
these revisions and exhibit a delayed reaction. This evidence shows that even when the 
credibility of the analysts is low, individual investors are induced to react after a delay.  
Finally, the findings indicated that there is an association between analyst characteristics, the 
change in attention, and the delayed investor return reaction. Individual investors tend to pay 
attention to extreme revisions made by less credible analysts’, which leads to a change in 
individual attention and a subsequent post-revision drift (delayed reaction). However, 
individual investors tend to react immediately after less extreme downgrades by more credible 
analysts, which leads to a strong short term reaction, and a subsequent reversal. These findings 
are also consistent with the notion that individual investors tend to underreact (overreact) after 
positive (negative) analyst revisions, which is consistent with the negative attention bias.  
Overall, the evidence shows that only individual investors pay attention to the “strength 
(extremes)” of the revision even when the “weight (credibility)” is low. However, they 
overreact to the low-strength downgrades when issued by “high-weight” analysts. Taken 
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together, my results are explained by the attention hypothesis proposed by Griffin and Tversky 
(1992) and negative attention bias (Baumeister.et.al, 2001). 
 
5.4 Private information, investor attention and the post-revision Drift 
Chapter 4 examined how the gradual diffusion of private information leads to an investor 
underreaction in the context of analyst recommendation revisions. The study further 
investigated how the degree of investor attention and information asymmetry interacts with the 
diffusion of private information. The study differs from Barber et al (2001), Altinkilic and 
Hansen (2009), and Loh (2010), because they did not account for the degree of private 
information. Kadan et al. (2014) showed that individual investor trading in response to private 
information leads to a post-revision drift, using abnormal returns as a measure of private 
information content. I examine this association using two precise measures of private 
information, namely a firm-matched abnormal return and the abnormal return matched to the 
industry (Babenko.et.al, 2012). In firm-matched abnormal returns, I ensure that stocks with 
analyst recommendations are compared with similar firms with no analyst recommendations 
released on the same day. When the recommended firms are matched with the non-
recommended firms, my measure improves the chances of capturing the degree of private 
information precisely. 
First, I found a positive association between the degree of private information and the post-
revision drift, showing that a larger amount of private information diffuses over a longer period 
of time (Hong and Stein, 2007). Furthermore, private information diffuses at a slower rate after 
upgrades than after downgrades. This finding indicates that investors’ reaction to new negative 
(positive) private information is stronger (weaker). This evidence is consistent with investors 
exhibiting the negative attention behavioural bias.  
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Second, I found that the private information diffusion is slower in the presence of increased 
individual investors’ attention. This notion is consistent with individual investors exhibiting 
more attention related behavioural biases when paying attention and responding to new private 
information. The evidence in Chapter 4 is consistent with the findings of Hacamo and Reyes 
(2012), Hirshleifer et al. (2011), and Kadan et al. (2014). 
Third, the evidence suggests that the impact of information asymmetry is stronger/weaker for 
upgrades/downgrades because investors consider the worst-case scenario when reacting to the 
news (Epstein and Schneider, 2008). Under conditions of information asymmetry, investors 
appear to respond to negative private information strongly assuming that the reliability of the 
negative signal is high (worst-case scenario) (also see Zhou, 2015). In the presence of high 
information asymmetry and high individual investors’ attention, there is an even slower 
diffusion of private information after upgrades. However, there is no such evidence for 
downgrades. 
I also found that the rate of private information diffusion is slower during times with a high 
degree of uncertainty and that positive/negative private information diffuses more slowly/more 
quickly during recessionary periods/non-recessionary periods, which is consistent with the 
findings of Veronesi (1999).  
In Chapters 2, 3, and 4, I found that individual investors’ behaviour is the overarching factor 
for the post-analyst-revision drift. The findings show that even when individual investors are 
paying attention, they tend to behave irrationally. While most previous studies consider 
investor inattention, the evidence presented in this dissertation introduces investor 
sophistication also as a major contributing factor to underreaction and the post-revision drift. 
The evidence also indicates that it is mainly individual investors who tend to exhibit 
behavioural tendencies when recognising the extremeness and credibility of information. The 
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evidence suggests that only individual investors tend to exhibit a reaction (though delayed) to 
extreme revisions by less credible analysts. Hence, the underreaction after revisions is partly 
explained by individual investors’ responses to the extreme but less credible revisions. I also 
found that the gradual diffusion of the private information contained in the recommendation 
revision is a contributing factor to the post-revision drift. I found that a larger degree of private 
information is positively associated with the post-revision drift, which is consistent with the 
notion that private information diffusion leads to underreaction. The slower diffusion of private 
information is complimented by the degree of information asymmetry and the behavioural 
tendencies of individual investors. Throughout the studies, I also found that individual 
investors exhibit a tendency to respond strongly to negative as opposed to positive events, 
consistent with negative attention bias (Baumeister et al., 2001), which results in an 
underreaction after positive events.  
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